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Abstract 
This dissertation describes the application of formal methods to the development 
of operating systems. A related area of software engineering-the development of 
protocols-has been improved substantially by the application of formal methods. The 
essential behaviour of a protocol can be checked for correctness by using a verification 
system. A model of a protocol is developed to capture its most essential characteristics. 
This model is then checked automatically for correctness properties which are specified 
as temporal logic formulae. 
One of the most successful verification techniques is known as model checking. It is 
a state exploration technique, each state being the values assigned to every variable 
in a protocol model at a given instant. Although protocols of realistic size generate 
millions of states, it is possible to check important correctness properties in minutes 
on a typical workstation. 
Broadly speaking, protocols and operating systems are similar in the sense that they 
are reactive systems. Such systems are designed to interact continually with their en-
vironments and usually involve concurrent processing. However, there are important 
differences between protocols and operating systems. For example, in protocol verifica-
tion, the focus is on the transmission rules. Data can be represented more abstractly. 
For operating systems, this is not so. Data structures (such as a scheduler queue) 
represent the internal state of the system and must be represented in more detail. 
To verify a complete operating system is a formidable task. A manageable first step 
was to select one important component and to investigate the feasibility of applying 
formal methods to its development. A component that is a basic building block of 
many modern operating systems is a microkernel. It implements the fundamental 
abstractions which support the rest of the system. 
Instead of using an existing verification system, an experimental verification system 
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was developed to verify the microkernel. This was done primarily to learn about the 
techniques involved, but the insight gained about the practical limits of the verification 
process also helped the the modelling process. Since it was known from the start that 
the representation of data is important, special care was necessary to store states as 
compactly as possible. 
This case study suggests that the designers of future operating systems can benefit 
from the use of formal methods. More important than the verification of a specific 
microkernel is the general approach, which could be used to verify similar systems. 
The experience gained from this case study is presented as a list of guidelines to reduce 
the number of states generated. However, many problems remain and these are pointed 
out as topics' for future research. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie verhandeling beskryf die toepassing van formele metodes om bedryfstelsels te 
ontwikkel. 'n Verwante gebied~die ontwikkeling van protokolle-is reeds beduidend 
verbeter deur die gebruik van formele metodes. Die basiese gedrag van 'n protokol kan 
nagegaan word vir korrektheid deur, 'n verikasiestelsel te gebruik. 'n Model van 'n pro-
tokol word ontwikkel om die belangrikste gedragspatrone vas te yang. Die model word 
dan outomaties analiseer om sekere korrektheidseienskappe na te gaan wat gespesifiseer 
word as formules intemporal logika. 
Een van die mees suksesvolle verifikasietegnieke staan bekend as modeltoetsing ( "model 
checking"). Die tegniek behels 'n soektog waar toestande sistematies ondersoek word. 
Elke toestand is die gesamentlike waardes wat toegewys is aan elke veranderlike van 'n 
modelop 'n gegewe tydstip. Alhoewel protokolle van realistiese grootte miljoene state 
kan genereer, is dit moontlik om belangrike korrektheidseinskappe na te gaan in enkele 
minute op 'n tipiese persoonlike rekenaar. 
Breedweg is protokolle en bedryfstelsels soortgelyk in die sin dat beide reaktiewe stelsels 
is. Sulke stelsels word ontwerp vir kontinue interaksie met hulle omgewings en behels 
gewoonlik gelyklopende verwerking. Nogtans is daar belangrike verskille tussen pro-
tokolle en bedryfstelsels. Byvoorbeeld, in die verifikasie van protokolle is die klem op 
transmissiereels. Data kan meer abstrak voorgestel word. Vir bedryfstelsels is dit nle 
so nie. Datastrukture (soos 'n skeduleerdertou) verteenwoordig die interne toestand 
van die stelsel en moet in meer detail voorgestel word. 
Om 'n volledige bedryfstelsel te verifieer is 'n geweldige taak. As 'n hanteerbare eerste 
stap is een belangrike komponent geselekteer. Die doel was om vas te stel of dit 
haalbaar sou wees om formele metodes te gebruik om so 'n komponent te ontwikkel. 'n 
Mikrokern is 'n 'n basiese boublok van baie moderne bedryfstelsels. Dit implementeer 
die fundamentele abstraksies wat die res van die stelsel ondersteun. 
v 
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In plaas daarvan om 'n bestaande verifikasiestelsel te gebruik, is 'n eksperimentele 
stelsel ontwikkel om die mikrokern te verifieer. Dit is gedoen hoofsaaklik om meer te 
leer van die betrokke tegnieke, maar die insig wat bekom is aangaande die praktiese 
beperkings van die verifikasieproses het ook gehelp tydens modellering. Omdat dit 
bekend was dat die voorstelling van data belangrik is, is spesiale aandag geskenk aan 
die kompakte voorstelling van toestande. 
Die gevallestudie toon aan dat die ontwerpers van toekomstige bedryfstelsels voordeel 
kan trek uit die gebruik vanformele metodes. Belangriker as die verifikasie van 'n 
spesifieke mikrokern, is die algemene benadering wat moontlik aangewend kan word om 
soortgelyke stelsels te verifieer. Die ondervinding wat opgedoen is tydens die projek 
word aangebied as 'n lys van riglyne om die aantal toestande wat genereer word te 
verminder. Heelwat probleme bly nog oor en word uitgewys as onderwerpe vir verdere 
navorsing. 
VI 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The development of a reliable operating system is a challenging undertaking. A sub-
stantial amount of effort is required to design, implement and test such a complex 
software system. A major problem is that many design errors will only show up later 
during testing. Even then, testing alone presents no guarantee that all errors have been 
eliminated. To address this problem, computer-aided verification tech:p.iques are being 
developed to pinpoint errors as early as possible-at the design stage. 
A convincing demonstration of the benefits obtainable from formal verification tech-
niques can be found in the field of protocol engineering. Protocols of practical size 
and complexity can be checked automatically to find subtle design errors. A modelling 
language is used to develop models that capture the-essential characteristics of a pro-
tocol and a verification system is then used to confirm that such models satisfy various 
correctness claims. It is a new challenge to apply such techniques to operating systems. 
It is my thesis that the ever increasing demand$ placed on the reliability of operating 
system software can and will be met by the use of computer-aided formal verification 
techniques. 
To support my thesis, I made the following contributions: 
• I demonstrated that the design of a non-trivial microkernel-one of the more 
complex building blocks of an operating system-could be verified to show that 
it satisfies formally specified correctness claims . 
• I showed how a microkernel can be designed to allow separate verification of its 
principle components. The challenge was to do this without making the kernel 
1 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2 
grossly inefficient. Such a design strategy is essential, because a monolithic design 
would be beyond the capabilities of currently available verification techniques . 
• As part of the experiment, a practical verifier and a suitable modelling language 
were developed . 
• Since the verification of a particular microkernel is not of much general interest, 
the experience gained during the project is presented as a set of design rules to 
serve as guidelines in similar application areas. 
1.1 Overview 
In what follows, I explain in detail how a microkernel was designed and verified. A 
microkernel is an example of a reactive program. Such programs continually interact 
with their environments and do not compute a final result on termination. The de-
velopment of reactive programs is considered to be particularly challenging because 
such programs must be designed to respond to events that may occur at unpredictable 
times. Moreover, such programs usually involve concurrency. This means that exe-
cution sequences that lead to error states are hard to reproduce, which makes testing 
difficult. In fact, verification is considered essential because the kind of errors usually 
found in such designs are often of an extremely subtle nature. 
Although research in protocol engineering offers much inspiration and useful guidelines, 
operating systems present a different and new challenge. It seems feasible to use formal 
verification techniques to develop fundamental components and then combine these 
"trusted building blocks" to create reliable systems. Although this strategy seems 
attractive, a simple-minded combination of reliable components does not necessarily 
lead to a reliable whole. For example, a system may deadlock even whenits components 
are all deadlock free. A complex design should therefore be studied at various levels of 
abstraction to analyse all possible patterns of interaction. 
Chapter 2 provides some background on microkernels in general and the specific mi-
crokernel that was developed as a case study. A microkernel controls the hardware, 
providing basic memory management, processor management, interrupt handling, in-
terprocess communication and sometimes drivers for peripheral devices. Microkernels 
can b~ reused to support different operating systems and this alone seems to justify 
the investment of extra effort in their development. In addition, a microkernel should 
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be highly reliable because it forms the foundation that supports everything else. 
Chapter 3 presents a selective overview of various protocol verification techniques. 
Against this background, the problems associated with verifying a microkernel stand 
out. The main challenge was to devise a compact representation technique to allow 
verification of the complex data structures encountered in microkernels. 
In Chapter 4 the main issues involved in designing a computer-aided verification system 
are discussed. Two notations are needed: a modelling language to describe systems, 
and a temporal logic to describe correctness claims about the systems being modelled. 
An efficient verification algorithm is used to check whether a given correctness claim is 
satisfied by a model. 
Chapter 5 describes the main experimental tool: a verification system for ESML-a 
modelling language designed with microkernels in mind. The temporal logic CTL was 
adopted to specify correctness requirements as part of the experiment. It turned out 
that the logic LTL would have been a better choice because verification algorithms for 
CTL require a substantial amount of memory. The selection of the specific verifica-
tion algorithms used in the verifier is motivated and areas are pointed out where the 
implementation could be improved. Some performance measurements are included to 
indicate the application limits of the new tool. The motivation for developing a new 
verifier was mainly to gain experience of the practical limits of different techniques. 
This provided the kind of insight needed to evaluate the practicality of computer-aided 
verification techniques. 
Chapter 6 contains the major new results: various· techniques are proposed to provide 
a formal development strategy, not only for microkernels, but also for similar operating 
system components. The main idea is to design complex reactive systems as a set of in-
teracting servers. The advantage is that servers can be isolated and verified separately 
by providing drivers and stubs to replace their more detailed counterparts. These tech-
niques were applied step by step to develop verified models of a non-trivial microkernel. 
It is explained how a microkernel can be designed as such a set of interacting servers. 
Chapter 7 is retrospective and presents the experience gained during the experiment. 
General guidelines are given that may help to simplify the development of similar 
reactive systems. However, some problems remain and these are pointed out as topics 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Microkernels 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to microkernels in general, followed by an 
overview of the specific micro kernel that was developed as a case study. This back-
ground is essential to draw up a list of requirements to be met by a suitable verification 
system. 
2.1 What is a microkernel? 
A microkernel is an intricate piece of software that implements the most basic func-
tionality of an operating system. It provides only those services that are difficult or 
expensive to implement otherwise. As explained by Tanenbaum, these services in-
clude basic memory management, process management, interprocess communication 
and sometimes device drivers [66]. The rest of the functionality of a microkernel-based 
operating system is provided by server processes running in user space. 
The advantages of designing operating systems around a suitable microkernel have been 
illustrated in various research environments [13, 62, 38, 68, 67]. In older monolithic 
operating systems all services were linked together. This means that services like device 
drivers cannot be removed or replaced without stopping the system. Some more recent 
systems (like Linux, FreeBSD and Windows NT) allow device drivers to be loaded 
at run time. Microkernel-based systems are even more flexible. A service is defined 
by its interface and new services can be added while the system is running. This 
allows a system to evolve naturally as older components are systematically replaced by 
improved versions. By hiding hardware-specific code inside a microkernel, the bulk of 
4 
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CHAPTER 2. MICROKERNELS 5 
an operating system can be made highly portable. Moreover, a microkernel presents a 
well-defined model of the hardware to an operating system designer who is encouraged 
to think in terms of abstract concepts instead of hardware-specific detail. Well-chosen 
abstractions can be guaranteed to satisfy a set of correctness properties. Abstraction 
forms the basis of modularisation, without which reliability is almost unattainable. A 
microkernel therefore creates a framework for the design of reliable operating systems 
composed of specialised interacting components. 
The main abstractions created by a microkernel are processes and communication chan-
nels. Because it supports communication channels between interacting processes, a mi-
crokernel has been called a "software backplane" [23]. Unbuffered synchronous (block-
ing) message passing is the preferred method of interprocess communication because 
this allows particularly simple and efficient implementations. Debugging can be simpli-
fied by keeping each process in a separate address space. Unfortunately this slows down 
interprocess communication because of the inherent overhead of moving data from one 
address space to another. Many microkernels therefore allow several processes to share 
the same address space. This allows data to be exchanged via shared memory. Such 
"multi-threaded" servers are efficient, but are more difficult to debug. 
2.2 A case study: the Gneiss microkernel 
A design that is divided into a number of clearly defined subsystems with simple inter-
faces is simpler to verify than a monolithic design. This is so because an abstract model 
can be used to study the interaction of the different subsystems and more detailed mod-
els can be used to study each subsystem on its own. The reachable state space for a 
monolithic design that includes a reasonable amount of detail can be enormous. 
It was therefore considered essential to have full control over the design of the micro-
kernel to be used as a case study .. Attempting to verify some well-known microkernel 
(without modifying it) was considered too ambitious, although such a project would 
probably be of more interest to the operating systems community. It was decided 
to concentrate on correctness and to rely on well-known concepts found in efficient 
microkernel-based systems such as Amoeba [55, 70, 54] and V [13, 11, 12]. 
The Gneiss microkernel was selected as a case study. A first version of the kernel was 
designed by the author [30]. The kernel was later rewritten in Oberon while keeping 
verification firmly in mind. The original design was retained, however. The basic ideas 
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client server client 
microkernel micro kernel 
II IPC II 
Figure 1: Distributed system based on the Gneiss niicrokernel 
incorporated in the Gneiss kernel are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Two physical machines are shown, each running a copy of the kernel. The physical 
machines are connected via a standard local area network to create a distributed ar-
chitecture. The key abstractions created and managed by the Gneiss kernel are virtual 
machines (VMs), processes, and ports. The physical machine on the left of Figure 1 
supports two virtual machines (VMs), one implementing a client application and the 
other a server. The physical machine on the right supports a single VM which runs a 
client application. Each VM has a separate protected address space and can execute 
one or more processes that may communicate via ports or shared memory. VMs and 
processes are scheduled by the kernel. The idea is that each VM will support a single 
well-defined component of an operating system. A VM may support several cooperat-
ing processes, all sharing the same address space. A process can be created about ten 
times faster than a VM and shared memory techniques may be used when necessary 
to increase the speed of interprocess communication within the same VM. Processes 
sharing the same address space are called "light-weight" processes to distinguish them 
from "heavy-weight" processes found in traditional systems such as Unix. In other 
systems, light-weight processes are sometimes called "threads". 
2.2.1 Design Overview 
An informal overview of the Gneiss kernel is presented here. The detail is left until 
Chapter 6 where models of different kernel components are described. These models 
are verified to show that they satisfy certain correctness claims. The verified models 
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can be found in Appendix A. 
To help maintain system integrity, the kernel prevents one VM from accessing the 
address space of another. This makes it impossible for any VM to accidentally (or 
maliciously) modify the memory area of another. Hardware support for memory pro-
tection helps to guarantee this. VMs and processes are represented in the kernel by 
records that are used to store their current state. VMs that can be activated await 
their turn in a number of queues, one for each priority level. Each VM record has an 
associated queue of process records (the VM's process queue) to represent the processes 
that are ready to run. 
The scheduler selects the highest priority VM and activates the first process in its 
process queue. VMs are time-sliced, but a process is allowed to run until it invokes 
an interprocess communication (IPC) operation or a higher-priority VM becomes exe-
cutable. When a specific VM is suspended because something more important demands 
attention, it is guaranteed that the interrupted process will be resumed immediately 
when the VM is reactivated later. In other words, processes supported by each VM are 
executed non-preemptively. The only way to switch from one process to another in the 
same VM is to execute a kernel call. This ensures that when a process updates a shared 
data structure, no other process can interfere. No other synchronising primitives such 
as semaphores or condition variables are needed. 
Processes in different VMs can only communicate by executing kernel calls. There are 
only three IPC primitives. A server process executes a ReceiveRequest to wait for a 
request message. A client issues a request by executing a Transaction primitive. After 
receiving a message, a server proceeds to deliver the requested service. The client 
process is blocked until the server executes a SendReply to return the result of the 
requested operation. Processes are not addressed directly; ports are used to provide an 
extra level of indirection. A timeout mechanism ensures that all transactions terminate 
eventually-either successfully or not. A status code is returned to indicate the outcome 
of each request. 
Peripheral devices are controlled by kernel-resident servers with specific reserved ports. 
To issue a request to a peripheral device, a client process executes a Transaction op-
eration on the port associated with the appropriate device driver. A request queue 
may be maintained by a device driver in the form of a linked list of client processes 
waiting for requests to be completed. On completion of a peripheral operation (when 
the completion interrupt arrives), the waiting client process is activated by returning 
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its process record to the scheduler. The next peripheral operation in the request queue 
(if one is available) is started immediately and then the scheduler is invoked to select 
a new process to activate. 
It can thus be seen that interrupt handling, process scheduling and message passing 
are intertwined. Fortunately, this need not concern a programmer at the VM level who 
is presented with a well-defined abstract machine that is much easier to program than 
the underlying physical machine. To summarise, a VM is an abstract machine with 
the following properties: 
• It has a separate protected address space which encapsulates code and data. 
• A VM executes one or more processes that share the same address space. 
• Processes interact by executing three primitive IPC operations: Transaction, 
ReceiveRequest and SendReply. A valid port must be specified with each IPC 
operation. Processes in the same VM may communicate via shared memory 
where speed is crucial. 
• A VM allows only one process to execute at a time. A process switch may occur 
only when an IPC primitive is executed. 
2.3 Verifying a microkernel 
A model of a system is verified by proving that it satisfies certain formally stated 
correctness criteria. It is desirable (and probably less expensive) to develop models of 
a system with the goal of detecting errors before any implementation code is produced. 
However, although many errors of a purely logical nature can be eliminated through 
verification of a design, the devil can still hide in the details. When a verified model is 
translated into an implementation, errors may be introduced. For example, certain low-
level operations that interact with the hardware are required in an operating system. 
The nature of such operations is usually simple, but the wrong bit may be specified, 
for example, or the initialisation sequence for a controller card may be incorrect. In 
a model the detail of such low-level operations is suppressed by representing then 
as simple atomic events. In practice each such low-level operation should be tested 
on its own. Fortunately, it is fairly simple to isolate and correct such coding errors. 
A systematic approach should be followed though to ensure that all such low-level 
operations are tested. 
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To verify a microkernel, two separate formal descriptions are essential: a specification of 
the kernel's intended behaviour, and a description of various correctness requirements. 
Two different notations are needed: a modelling language to describe the intended 
behaviour of the kernel, and a notation that allows various correctness claims to be 
expressed concisely. A model of a system is an executable abstract program while a 
correctness claim is usually a formula expressed in a suitable temporal logic. 
2.3.1 Behavioural Specifications 
A number of modelling languages have been developed that are loosely based on the 
principles ofCSP [41]. The complexity ofa verifier is influenced by various properties 
of the modelling language. Instead of implementing a plethora of specialised concepts, 
the goal should be to find a small number of general constructs that can be used to 
model most implementations in a natural way. The following concepts are especially 
useful: 
• Concurrency. An intrinsic property of reactive systems is that a number of 
processes are executed concurrently. A process oriented language therefore forms 
a natural framework for expressing concurrent execution. The interleaving model 
of concurrency-where only one process may execute a basic atomic operation 
at a time-has been accepted widely as a basis for verification systems. A good 
explanation of how concurrent systems can be modelled by using interleaving 
can be found in [52]. SPIN is a well-known verification tool that is based on 
interleaving of the actions of concurrent processes [44]. The choice of which 
process to select when there are alternatives, raises the issue of fairness, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Concurrent systems can be designed in two different ways: 
based on shared memory and based on message passing [2]. Both approaches can 
be modelled using a process oriented modelling language. Processes are also 
useful in other ways. No procedures and functions are strictly necessary since 
these can be modelled as processes. Even objects (in a limited sense) may be 
modelled as processes. 
• Messages. It was decided to accept the principles of CSP as a design framework. 
This means that processes exchange data through unbuffered, synchronous mes-
sage passing. The management of buffer spaces presents an additional problem to 
the kernel designer and as illustrated by the V microkernel synchronous message 
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passing can be quite efficient [11]. 
• N ondeterminism. This is a fundamental concept that is useful in a modelling 
language. Nondeterminism, especially as part of control structures such as alter-
native commands, is useful to suppress irrelevant detail. 
• Interfaces. At the highest level, the structure of a design is determined by the 
way its various processes interact. This is reflected by the interfaces between 
processes. Channels are provided by CSP to define interfaces between processes 
and this should be accommodated by the modelling language. In addition, the 
messages that may be transmitted over every channel should be defined explicitly. 
This facility enables a compiler to detect many design errors at an early stage of 
development. 
• Strong typing. Compile-time type checks are valuable for the development of 
reliable software. Serious attention to the definition of fundamental types in a 
system usually pays off at a later stage by improving clarity. Carelessness in this 
regard soon leads to awkward type conversions in the code. It therefore seems 
worthwhile to do it right from the start by insisting that the modelling language 
should be strongly typed. This allows type conflicts to be detected in the least 
expensive way: before any implementation code is written. 
Above all, the modelling language should be designed to make efficient, automatic 
verification possible. At the same time, it should be close enough to a modern imple-
mentation language to make the implementation task fairly mechanical. In fact, auto-
matic generation of (some) implementations should be possible. The notation should 
be readable and natural to allow one to focus on concepts rather than distracting detail. 
At the start of this project, it was unknown whether a special modelling language 
and verifier would be required to verify a microkernel or operating systems in general. 
However, it was clear that the representation of rather complex data would have to be 
addressed because the behaviour of a microkernel is governed by internal data structures 
that must be modelled in some detail. The most basic data structuring concept that can 
be included in a modelling language is arrays-a useful device for modelling tables and 
other mappings. However, reactive systems like a inicrokernel include data structures 
that are awkward to model as arrays. A scheduler queue is a good example. The 
behaviour of a scheduler depends on a queue of process records. To model queues as 
arrays requires explicit index manipulation and modulo arithmetic. A more abstract 
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structuring concept is clearly needed. Sequences form part of specification languages 
such as Z [64] and can model queues and stacks in a natural way. To model process 
records (that may contain fields of different types) record structures are needed. It was 
therefore decided to include arrays, sequences and records. The design of a verifier is 
affected by these data structuring facilities. Data must be represented as compactly 
as possible to avoid an explosion in the size of states. Furthermore, such compaction 
must not be prohibitively expensive in terms of processing time. 
Fortunately, microkernels do not need the sophisticated communication techniques sup-
ported by some protocol verifiers. Since buffered message passing is not needed, chan-
nels are not part of the global system state. This accounts for a significant reduction 
in state size. 
2.3.2 Correctness requirements 
Correctness claims to be verified must be expressed in a formal notation. Temporal 
logic is usually used for this purpose and the properties that can be specified depend 
on the logic. The verification problem is only tractable for suitably restricted temporal 
logics and therefore only certain relatively simple properties can be verified efficiently 
for large models. 
Fortunately, even the simplest correctness checks are valuable. Freedom from deadlock 
is such a property that is straightforward to check. The cause of a deadlock is often a 
structural clash in the synchronisation skeleton of a design and this should be corrected 
as soon as possible. Therefore freedom from deadlock should be verified at an early 
stage. Only a rather abstract model of the entire system is needed to detect deadlocks 
that may easily go undetected otherwise. It is preferable to start with such an abstract 
model to arrive at a skeletal design for the entire system that is free from deadlock. The 
alternative bottom-up approach-to develop detailed subsystems and integrate them 
later-often leads to structural clash. 
Freedom from deadlock is an example of a system invariant-a property that should 
never be violated. Any reactive system should maintain certain invariants. An invariant 
property is true after initialisation and is supposed to remain true thereafter. Another 
example is proper buffer management. During overload conditions buffer space may 
be depleted and some mechanism should be provided to handle such situations. In 
general, inspection of a design cannot determine reliably whether such mechanisms 
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will function as intended. Unfortunately such errors often occur in practice and seldom 
reveal themselves until a system has been in use for some time. Verification can be 
used to eliminate such errors as early as possible--at the design stage. The class of 
so-called invariant properties are expressed in the form "it will always be the case that 
P holds" , P being a function that can be evaluated in every state of a model. 
The verification models considered in this dissertation consist of two components: a 
system model and a model of its environment. Another class of correctness properties 
known as response properties is particularly relevant to such models. If the interface 
between the system model and its environment is defined precisely, it is possible to show 
that the system model will respond to all external events caused by its environment in 
the intended way. In the case of the Gneiss microkernel this interface was deliberately 
designed to be as simple as possible. Three kernel calls and hardware interrupts are 
the only possible external events. An important property to verify is therefore that the 
kernel model always responds correctly to kernel calls and interrupts. Such properties 
are expressed in the form "if event el happens then event e2 will eventually happen" . 
A third kind of property that can be verified efficiently is called precedence properties. 
The idea is to prove that event el will always happen before e2. Precedence prop-
erties can be expressed in different ways, with subtle differences, but a useful format 
is "condition Cl will hold until condition c2becomes true". For example, it may be 
important to verify that if a message is received it will not be discarded until it has 
been processed. This can be expressed as a precedence property. 
Even if the interface between a microkernel and its environment is simple, a huge 
number of internal actions are possible, especially if the kernel is designed to be in-
terruptible. Fortunately, a microkernel can be divided into subsystems that can be 
modelled separately. In the presence of concurrency, the interaction between differ-
ent components is a common source of subtle design errors. More detailed models 
of the process management policy, interprocess communication and device drivers are 
essential foverify these mechanisms. 
Process management includes scheduling. A set of rules are encoded in the scheduler 
model to determine the next process to run. If the rules are wrong the scheduling policy 
may be violated. This may allow the system to work, although inefficiently. Verification 
techniques can detect this kind of error when a scheduler is designed. Interprocess 
communication in a microkernel can be modelled as a protocol. Properties that can 
be verified are typical for protocols. Device drivers are cyclic routines that interact 
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closely with the hardware that controls peripheral devices, the interrupt system and 
the scheduler. It would be valuable to verify that every request is eventually satisfied, 
that no interrupts are ignored forever and that requests are serviced in the intended 
order. 
2.3.3 Characteristics of a suitable verifier 
The kind of verification system needed to verify a micro kernel depends on the func-
tionality of the kernel and the kind of correctness claims to be checked. Building a 
detailed model of a complete microkernel does not make sense for the following reason: 
a microkernel is a complex piece of software and should be designed by dividing it into 
functionally coherent components that can be modelled separately. It is natural to 
develop an abstract representation of the kernel's structure and more detailed models 
of every subsystem. An abstract model of the complete kernel is useful to determine 
an efficient structure and the models of subsystems can be detailed enough to serve as 
blueprints for coding. However, this approach leaves the designer with an important 
but non-trivial problem to solve. It must be possible to analyse every submodel on 
its own and then combine the verified submodels, knowing that the sum of the parts 
will constitute a correctly functioning whole. To ensure that the various submodels 
fit together, a formal compositional technique is essential, based on a suitable formal 
structure. 
Considering the kind of structures found in a micro kernel, the verification system should 
be designed to cope with the following: 
• It must be able to handle complex data structures such as arbitrary combinations 
of arrays, records and sequences. This means larger states. To avoid using an 
excessive amount of memory, effective state compaction techniques are required. 
Compile time compaction techniques should be used wherever possible, because 
run time compaction is expensive. 
• The average number of states processed per second determines the size of model 
that can be analysed in an acceptable time. Suitably detailed models to serve as 
guidelines for coding invariably generate huge state spaces. Efficiency is therefore 
important. 
• When a verification run detects an error, a facility is needed to help the designer 
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to find the problem. Both an interactive simulator and a tool to inspect error 
trails are useful. 
• Some form of fairness should be supported to avoid reporting "artificial" errors 
caused by cycling continuously through the same states when an alternative ex-
ecution path exists. 
• A verifier is a complex program that can contain errors. There are two pos-
sibilities: a model may be rejected erroneously or it may be accepted when it 
contains an error. The second possibility is more troublesome. Although verifiers 
are sequential programs similar to compilers or interpreters, current verifiers are 
not yet as well-structured and reliable as the best compilers. More research is 
required to compare different ways of structuring a verifier to improve efficiency 
and reliability. 
• Depending on how many states are generated, special techniques may be needed 
to. reduce the state explosion. There are several options: partial order tech-
niques [46, 35, 37] restrict the search by avoiding execution paths that cannot 
influence the results. For really large models, controlled partial search tech-
niques [43, 44] can be used. Alternatively, techniques based on binary decision 
diagrams [9] have been reported to yield impressive results for some very large 
models by storing states implicitly rather than explicitly. 
2.4 Summary: project goals 
To illustrate that computer-aided verification techniques can be useful for developing 
operating system software such as a microkernel, the following goals were set: 
..'!'he selection or development of a specification language that allows description 
of the behaviour of a microkernel. It should be possible to model the design of the 
kernel in sufficient detail to serve as an outline for an efficient implementation. 
• Selection or development of a formal notation to specify correctness properties 
that should be satisfied by the kernel model. A successful notation would be a 
compromise: it should be expressive enough to specify important kernel prop-
erties, but not overly complex, because that would make efficient verification 
impossible. 
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• A verifier should be selected or developed that can check automatically whether 
a design satisfies the stated correctness criteria. 
• Models at various levels of abstraction should be developed of a practical micro-
kernel. These models should be verified to satisfy important correctness criteria. 
• A running version of the kernel should be produced and shown to conform to the 
verified models. 
• The experience gained during the project should be summarised in the form of 
a set of guidelines. This may serve as a starting point for other developments in 
related fields. 
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Automated verification 
This chapter presents a selected overview of computer-aided verification. The intention 
is not to cover all literature on the subject, but rather to provide a brief overview of 
research that led directly to the techniques presented in this dissertation. 
Broadly speaking, most computer-aided verification systems are based on either au-
tomated theorem proving or state exploration. A· theorem prover can be used to 
check non-trivial correctness properties of system designs. Expert knowledge is needed 
though. Even the most advanced theorem provers currently available require a con-
siderable amount of user interaction. Non-trivial problems must be divided into sub-
problems that are manageable and a substantial amount of effort is often required to 
find the "right approach". Theorem provers also do not assist designers to pinpoint 
errors in incorrect designs. It would therefore be difficult to persuade most designers 
of reactive systems to use a theorem prover to check designs for correctness. 
Fortunately, verification tools based on state exploration are easier to use. These tools 
require no user interaction and can detect many commonly occurring errors in system 
designs. Although the size of systems that can be analysed is limited (realistic designs 
usually generate a huge number of states), substantial progress has been made to reduce 
the impact of this so-called state explosion problem. Currently a few million states can 
be analysed in minutes. 
The rest of this chapter is about state exploration. Section 3.1 provides a brief overview 
of reachability analysis techniques. Section 3.2 presents the idea of model checking that 
was introduced by Clarke and Emerson. By combining techniques from reachability 
16 
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analysis and model checking, more powerful verification techniques have been devel-
oped. A selection of these techniques are described in Section 3.3. Finally, by compar-
ing different options, the strategy that was selected to verify the Gneiss microkernel is 
motivated in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Reachability analysis 
Work on automated protocol verification started in the late seventies. A compact his-
torical overview can be found in Chapter 11 (bibliographic notes) of [44]. The original 
idea was t~ apply reachability analysis to check a protocol against a list of commonly 
occurring errors. The properties to be verified were formulated as reachability asser-
tions. At first all unique states were stored in memory, but it was soon realised that 
larger protocols could be analysed by generating states dynamically during a depth-first 
search process. A depth-first search is better than a breadth-first search because less 
memory is required. This is so because the depth of a model's execution tree tends to 
increase much slower than its width as new states are generated. Unfortunately it is 
not enough to store only the current path because an excessive amount of unnecessary 
work will have to be done. To prevent this, more memory is needed to store all unique 
states as they are generated. The idea is to detect revisited states as will be explained 
in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1). It follows that the practical limit of a full state space search 
is determined by the amount of memory that is available. 
There are basically two ways to tackle larger models: (1) a limited amount of wo~k can 
be repeated by discarding some of the states stored, or (2) some execution sequences 
can be truncated. The first option is to store all unique states in a cache and to discard 
some states as the cache fills up. Up to a point, this works reasonably well, but it 
is difficult to decide which states should be discarded to make room for new states. 
If states that have been discarded are revisited, the runtime increases. This can be 
tolerated to a certain extent, but to handle really large models the second option is 
currently the only viable alternative. Obviously, this means that some errors may be 
missed. A controlled partial search means that we can decide which states to ignore. 
Various techniques have been investigated, such as setting a depth bound on the stack 
or favouring transitions that are likely to lead to error states. It is difficult, however, 
to find guidelines that will work well in general. 
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3.2 Model checking 
In the early eighties Clarke and Emerson first used the term model checking [14, 15] 
to denote an automatic verification technique (based on state exploration) that uses 
temporal logic to allow greater flexibility in specifying correctness claims. The global 
state graph of a system (representing a Kripke structure-a model) is explored to check 
whether it satisfies a given temporal logic formula that represents a correctness claim. 
The advantage is that a verification system that is based on model checking enables 
a user to verify any correctness claim expressible by the chosen temporal logic. The 
ad hoc methods previously used in protocol verification systems to express correctness 
claims were therefore no longer needed, at least in principle. However, the earliest 
model checking systems were severely limited in their capability to explore large state 
spaces. 
At about the same time Quielle and Sifakis independently developed.a similar ver-
ification technique, although it was not called model checking [60, 61]. Both these 
techniques were implemented using CSP to specify behaviour. Both used branching 
time temporal logic to specify correctness claims. The issue of fairness in the under-
lying transition systems was treated differently though. Clarke and Emerson defined 
a fair version of CTL (Computation Tree Logic )-their chosen temporal logic-that 
restricted the temporal operators of CTL to range over fair paths. Queille and Sifakis 
took a different approach to fairness by using special temporal operators to indicate 
conditions that should hold along fair paths. Since these early beginnings, CTL was 
studied extensively. The logic combines linear time and branching time operators and 
was designed to express an important class of correctness claims while allowing efficient 
verification. Linear time operators are quantifiers over states along a given execution 
path, while branching time operators quantify over paths. 
The time required to verify a temporal logic formula depends on the number of reach-
able states and the formula size (the number of operators contained in the formula). For 
CTL the time complexity of the model checking algorithm is linear in both the size of 
the state space and the formula size. For other less restrictive logics, model checking is 
more expensive in general. For example, the well-known logic LTL (developed from the 
logic DX described in [58]) requires time linear in the state space size, but exponential 
in the size of the formula. However, in practice this exponential blowup is not too im-
portant because typical correctness claims are expressible as LTL formulae that contain 
only a few operators. Whether linear time or branching time is best [49, 59, 25, 27] has 
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not been resolved yet. Emerson and Lei pointed out that the question is not whether 
linear or branching time is best, but which modalities to use [27]. However, the issue 
remains controversial. It is often argued that most correctness claims can be expressed 
as linear time formulae and that path quantifiers are not needed. However, cases exist 
where a branching time approach has merit. For example, a branching time formula 
is needed to specify that a reactive system can recover from failures. Such a formula 
would state that along all paths, in every state, a path exists that leads to the initial 
state. 
3.3 Towards practical verifiers 
The early model checkers could not verify systems of practical size, the main problem 
being that the entire state space was stored in main memory. To address this problem, 
the better developed techniques of pure reachability analysis were combined with the 
greater flexibility of model checking. Various new model checking algorithms were 
developed that generate states dynamically. A depth-first search is executed and only 
the current execution path is stored in memory. Unfortunately, many paths may lead 
to the same state, causing unnecessary work to be done. One solution is to use all 
available memory to store a large cache of states. If a state is revisited and it is in 
the cache, it can be ignored. Related algorithms based on this idea became known 
under names such as "on-line model checking" [47] ang "on-the-fly verification" [28]. 
Holzmann developed the first practically useful implementation of a model checker for 
full LTL that incorporates fairness and efficient on-the-fly state exploration techniques. 
The system, which is known as SPIN, is described in [44], the first book to explain how 
computer PIJotocols of realistic size and complexity can be designed by using computer-
aided verification. 
Research that placed model checking on a firm foundation focused on several important 
issues: the expressive power of various temporal logics, formalising the model checking 
problem, fairness, and new algorithms and reduction techniques to combat the fun-
damental state explosion problem. The logics CTL, CTL* and LTL received much 
attention. A decision procedure for satisfiability of CTL formulae is given in [24] and 
a complete axiomatic basis is described in [26]. Manna and Pnueli made a substantial 
contribution towards the specification of program properties using the logic LTL. In 
[52] it is described how various modalities can be used to capture different correctness 
properties and a classification of such properties is given. 
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The model checking problem was first formalised in model-theoretic terms. The seman-
tics of a temporal logic is usually described in terms of Kripke structures. How this 
can be done for the logic CTL*, which includes the sublogics LTL and CTL, is shown 
in [4]. The model checking problem is to determine automatically whether a given fi-
nite transition system satisfies a correctness claim-represented by some temporal logic 
formula-by checking whether the Kripke structure defined by the transition system 
is a model of the formula. A distinction is sometimes made between global and local 
model checking. In global model checking the validity of a formula is computed in all 
reachable states whereas in local model checking the validity of a formula is computed 
with respect to a specific state [72]. In local model checking states are generated only 
if they are needed to compute the truth value of a given formula. In this way much of 
the unnecessary work performed during global model checking is avoided. 
Vardi and Wolper showed that the model checking problem can also be formalised by 
using automata theory [71]. The idea is to represent the correctness claim as well 
as the reachable state space as automata. An explanation of this approach can be 
found in [17]. The synchronous product of the two automata (one representing the 
negation of the correctness claim and the other the teachable state space) is computed 
on-the-fly. If the product of the two automata is empty, the correctness claim is sat-
isfied. Although explicit construction of automata that represent correctness claims is 
somewhat counter-intuitive, it is possible to translate linear temporal logic formulae 
automatically into automata suitable for this kind of analysis. 
Various techniques and algorithms were developed,' all aiming to reduce the memory 
requirements and to speed up the state exploration process. A technique that led to 
a significant improvement in both areas is due to Holzmann [43]. It is basically an 
ingenious way of keeping track of revisited states. The state value is hashed into an 
index in a large array of bits. Initially all bits in the array are set to 0 and when a 
new state is generated, the corresponding bit is set to 1. For a large enough array 
the probability is low that two different states will be hashed to the same bit. Since 
such an undetected hash collision will cause some states to be missed, the technique 
cannot be guaranteed to detect all errors in a model, although it reduces the memory 
requirements. 
Although the global model checking algorithm for CTL was published in the early eight-
ies, the on-the-fly algorithms for CTL were developed much later. The first constructive 
proof of the correctness of such an algorithm is presented in [72]. The algorithm uses 
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an efficient depth-first search, but it is not shown how to handle fairness-an essential 
issue when designing a practically useful verification tool. Another efficient on-the-fly 
algorithm that can be used to verify CTL and CTL* formulae is given in [4]. This 
algorithm is quite intricate when compared to the classical model checking algorithm 
as described in [16], but the time complexity is nonetheless the same. Unfortunately, 
a substantial amount of memory is needed. Partial graphs must be constructed (and 
stored in memory) to identify strongly connected components and a number of addi-
tional data structures are needed to record the truth values of assertions up to the 
current point in the exploration process. Similar model checking algorithms exist for 
other logics. An efficient on-the-fly algorithm for LTL is given in [28]. The algorithm 
constructs an automaton that represents all execution sequences satisfying a given LTL 
formula. 
A paper published by Burch et al. introduced a new model checking technique that 
became known as symbolic model checking [9]. Both the transition relation and the 
set of visited states can be represented compactly by using binary decision diagrams 
(BDDs) [7]. In this way, the effect of executing all enabled transitions in every unique 
state of a model is represented compactly as a graph. The first step i,s to generate all 
states that can be reached from the initial state in a single step. This set of states is 
then repeatedly expanded in a similar way until no new states can be generated. This 
process defines a breadth-first search that stops when no new states are generated. 
BDD-based techniques have some potential advantages. Several case studies demon-
strated that large state spaces can be represented more compactly in this way. In 
addition, since states are stored implicitly, the various operations on BDDs often have 
the effect of processing several transitions simultaneously. Unfortunately, there is no 
guarantee that the symbolic representation of a model will be smaller than an explicitly 
constructed one. The problem is that no efficient BDD-representation exists for some 
very basic functions [7]. Moreover, variable ordering has a significant effect on the 
amount of memory that is required. The performance of a verifier that uses the BDD 
technique is therefore unpredictable in general, although impressive results have been 
obtained in several case studies, particularly when applied to hardware problems [8]. 
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3.4 Verifying a microkernel 
The fact that formal methods are useful to develop correct protocols suggested that 
similar techniques could work to verify other reactive systems like microkernels. How-
ever, the main purpose of ,most protocols-to transfer data between communicating 
processes-is but one of the functions of a microkernel. In addition, microkernels also 
control the basic hardware of a computing node: the processor(s), main memory, and 
peripheral devices like disks and communication cards. To model the management 
functions of a microkernel, sophisticated data structures are needed. Furthermore, it 
is essential to represent these data structures as compactly as possible. The reason is 
that complex data structures will increase the state size significantly and since huge 
numbers of states must be stored, larger states will increase the memory requirements 
dramatically. 
In practice, most software is verified by using on-the-fly techniques. Protocols, in 
particular, have been an exceptionally fruitful application area. On-the-fly verification 
is quite efficient: memory is used effectively by storing only the current execution path 
during a depth-first search. In addition, a number of state space reduction strategies 
are available that allow partial searches without influencing the verification results. 
For example, the partial order technique described in [35] can improve efficiency in 
a significant way. The real limit is the amount of memory available to store states. 
Compaction techniques can pack more states into available memory. Furthermore, 
when a model is too large to allow a full state space search, Holzmann's technique of 
hashing without collision detection still allows excellent coverage. 
To verify the Gneiss microkernel the choice was between using on-the-fly or BDD-
based techniques. Although BDD techniques can produce impressive results, especially 
in the field of hardware verification, the memory requirements cannot be guaranteed to 
be less than for on-the-fly techniques. Furthermore, the successful verification system 
SPIN demonstrates that a combination of state compaction, partial order reduction 
techniques and controlled partial searches makes possible the construction of a verifier 
that does not' reject models that are too large to handle. The ability to resort to 
partial analysis when necessary is essential in a practical verification system and it was 
therefore decided to follow the example set by SPIN. 
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Modelling, correctness claims 
and verification 
The verifier described in Chapter 5 was designed from scratch and adapted to the task at 
hand-to verify the microkernel described in Chapter 2. However, many features of the 
new verifier can be traced back to other people's work. Several features were adopted 
from Holzmann's verification system SPIN which has proven its worth in practice. 
SPIN is probably the most widely used system of its kind. The concepts behind it are 
described in [44] and the source code, which is freely available, provides implementation 
detail that can seldom be derived from research papers alone: It would be possible to 
use SPIN to verify a microkernel, but it was decided to implement a new verifier instead. 
In retrospect, this was a good decision. Most programs that are intended for a specific 
purpose can be optimised. For example, an efficient state compaction technique was 
developed since it was known from the start that the complex data structures in a 
microkernel would cause the size of states to become a problem. Nonetheless, the 
main reason for developing a new verifier was to learn about the techniques involved. 
When modifying a complex program it is easy to ignore the implementation detail of 
some components. In this way crucial concepts can escape attention. When developing 
a new verifier, especially when some new techniques are incorporated, the important 
issues of the various components stand out much clearer. The lessons learned from this 
experience are summarised at the end of Chapter 7. 
A straightforward recoding exercise would have been pointless, of course, and the op-
portunity was used to experiment with some alternative techniques. The temporal 
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logic CTL was used instead of LTL, as used in SPIN. The issue of which logic is best 
is still controversial. The verification algorithm that was used is a modified version of 
Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm [72]. 
Oberon was chosen as implementation language [74, 50]. The language supports mod-
ular software development and has excellent safety features that simplified the coding 
task. Furthermore, Oberon code is highly portable because the same compiler has been 
modified to produce efficient code for most popular workstations. The following goals 
were set for the verification tool (points 1, 2, 3, and 4), the modelling language (points 
5, 6 and 7), the case study (point 8), and the temporal logic (point 9). These 
1. Full state exploration of all microkernel models should be attempted, if feasible, 
with controlled partial searches (based on the bit vector technique as implemented 
in SPIN) as an alternative, if necessary. 
2. Compact state representation would be needed to support the relatively com-
plex data structures found in a microkernel. Experiments with suitable data 
compaction techniques were considered essential to restrict states to reasonable 
sizes. 
3. An interactive facility was considered essential to follow execution paths that lead 
to error states. Without such a tool, many unproductive hours would be spent 
on finding errors while developing the kernel models. 
4. It was decided to experiment with an alternative structure for verifiers of this 
kind by identifying and separating the major components. The idea was to make 
it possible to modify one part of the system without having to understand every-
thing in detail. In addition, the separation of independent issues would make the 
system simpler to describe and therefore easier to understand. 
5. Support for parallelism, in the form of concurrently executing processes, would 
be essential to model a microkernel. Even when only a single processor is sup-
ported, peripheral devices still function as separate concurrent entities. CSP was 
selected as a concurrency framework for the design of the modelling language. 
This simplified the design of both the kernel and the verification system. 
6. A microkernel must manage several queues of waiting processes. Specialised con-
structs would be needed to simplify the representation of such complex data and 
it was decided that the modelling language should support arbitrary combinations 
of finite sequences, records and arrays. 
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7. There is no guarantee that real systems will perform as required unless we can 
establish a formal relationship between verified models and implementations de-
rived from them. This is difficult in general, but to increase our confidence in the 
correctness of real systems, the model should at least reflect the structure of the 
implementation to be developed from it. For example, several modern program-
ming languages support modules which are invaluable for partitioning a system 
into manageable components. The modelling language should therefore support 
modular design. 
8. It was expected that a single model of the entire microkernel would be too com-
plex to handle. Submodels with well-defined interfaces were therefore considered 
essential. 
9. A suitable temporal logic was needed to capture the kind of correctness prop-
erties mentioned at the end of Chapter 2. However, to keep the project within 
reasonable bounds, it was decided to ovoid designing a new logic. Some standard 
logic, adapted if necessary, would have to suffice. 
4.1 Computational model 
A verifier must explore all execution paths defined by a model. Models are expressed 
in a suitable high-level notation that can be translated into a low-level form that is 
convenient for state exploration. The basic formalism used to represent concurrent 
designs is a transition system. The definition presented in [52, Chapter 1] is adopted 
here. A transition system is a 4-tuple (V, S, T, J) with the following components: 
• V, a finite set of state variables. These include data variables which are modified 
by executing the transition system, and control variables to indicate the current 
location(s) of activity. The cm-rent state of a transition system is determined by 
the values of the state variables . 
• S, a finite set of (unique) states generated by executing the transition system. A 
state is a unique assignment of values to the variables in V. A state s satisfies an 
assertion A if and only if the assignment of values to V makes A true, i.e., s F A. 
• T is a finite set of transitions. Each transition represents a basic action that can be 
executed by the system to generate a (potentially) new state. Each transition has 
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an associated enabling condition-a predicate on the current state. A transition 
is enabled and can be executed if and only if its enabling condition holds . 
• I, the initial state of the transition system. 
Only finite transition systems (with a finite number of transitions and a finite number 
of unique states) are considered here because efficient verification techniques exist for 
such systems. Many practical systems can be modelled as finite transition systems. 
A path is a sequence of states So, Sl, ... such that So is the initial state, and for all 
i ;:::: 0, Si+l can be generated from Si by executing some transition t E T. Alternatively, 
a path can be defined as a sequence of transitions that can be executed to generate a 
given sequence of states. This approach is taken in [3, Chapter 2], but the state-based 
definition is used here. A state s is reachable if and only if some path exists that 
includes s. 
Consider two processes Po and PI in which Po can execute a transition to and PI 
can execute a transition ti. If both to and h are enabled' initially, and they cannot 
disable each other when executed, two execution sequences are pos~ible: to, tl and 
tl, to. In transition systems concurrent execution is represented by nondeterminism. 
A transition system is nondeterministic if more than one transition is enabled in some 
state. 
Analysis is simplified by representing concurrency as interleaved execution of nonde-
terministic transition systems. However, such a model may allow execution sequences 
that are undesirable. Implicit constraints placed on the behaviour of a transition sys-
tem correspond to different notions of fairness, as will be discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
Without these constraints, a verifier will report errors that will only occur through 
unfair selection of simultaneously enabled transitions. 
4.2 Temporal logic 
Temporal logic is useful to specify correctness requirements of reactive systems. Broadly 
speaking, a temporal logic extends classical propositional logic by adding certain non-
truthfunctional temporal operators, such as always, sometimes, next or until. Validity 
in such a logic is governed by the assumptions made about the nature of time. Since 
it was decided to model reactive systems as nondeterministic transition systems, it 
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is natural to think of nondeterminism as various different "futures" that are possible 
at any given time instant. A branching time temporal logic therefore seems like the 
natural choice. However, linear temporal logic can also be used to specify correctness 
properties by assuming that any property must hold for all execution sequences. In 
[52] Manna and Pnueli describe how linear temporal logic can be used to specify many 
different correctness properties of reactive systems. 
The chosen logic not only determines the kind of correctness claims that can be checked; 
it also has a marked effect on the efficiency of the verification system. For example, 
some properties expressible in the logic CTL * (which contains CTL) are costly to 
check while the subset of properties expressible in CTL can be checked efficiently due 
to carefully-chosen restrictions for combining teinporaloperators. On the other hand, -
CTL is less expressive than CTL*. For example, CTL cannot express fairness while 
the logic CTL* can. The linear time logic LTL (contained in CTL*) can also express 
fairness because similar rules apply for combining the basic modalities. 
It has been argued that whether to use branching time or linear time logic is not the 
basic issue and that the selected temporal operators are more important [27]. However, 
branching time logics present additional implementation problems that can be avoided 
with linear time. As a result it took several years before on-the-fly model checking 
algorithms were devised for CTL and CTL*. 
It was decided to use the temporal logic CTL as first defined in [14] to express correct-
ness claims to be verified for the Gneiss kernel models. The logic seemed expressive 
enough for the task at hand and the existence of efficient model checking algorithms 
for CTL was considered a bonus. Time is modelled as a tree of discrete time instants, 
each time instant corresponding to a state in the execution of a transition system. 
4.2.1 Basic concepts 
The language of classical propositional logic is adopted wholesale. As is customary in 
modal-type logics it is next assumed that there is a set S of states such that every 
atomic proposition is or is not true at a particular state. The states are related to 
each other by an accessibility relation, R. The set S corresponds to the unique states 
generated by the transition system that represent the reactive system to be analysed. 
The relation R is determined by the set of transitions of the transition system. 
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In modal logics the set of states, together with the accessibility relation and the assign-
ment of truth values to atomic propositions in every state, is called a K ripke structure. 
Some properties are usually ascribed to the accessibility relation and depending on 
what these are, different modal logics arise. Here the accessibility relation structures 
the set of states into a tree, the branches representing all possible execution sequences 
from some initial state. The truth value of a compound formula at a given state may 
depend on the truth values of some of its subformulae at other states further down 
the tree. To express this, it is necessary to quantify over the states in any particular 
execution sequence, and also over execution sequences. For the first purpose the nota-
tion "G" is used for "globally", "F" for "finally" and "X" for "next". For the second 
purpose "A" is used for "for all" and "E" for "there exists". Finally, these different 
quantifiers are combined to obtain six different modalities: AG, AF, AX, EG, EF and 
EX. Thus "AGa" would say that formula a is true for all states in every execution 
sequence, "AFa" says that in every execution sequence there is some state in which a 
is true, "EX a" says that a is true in some immediate successor state, and so on. 
In the more technical Section 4.2.2 below!tn until operator is also introduced to increase 
the expressiveness of the language. Roughly, "a U {3" is the claim that f3 will be true 
at some point in the future, and up to the immediately preceding point a will be true. 
Again, this may be preceded by A or E, indicating respectively that the claim holds 
for all or only some execution sequences. 
In Section 4.1 the basic concepts of transition systems were defined. In the next section 
some of these concepts are defined from a logical point of view and finally these concepts 
are brought together to form the basis of a verification system. 
4.2.2 The branching time logic CTL 
The alphabet of CTL comprises: a set of variables P = {Pl,P2, ... ,Pn, .. . }; the con-
stants "true" and "false"; the connectives --, and A; the temporal operators A, E, X 
and U with parentheses as punctuation symbols. 
Any variable by itself is a formula. If a and f3 are formulae, then so are: 
--,a, a A (3, AXa, EXa, A(a U (3), E(a U (3), 
and nothing else is a formula. To define validity, our assumptions concerning time are 
packed into the formal definition of a Kripke structure. It is a triple K = (S, R, v) such 
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that: 
• S is a finite set, the elements of which are called states. There is some distin-
guished state So E S, called the initial state. 
• R is an adjacency relation over S, such that (S, R) is a tree, with root node so. 
• v : P x S --7 {O, I} is an assignment of some truth value (0 or 1) to every variable 
at every state. 
A path is a branch of the tree (S, R)-an infinite sequence of states so, SI, ... starting 
with theroot node So and such that (V'i)[ (Si' Si+1) E R]. A path/rom a given!:;tate s is 
a branch of the subtree with s as root. 
Note that the structure (S, R) denotes the tree whose nodes are occurrences of unique 
states in S. That is, if a state is revisited, it will occur once for each time it is reached. 
Having assumed an assignment of truth values to every atomic formula at every state, 
a definition can be given of what it means for any compound formula a to be true at 
some state s. This is indicated in the usual way by "s F a" and the fact that a is not 
true at s by "slf: a". Inductively then, for any state s: s F true, and slf: false; for 
any atomic formula p, and any state s: s F p iff v(p, s) = 1; for any formulae a and 
f3, and any state s: 
• s F -,a iff slf: a 
• 8 F a 1\ f3 iff s F a and s F f3 
• 8 FAXa iff for every state Sf such that (8, Sf) E R we have Sf Fa 
• 8 F EXa iff there exists a state Sf such that (s, Sf) E Rand 8 f Fa 
• S F A( a U f3) iff for all paths-8~ (= s-},-A; s~,-.. .. from s {3i)[i ~ 0 and s~ F f3 and 
(V'j)[O ::; j < i implies sj Fa] 
• s F E(a U f3) iff there exists a path s~(= s), s~, s~, ... from s such that (:3i)[i ~ 0 
and 8~ F f3 and (V'j)[O ::; j < i implies sj Fa] 
The other propositional con,nectives, V ("or"), :::} ("implies") and {:::::::;> ("iff") may 
be defined from -, and 1\ in the ordinary textbook way. The remaining four of the six 
modalities mentioned in Section 4.2.1 can now be introduced by definition: 
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AFa iff A(true U a); EFa iff E(true U a); AGa iff ,EF,a and EGa iff ,AF'a. 
By the inductive definition of F every CTL formula a is or is not true at any state 
8 in a Kripke structure K. Because of the forward looking nature of the temporal 
operators it is necessary, for unspecified a, to have full knowledge of the distribution 
of truth values to atomic formulae at all states in the subtree with root 8 to deduce 
the truth value of a at 8. Conversely, of course, if we do know that a is true at 8 we 
know something about the subtree with root 8. The convention is adopted of saying 
that a subtree with root 8 has property a if the state 8 itself has property a, which is 
to say that a is true at 8. In particular then, a Kripke structure K has property a iff 
a is true at the root node 80. 
4.2.3 Fairness and CTL 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the reduction of concurrency to nondeterminism rises the 
issue of fairness. The specific constraints placed on resolving nondeterminism determine 
how faithfully concurrency is modelled by interleaving. In [31, Chapter 7] Francez 
defines various notions of fairness. Of these, weak and strong fairness are most relevant 
here. Manna and Pnueli describe weak fairness and strong fairness in the context of 
transition systems [52, Chapter 2]. 
Intuitively, weak fairness requires the following: transitions that are continually en-
abled beyond a certain point may not be ignored indefinitely. In addition to the weak 
fairness requirements, strong fairness requires that transitions that are not continually 
enabled, but are nonetheless enabled "repeatedly" (infinitely often) may not be ignored 
indefinitely. Fairness places additional constraints on execution sequences that are ac-
ceptable in a verification system. Without these implicit constraints, a verifier will 
report errors that should be ascribed to "unfair behaviour". For example, a protocol 
designed to transmit messages over a lossy channel usually includes some mechanism to 
retransmit lost messages. We assume that the channel will eventually transmit every 
message successfully, albeit after an unspecified number of retransmissions. However, 
unless the model specifies some maximum number of retransmissions explicitly, a ver-
ification system without fairness constraints will detect the possibility that a given 
message may never get through and report this as an "error". 
Fairness requires that path quantifiers range only over fair paths in CTL. All unfair 
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execution sequences are ignored. In Chapter 5 it is explained how fairness was imple-
mented in the experimental verification system for ESML. 
4.2.4 Correctness requirements 
In [52, Chapter 4] Manna and Pnueli illustrate the use of temporal logic to specify 
correctness properties of reactive programs. They give two different classifications of 
correctness properties, first in terms of the structure of the formulae and then the well-
known safety-liveness classification. This is followed by a selection of examples. In 
practice, however, three generic formulae cover most cases. In [51] Manna and Pnueli 
described these three classes of properties as "the majority of properties one would 
ever wish to verify". The logic used is the linear-time temporal logic LTL, but similar 
classes of properties can be expressed in CTL, as illustrated below: 
• Invariance properties. These properties are expressed in CTL by formulae of 
the form AGp, where p is a state property. A common example of an invariance 
property is a global invariant that constrains the range of a data variable. For 
example, if the number of outstanding messages (indicated by the variable out) 
may be at most n to ensure correct functioning of a communication system, this 
can be captured by the following CTL formula: AG (out ~ n). Deadlock freedom 
is another example of an invariance property, but it is more efficient to let the 
verifier check directly for deadlock by detecting terminal states. Mutual exclusion 
is another common example. For two processes Po and PI that share a buffer, 
this property can be expressed by the formula AG(-,(cro 1\ crl)), where cro and 
crl indicate which process is inside its critical region. The formula states that 
both processes cannot be inside their critical regions simultaneously. 
• Response properties. These properties are expressed in CTL by formulae of 
the form AG(p =? AFq), where p and q are state properties. It is claimed that 
for all execution sequences a state where p holds is eventually followed by a state 
where q holds. For example, if a message is sent, it is guaranteed that it will be 
received eventually. 
• Precedence properties. These properties involve three assertions p, q, and r, 
which are again state properties, and are defined as follows in [51]: Any p-state 
(a state where p is true) initiates a q-interval (an interval all of whose states 
satisfy q) which either runs to the end of the computation, or is terminated by an 
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r-state. This property is defined in terms of a weak until operator. In CTL the 
strong until operator is used and a related class of precedence properties can be 
defined as AG(p ::::} A(q U r)). The essential difference between these two until 
operators is that for the strong until r must eventually become true, while for 
the weak until operator this is not required. 
A verification system is a combination of a transition system and a suitable temporal 
logic. A reactive system is represented by a transition system from which an execution 
tree can be computed. Repetitive sequences of states are discarded according to the 
rules of fairness. (The kind of fairness that was adopted, the precise rules to be followed, 
and how these rules were implemented is described in Chapter 5.) This reduces the tree 
to be finite without losing important information. Simple tests on the variables of the 
transition system are used to determine the truth value of atomic propositions. The 
reduced tree may thus be regarded as a Kripke structure, and correctness requirements 
of the reactive system are expressed as CTL formulae. The CTL formula therefore 
represents a property the system should have while the (finite) execution tree of the 
reactive system represents a Kripke structure. The verifier can now determine whether 
the given reactive system has the ~pecified property by checking whether the formula 
is true at the root node of the tree. 
Although transition systems are theoretically powerful enough to model reactive sys-
tems, a higher level modelling language is needed in practice. A compiler is needed to 
translate models expressed in such a modelling language into functionally equivalent 
transition systems that can be analysed by a verifier. 
4.3 The modelling language ESML 
Two languages are_used to describe reactive programs: ESML (Extended State Machine 
, Language) [21] to specify the behaviour of a program and the branching time temporal 
logic CTL (Computation Tree Logic) to specify correctness requirements. CTL and 
how it can be used to express correctness claims was described in the previous section. 
An overview of ESML is given here. 
The design of ESML was inspired by two languages: the systems programming language 
Joyce [5] and the modelling language Promela [44]. Joyce provided a design framework 
for ESML. It is a strongly typed programming language based on CSP [41]. The 
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run-time environment for ESML was strongly influenced by Promela [44], a modelling 
language for protocols. 
After studying Promela and Joyce and also gaining some experience by attempting to 
construct "paper" models of typical mechanisms found in microkernels, the following 
observations were made: 
• As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), unique states generated by a model are 
stored to allow detection of revisited states; the language should therefore allow 
states to be represented as compactly as possible. 
• Dijkstra's guarded command notation [22] which is. also used in Promela III 
slightly modified form, provides a powerful and elegant control formalism. 
• Promela supports synchronous as well as asynchronous message passing. When 
synchronous message passing is used, a process that sends a message is blocked 
until another process is willing to receive the message. In asynchronous message 
passing a process may continue immediately after sending a message. This im-
plies some form of buffering to store the message until another process is willing 
to receive it. Because buffer management presents additional problems, it was 
decided to implement only unbuffered synchronous message passing in the Gneiss 
kernel and in ESML. 
• Shared variables were considered unnecessary. To exchange information between 
the various kernel components, CSP-style message passing was considered to be 
sufficiently powerful. 
• It has been mentioned already that models of microkernels require more sophis-
ticated data structures; a modelling language should allow data structures such 
as queues and tables to be expressed naturally. The challenge is to achieve this 
without making verification grossly inefficient. To model the Gneiss microkernel, 
three data structuring mechanisms were considered essential: records-to group 
related data together, sequences-as a natural tool to model queues for exam-
ple, and arrays-to represent tables. ,It is sometimes necessary to combine these 
structures to form more sophisticated structures. For example, a queue of process 
records was used to model the scheduler. Each process record contains data about 
a specific process (process number, process state) while the queue is a sequence 
of such process records. Efficient verification dictates finite data structures. It 
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was therefore necessary to restrict sequences to be finite-they are called lists in 
ESML. Records and arrays are finite by definition. 
In ESML a model of a reactive program consists of a collection of processes. ESML 
processes are similar to agents in Joyce and processes in Promela. A process may 
contain typed variables as well as other process definitions. Standard operators are 
provided to manipulate Boolean and integer variables. Processes take the place of 
modules in a design; after creation they execute concurrently and communicate over 
channels. 
4.3.1 Type and variable definitions 
Data variables form part of the global state. To store states compactly, the ranges of 
variables are fixed by type definitions. Instead of allocating one or more bytes for a 
number of standard types (say, 16 bits for an integer), a more economical scheme is 
used: the smallest number of bits is allocated to support subrange types. For example, 
a subrange of type integer defined as 0 .. 10 can be represented in 4 bits. This idea would 
probably be too restrictive in a programming language, but it works surprisingly well 
for a specification language because it leads to a significant reduction in state size. 
The keywords "TYPE" and "VAR" indicate type and variable definitions respectively. 
Extended BNF notatio'n is used to define the ESML grammar. As usual [a] denotes 
the sentence a or the empty sentence and {a} denotes a finite sequence of sentences a 
or the empty sentence. Terminal symbols are enclosed in double quotes. The syntax 
of type definitions is defined as follows: 
TypeDefinition = TypeName "=" NewType ";". 
NewType = NewArrayType I NewListType I NewRecordType 
NewPortType I NewSubrange I NewEnumeratedType. 
NewSubrange = Numeral " .. " Numeral. 
N~wEnumeratedType = Name {II, II Name}. 
Example: 
TYPE Number = 0 .. 10; Colour = red, amber, green; 
VAR counter1, counter2: Number; TrafficLight: Colour; 
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Brinch Hansen found that the most common errors in Joyce programs were type errors 
in communication commands. He concluded that "any CSP language must include 
message declarations which permit complete type checking during compilation". We 
therefore adopted the idea of a port type as defined in Joyce. A port type T defines 
an alphabet which is a set {so(TO),Sl(Tl), ... ,sn(Tn)} of symbol classes. The values in 
each symbol class si(Td are formed by prefixing each value of type Ti with the name Si. 
While each value in Ti represents a different message symbol, classes make it possible 
to group related messages together conveniently. A special symbol class can be defined 
with no associated messages. This is called a signal. "EndStream" in the example 
below is an example of a signal. 
NewPortType =- "{" Alphabet "}". 
Alphabet = SymbolClass {"," SymbolClass}. 
SymbolClass = SymbolName ["(" MessageType ")" ]. 
MessageType = TypeName. 
Example: 
TYPE Number 0 .. 10; Stream = {value(Number), EndStream}; 
Processes exchange messages via channels by using two communication commands. 
Channels are accessed indirectly via ports which must be declared in the parameter 
list of a process. Ports will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.4. For now it 
is enough to know that a message m which belongs to symbol class S of alphabet A 
is sent via a port p by the command p! S em). Similarly a message m which belongs 
to symbol class S is received via a port p and assigned to a variable x of type T 
by the command p?S ex). When a message is sent, the sending process waits until a 
matching receive command is executed by another process. Similarly a process wanting 
to receive a message waits until a message of the specified type is sent. Here is the 
syntax of communication commands: 
Communication = VariableAccess "!" SymbolName [ "(" Expression ")" ] I 
VariableAccess "?" SymbolName [ "(" VariableAccess ")" ]. 
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4.3.2 Structured data 
Although arrays can be used to simulate sequences and records, this was found to be 
rather awkward. ESML therefore supports arrays, records and lists (sequences of finite 
length) as separate types. The maximum length of a list is specified by a constant 
between square brackets as shown in the example below. Any combination of these 
structures is allowed. 
NewArrayType = "ARRAY" "[" Constant "]" "OF" TypeName. 
NewListType = "LIST" "[" Constant "]" "OF" TypeName. 
NewRecordType = "(" FieldList ")". 
FieldList = RecordSection { ";" RecordSection }. 
RecordSection = FieldName RecordTail. 
_ RecordTail = ", "- RecordSection I "." TypeName. 
Examples: 
TYPE Row = ARRAY[5] OF Number; 
TYPE ProcessRecord = (ProcessNumber, Priority: Number); 
TYPE ProcessQueue = LIST[3] OF ProcessRecord; 
To manipulate lists, standard operations "APPEND", "PREPEND", "HEAD", "RE-
MOVE", "LEN" and "EMPTY" are available. The operations "APPEND(q, x)" and 
"PREPEND(q, x)" are used to catenate a single new value x to the beginning or the 
end of a list q. The function "HEAD(q)" returns the first element of a list q without 
removing it while REMOVE(q) can be used to remove it. "LEN" returns the number 
of elements in a list. "EMPTY(q)" is used for initialising a list and sets q to the empty 
list. 
4.3.3 ESML commands 
The global state of a model is changed by executing commands. Even the SKIP com-
mand, which does not change any data variables, changes the state of a model. This 
is so because the location variable which points to the next command to be executed 
is modified. The global state can also be modified by evaluating an expression and 
assigning the resulting value to a type compatible variable. Range checks are always 
done before assignments. It is therefore unnecessary to use CTL formulae to specify 
range checks. 
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Arithmetic expressions based on the four basic operators associated with integer num-
bers as well as logical expressions with and ("&"), or ("OR"), not ("-") and the usual 
relational operators are supported. Control structuring is provided by guarded com-
mands, which are defined as follows: 
If Construct = "IF" GuardedCommandList "END". 
DoConstruct = "DO" GuardedCommandList "END". 
GuardedCommandList = GuardedCommand { "[]" GuardedCommand }. 
GuardedCommand = Guard "->,, CommandSeq. 
Guard = Expression. 
CommandSeq = Command {";" Command}. 
Command = AssignmentCommand I If Construct 
DoConstruct I Poll Construct I SKIP 
ProcCommand I Communication. 
The semantics of the IF and DO constructs conform to the similarly named constructs in 
Dijkstra's guarded commands [22]. A guarded command can be executed if and only if 
the expression constituting its guard evaluates to true. A guarded command is executed 
by executing its corresponding sequence of commands (CommandSeq). When more 
than one guard is true, any executable guarded command is chosen nondeterministically 
and executed. 
For an IF construct, at least one of the guards must be true to avoid a run-time error. 
For a DO construct any executable guarded command is executed; the DO construct 
is repeatedly executed until all guards are false. 
Examples: 
IF x >= 0 -> z:= x 
[] x <= 0 -> z:= -x 
END; 
DO counter> 0 -> counter:= counter - 1 END 
Input and output commands are forbidden in the guards of IF and DO constructs. 
When guarded communication commands are needed, they must be used within a 
POLL construct, which is defined as follows: 
PollConstruct = "POLL" GuardedPollList "END". 
GuardedPollList = GuardedPollCommand { "[]" GuardedPollCommand }. 
GuardedPollCommand = PollGuard "->,, InstructionSeq. 
PollGuard = Communication [ "&" Expression ]. 
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A guard in a POLL construct is true if the communication constituting the guard can 
execute and the optional Boolean expression evaluates to true. The Boolean expression 
may contain variables to be received during communication. A POLL terminates when 
at least one of its guards becomes true. 
Examples: 
POLL request?value(x) & x>O -> result!value(x + y) 
[] qutput!value(y) -> SKIP 
END 
Note tliat iIi the first guard of the POLL command above, the message can only be 
received if x > O. The termination rules of DO and POLL constructs are easy to 
remember. A DO terminates when all its guards are false; a POLL terminates when 
at least one of its guards is true. 
4.3.4 Concurrency and communication 
A new process is activated (created and started) by executing a process activation 
command. A model must include at least a main process, but usually a number of 
other processes are declared as well. Execution starts at the main process, which is the 
only process that may activate additional processes. 
During the activation of a process, storage is allocated for all its variables. A pro-
cess terminates after the last command in its command sequence has been executed. 
However, the main process may only terminate once all processes created by it have ter-
minated. This termination rule allows simple, efficient run-time storage management 
for processes. In the current version of ESML, processes cannot be activated recur-
sively. Although this can be implemented (and was used in an early version), it was 
not needed. Dynamic process creation was therefore eliminated to improve efficiency. 
The process activation command has the following syntax: 
ProcCommand = ProcName [ II (" ActualParameterList II) II ] 
Two kinds of parameters are supported: value parameters and ports. Ports are marked 
by one of the keywords "IN" or "OUT" to indicate the direction of transfer. A process 
activation command must provide an actual parameter (of matching type) for every 
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formal parameter defined by the process definition. In the case of value parameters 
the value of the corresponding actual parameter is assigned to each formal parameter. 
When a process is activated, its ports are mapped onto the corresponding ports of the 
creator to create channels. A channel is a connection between two processes, but it 
can only be accessed via ports. A process definition consists of a process name, formal 
parameters and body: 
Process = "PROCESS" ProcName Block ProcName 
Block = [ "(" FormalParameterList ")" ] ProcBody. 
FormalParameterList = ParameterDefini tion { ";" ParameterDefinition }. 
ParameterDefinition = "IN" VariableGroup I 
"OUT" VariableGroup I 
VariableGroup. 
ProcBody = [ ConstantDefinitionPart ] [TypeDefinitionPart ] 
[ VariableDefinitionPart ] { Process "; "} 
"BEGIN" CommandSeq "END". 
The use of ESML to model various aspects of the Gneiss microkernel is illustrated in 
Chapter 6. The models are developed and discussed one step at a time and a list of 
complete models can be found in the appendix. 
4.4 Verification algorithm 
A compiler is used to translate ESML models automatically into equivalent transition 
systems. A practical verification strategy is needed to check a model against a given 
correctness claim as expressed in CTL. 
Vergauwen and Lewi published a goal-directed algorithm that can check CTL formu-
lae in time linear in the size of the state space and the number of operators in the 
formula [72]. The most attractive property of this algorithm is that the reachability 
graph is computed on-the-fly by evaluating only those subformulae that are actually 
needed. This means that the algorithm executes the transition system to generate 
states as necessary to compute the truth-value of a given formula. However, the space 
requirements limit the practical value of this algorithm. A large data structure is used 
to store the value of every subformula in all reachable states. The size of the models 
that can be analysed is therefore limited by the amount of memory available to store 
this data structure. Furthermore, the algorithm does not address fairness. Nonethe-
less, this algorithm is a suitable point of departure to discuss the strategy used in the 
verifier that is described in the next chapter. The version of Vergauwen and Lewi's 
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algorithm described here is due to Heljanko [39]. It is similar to Vergauwen and Lewi's 
algorithm, but the formulation is much clearer and more detailed. 
A depth-first search is used to explore the reachable state space, keeping track of the 
values of all subformulae as they are evaluated in each state. In general, the value of 
a subformula in a given state can be true, false or unknown. An array info [s, i] 
is used to store the value of each subformula i in every state s. A function Info (s, 
i) returns the value of subformula i in state s and procedure Setlnfo (s, i, v) is 
used to set the value of subformula i to the value v in state s. While computing the 
value of each subformula, all states visited are marked (by procedure Mark) to make it 
possible to detect loops. Since the algorithm is quite complex, it will be described as a 
-
set of interacting procedures, similar to Heljanko's exposition in [39]. 
The main procedure Check is invoked to compute the value of any CTL formula i 
in a given state s, typically the initial state of a model. Pseudocode for procedure 
Check is shown in Figure 2. Note that Check does nothing if the value of a formula 
is already known. This is so because Check can be called recursively to evaluate some 
CTL formulae. The values of the simpler subformulae are computed directly, but two 
procedures AU and EU are invoked to compute the value of a formula containing these 
more complex temporal operators. 
On completion, Check guarantees that the value of formula i has been computed in 
state s. The global array info must be initialised before invoking Check. Each entry 
in the array stores the values of every reachable state. All these values are initially 
set to unknown. The order in which states are reached is important and therefore a 
depth-first search number is allocated to every state. Each entry in info contains a 
field to store this number and all are initialised to O. The function ValueProposition 
returns the value of a propositional variable in a given state. The functions Left () 
and Right () return the left and right operands of an operator respectively. When an 
operator has only one operand, Left 0 is used to return this operand. 
Formulae containing the AU operator are handled by the two procedures shown in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4. Procedure CheckAU executes a depth-first search. The goal of 
procedure AU is to preserve a counter example if the formula turns out to be false; 
Procedure CheckAU returns immediately if the value of formula i is already known 
in state s. Otherwise, a depth-first search is started to compute the value by calling 
Check to evaluate the right operand of AU. Procedure Check enters this value in info. 
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PROCEDURE Check(s: State; i: Formula); 
BEGIN 
IF Info(s, i) = unknown THEN 
CASE FormulaType(i) 
atomic: SetInfo(s, i, ValueProposition(s, i» 
not: SetInfo(s, i, -ValueProposition(s, i» 
and: 
Check(s, Left(i»; 
IF Info(s, Left(i» = true THEN 
Check(s, Right(i»; 
IF Info(s, Right(i» = true THEN 
SetInfo(s, i, true); RETURN 
ENn 
END; SetInfo(s, i, false) 
ax: 
FOR EACH t IN Successors(s) DO 
Check(t, Left(i»; 
IF Info(t, Left(i» = false THEN 
SetInfo(s, i, false); RETURN 
END 
END; 
SetInfo(s, i, true) 
au: AU(s, i) 
eu: EU(s, i) 
END 
END 
END Check; 
Figure 2: Procedure to compute the value of a CTL formula in a given state. 
PROCEDURE AU(s: State; i: Formula); 
BEGIN 
Clear(cstack); 
CheckAU(s, i, cstack); 
WHILE NEmpty(cstack) DO 
(* cstack contains a counter example *) 
t := Pop(cstack); 
Unmark(t, i); 
SetInfo(t, i, false) 
END 
END AU; 
Figure 3: Main routine to check AU. It calls CheckAU to conduct a depth-first search 
and displays a counter example if the formula is false. 
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PROCEDURE CheckAU(s: State; i: Formula; cstack: Stack); 
BEGIN 
IF Info(s, i) = unknown THEN 
Check(s, Right(i»; 
IF Info(s, Right(i» = true THEN 
Unmark(s, i); SetInfo(s, i, true) 
ELSE 
Check(s, Left(i»; 
pushes, cstack); 
IF Info(s, Left(i» = true THEN 
Mark(s, i); 
FOR EACH t IN Successors(s) DO 
IF -Marked(t, i) THEN CheckAU(t, i, cstack) 
ELSE RETURN 
END 
END 
t := Pop(cstack); 
Unmark(s, i); 
SetInfo(s, i, true) 
END 
END 
END 
END CheckAU; 
Figure 4: Routine to handle the AU operator. If a counter example is found, it is stored 
in cstack. Nothing is done if the value of the formula is known already. 
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If it is true, the formula AU is true no matter what the value of its left operand may be. 
If the value of the right operand of AU is false, the value of its left operand is needed. 
As before, procedure Check is called to compute this value. The state s is pushed 
onto cstack because it may form part of a counter example. If the left operand of AU 
turns out to be false, the formula is false, and procedure CheckAU returns. Otherwise, 
the successors of state s must be explored. If the formula containing the AU operator 
turns out to be false in anyone of the successors of state s, the AU operator is false 
in s. Otherwise, the state s, which has been pushed onto cstack, must be removed, 
unmarked, and the value of the formula containing the AU operator can be set to true 
in state s. Termination of the procedure is ensured by the marking of states. This can 
be seen in the FOR-loop that explores th~ successors of each state t: if a state is found 
to be already marked, procedure CheckAU returns. 
The algorithm for EU is more complex. Two consecutive depth-first searches are needed. 
The first search tries to find a goal state: a state in which the right operand of the EU 
operator is true and that can be reached via states in which the left operand of the EU 
operator is true. Whether a goal state could be found is indicated by a global variable 
for each formula, which is initialised to -1. The efficiency 9f the algorithm depends on 
some extra bookkeeping and this accounts for the complexity of the algorithm. While 
searching for a goal state, all states visited are marked because, in most cases, the value 
of the formula EU can be derived for those states as well. 
The first search is implemented by procedures EU and CheckEU as shown in Figure 5 
and Figure 6 respectively. 
Procedure EU initialises the goal state for formula i to -1 (meaning "unknown") and 
then calls procedure CheckEU. The stack cstack is used to store all states that are 
visited while looking for a goal state. Note that the sequence of states on cstack does 
not necessarily form a path. From the semantics of the EU operator it is clear that if 
no goal state is found, the value of the formula can be set to false in all states that 
were visited during the search. However, if a goal state could be found, a second search 
is necessary to determine from which states on cstack the goal state can be reached. 
The formula EU is then set to true in these states. The second search is implemented 
by procedures LabelSCC (Figure 7) and EvalSCCs (Figure 8). Procedure LabelSCC 
clears fstack and then calls procedure EvalSCCs which implements the second search, 
pushing states onto fstack. Depth-first search numbers are assigned to states to allow 
computation of strongly connected components using Tarjan's algorithm [1, Chapter 5J. 
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PROCEDURE EU(s: State; i: Formula); 
BEGIN 
(* Set goal state for i to unknown *) 
SetGoal(i. -1); 
Clear(cstack); 
CheckEU(s. i, cstack); 
IF Goal(i) = -1 THEN (* no witness found *) 
WHILE -Empty(cstack) DO 
t := Pop(cstack); 
Unmark(t. i); 
SetInfo(t. i. false) 
END 
END 
END EU; 
Figure 5: Main routine to check EU. It calls CheckEU to conduct a depth-first search 
for a path that makes the formula true. 
This standard technique is described in detail in Chapter 5. Essentially, the idea is to 
find the root node of each SCC. The root node is the node with lowest depth-first 
search number. If the root node of a sec is found and the goal state is not reachable 
from it, the formula i is marked false in all states of the SCC. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presents background material needed to understand the design of the 
verifier that was developed to verify the Gneiss microkernel. Correctness claims are 
verified by exploring every possible execution path of a model. Models are described 
in a high-level notation that makes the individual processes and their actions clearly 
visible. Instead of executing this high-level notation directly, a given model is first 
translated into an equivalent transition system which is more convenient to interpret. 
The transition system used as computational model is described. 
Correctness claims are represented as temporal logic formulae. The branching time 
logic CTL was selected to express correctness claims because the best model checking 
algorithms for it require time linear in the size of the state space and the length of 
the formula. The best model checking algorithms for LTL (another popular temporal 
logic that can be used to specify correctness claims) is linear in the size of the state 
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PROCEDURE CheckEU(s: State; i: Formula; cstack: Stack); 
BEGIN 
IF Info(s, i) = false THEN RETURN 
ELSIF Info(s, i) = true THEN 
(* state s is the goal *) 
MarkState(s, i); 
SetGoal(i, s); 
RETURN 
ELSE (* value still unknown *) 
Check(s, Right(i)); 
IF Info(s, Right(i)) = true THEN 
(* goal state found *) 
MarkState(s, i); 
SetGoal(i, s); 
RETURN 
ELSE 
Check(s, Left(i)); 
IF Info(s, Left(i)) = false THEN 
Unmark(s, i); 
SetInfo(s, i, false); 
RETURN 
ELSE 
MarkState(s, i); 
pushes, cstack); 
FOR EACH t IN Successors(s) DO 
IF -Marked(t, i) THEN CheckEU(t, i, cstack) END 
END 
END 
END 
END 
END CheckEU; 
Figure 6: Routine to handle the EU operator. The algorithm attempts to find a goal 
state in which it is first discovered that the EU operator is true. The search stops 
as soon as a goal state is found or when it is discovered that a goal state cannot be 
reached. A stack is used to store all states visited. 
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PROCEDURE LabelSCC(s: State; i: Formula; goal: State); 
BEGIN 
dfsnr := 0; 
Clear(fstack); 
EvalSCCs(s, i, goal, fstack); 
WHILE -Empty(fstack) DO 
(* cstack contains states visited *) 
t := Pop(fstack); 
SetSearchNr(t, 0) 
END 
END LabelSCC; 
Figure 7: Routine to label states from which goal can potentially be reached. A: 
subsequent search is required to determine which of these states can actually lead to 
the goal. 
space, but exponential in the size of the formula. In practice, however, rather large 
data structures are needed by the best known verification algorithms for CTL. 
An experimental modelling language, ESML, is described that was designed specifically 
to model the Gneiss microkernel described in Chapter 2 and similar systems. ESML 
is loosely based on CSP. The language includes the concept of a process, and commu-
nication between processes is based on synchronous message passing. In line with the 
philosophy behind CSP, global variables are prohibited. This did not hinder the project 
at all because the microkernel verified as a case study was designed as a hierarchy of 
clients and servers, each represented as a process with its own local data structures. 
Finally, an efficient model checking algorithm for CTL is described. A rather abstract 
version of this algorithm was published by Vergauwen and Lewi [72], the detailed version 
described here being developed by Heljanko [39]. The main advantage of this algorithm 
is that it requires time linear in the size of the state space and the length of the CTL 
formula. Unfortunately, it needs rather large data structures and therefore a modified 
version of the algorithm was developed to reduce the memory requirements. The new 
algorithm, which can check a useful subset of CTL is described in the next chapter. 
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PROCEDURE EvaISCCs(s: State; i: Formula; goal: State; fstack: Stack; 
root: INTEGER); 
VAR m: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
Unmark(s, i); 
(* assume s leads to the goal state *) 
SetInfo(s, i, true); 
IF s = goal THEN RETURN END; 
INC(dfsnr); 
SetSearchNr(s, dfsnr); 
min := dfsnr; 
Push(s, fstack); 
FOR EACH t IN Successors(s) DO 
m := SearchNr(t); 
IF (m = 0) & marked(t, i) THEN 
EvaISCCs(s, i, goal, fstack, m) 
END; 
IF (m > 0) & (m < min) THEN 
(* state with smaller dfsnr found *) 
m := min 
END 
END; 
IF SearchNr(s) min THEN 
(* root state of SCC found and goal not reachable *) 
REPEAT 
t := Pop(fstack); 
SetSearchNr(t, 0); 
SetInfo(t, i, false) 
UNTIL t = s 
END 
END EvaISCCs; 
Figure 8: Routine to determine from which states in fstack the goal state can be 
reached. In these states the EU formula is true and in all other states on fstack it is 
false. 
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A verifier for reactive systeDls 
As explained in Chapter 4, the efficiency of fast model checking algorithms for CTL 
depends on the storage of intermediate results in :main memory. Vergauwen and Lewi's 
algorithm uses a large table to store the value of every subformula in all reachable states. 
They suggest that memory can be saved by storing only the results of subformulae 
that are expensive to evaluate, but point out that this would destroy the linear time 
property of the algorithm. The algorithm of Bhat, Cleaveland and Grumberg for CTL* 
has similar space requirements [4]. It constructs a strongly connected component of 
the state graph on-the-fly and, in addition, two large data structures are used to store 
all assertions that have been encountered, and a set of assertions that have been found 
to be false. 
From a practical point of view, there is another problem with both these algorithms: 
no mechanism is provided to cope with state spaces that are too large for a given 
memory size. Even one state too many would cause a verification system based on 
these algorithms to terminate with an "out of memory" message. For a practical 
verifier this is unacceptable. The goal should be to design a system that can produce 
useful results even for models that generate state spaces too large to fit into memory. 
The challenge, therefore, was to design a verification algorithm whose performance 
degrades gradually under overload conditions. A cache with replacement of states is 
used to meet this requirement at the cost of an (often acceptable) increase in run 
time. The system described here accepts models written in ESML and correctness 
claims expressed in a subset of CTL. Although the basic strategy is similar to that of 
Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm, there are a number of important differences: 
48 
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• A state cache with replacement has been incorporated to increase the size of 
models that can be analysed. 
• A compaction scheme is used to increase the number of states that can be stored 
in a cache of a given size. 
• The system is designed to handle a useful subset of CTL rather than full CTL. 
This makes it possible to save memory by postponing the evaluation of nested 
temporal operators without storing all intermediate results. 
• Fairness has been incorporated. 
5.1 A cache to detect revisited states 
Revisited states can be detected by storing all unique states as they are generated. 
However, models of realistic size generate far too many states for this to be practical. 
It was decided to address this problem by using a state space cache-a technique that 
was first proposed by Holzmann in [42J. The basic idea is to store as many states as 
possible and to replace (overwrite) states as memory fills up. A good description of 
this technique can be found in [28J. This strategy reduces memory requirements at 
the expense of increased runtime, because the removal of states from the cache will 
probably cause some work to be repeated. 
Experiments show that state space caching makes it possible to handle state spaces 
that are up to three times larger than can be stored in memory. If necessary, the 
performance of a state cache can be improved further by reducing the probability of 
reaching each stored state. This can be done by combining a cache with partial order 
techniques as was argued in [36J. In addition, a good state compaction scheme makes 
it possible to fit even more states into memory. However, most compaction schemes 
-- require additiomi.I processing- which lead to a substantial increase in runtime. 
5.2 An efficient state compaction scheme 
A simple type in ESML defines a finite set of values. Variables of these types can 
be encoded in fZo92n 1 bits, where n is the cardinality of the set defined by the type. 
For example, type BOOLEAN can be encoded ina single bit, while the subrange type 
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0 .. 10 will need 4 hits. Complex data types cause a substantial increase inthe state size. 
Since the number of states that can fit into a cache of a given size depend on the state 
size, a compaction technique is used to represent data types in the smallest possible 
number of bits. Consider a state containing the following variables: 
VAR c: O .. 4; 
b: BOOLEAN; 
p: (x, y: o .. 149); 
The compacted state is computed as c+5· (b+2· (p.x+ 150·p.y)), which can be written 
as 1 . C + 1 . 5 . b + 1 . 5 . 2 . p.x + 1 . 5 . 2 . 150 . p.y to show that each variable z has two 
associated "mask" factors Zlo and Zhi that are computed by the ESML compiler. In 
particular, Clo = 1, Chi ...:.... 1· 5, blo = 1· 5, bhi = 1· 5·2, P.Xlo = 1· 5·2, P.Xhi = 1· 5·2 ·150, 
P.Ylo = 1 . 5 . 2 . 150, and P.Yhi = 1 . 5 . 2 . 150 . 150. This is analogous to the way a 
decimal number such as 3425 can be computed as 5 + 10 . (2 + 10 . (4 + 10 . 3)). The 
only difference is that in the compaction scheme a variable size "radix" is used which 
depends on the number of possible values assumed by each variable. 
Extracting the value of a given variable Z from a compacted state S is simple and 
requires only two operations: Z = (S mod Zhi) div Zlo. When the value of a variable Z 
changes to z', the updated compacted state S' = S + Zlo· (z' - z). Because the factors Zlo 
and Zhi are computed at compile time this compaction scheme is simple to implement 
and efficient. The mod and div operations that are required at run time represent the 
only run-time overhead. 
We have modified the verifier SPIN to incorporate the same compaction scheme, ob-
taining similar results [34]. A number of well-known Promela models were used to 
measure the effectiveness of the compaction technique. Some of the models (leader, 
pftp, __ snoopy, and sort)_ are part of the standard SPIN distribution l ., while the other 
models (cambridge and slide) were collected from the Internet 
Table 1 shows the memory required (in Mbytes) followed by the time needed to complete 
each validation run (in seconds)2. The first column (marked SPIN) gives the results 
for the standard SPIN system. The next column (marked SPIN-C) is for the modified 
SPIN system with compact representation of states. The last column shows the ratio 
between the two systems for purpos~s of comparison. Note that the technique works 
Ihttp://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/what/spin/Man/Exercises.html 
2Tests were executed on a 400MHz Pentium II with 256 Mbytes of memory. 
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Model SPIN SPIN-C Ratio 
memory time memory time memory time 
cambridge 54.1 6.9 23.8 6.8 0.44 0.99 
leader 91.7 12.6 33.2 7.7 0.36 0.61 
pftp 66.6 8.9 26.5 7.3 0.40 0.83 
snoopy 15.2 1.7 10.6 1.4 0.70 0.84 
sort 3.7 0.3 4.4 0.2 1.19 0.77 
sort(BIG) 130.7 22.6 70.4 14.7 0.54 0.65 
slide 33.3 3.2 20.3 3.2 0.61 0.97 
Average 0.60 0.81 
Table 1: Comparison of standard SPIN against SPIN with compaction (SPIN-C) 
best for the larger models. A useful reduction in memory requirements was measured 
for most models, the average being 40%. More surprising, however, is that execution 
time was decreased on average by 19%. The reason appears to be that the hash function 
associated with the state cache takes longer to compute for larger states. This seems to 
be enough to offset the small run-time overhead of conipression. As can be expected, 
the results differ from one model to the next. This is due to differences in the number of 
variables, the number of read and write accesses, and the structure of the state space. 
5.3 Delayed evaluation of subformulae 
Formulae with nested temporal operators such as AG(p '* AFq) present special prob-
lems. Such formulae can be handled in different ways. The original global model 
checking algorithm given in [15] works bottom-up, starting with the most deeply nested 
subformulae. This algorithm is straightforward, but unnecessary values are often com-
puted. A more serious problem is that the entire reachability graph must be stored in 
memory. Therefore the practical value of this approach is limited. 
Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm needs a large array to store the value of every sub-
formula in every state. A subset of CTL can be checked efficiently without storing 
any intermediate results. Fortunately the kind of CTL formulae that can be checked 
in this way are those that are often needed in practice. To verify the Gneiss micro-
kernel only two kinds of correctness claims were needed: invariance properties and 
response properties. In fact, according to Manna and Pnueli, a slightly larger subset of 
CTL is adequate to specify most correctness claims needed in practice as described in 
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Chapter 4. The verification system described here can check invariance and response 
properties. The verification process proceeds top-down, but the evaluation of nested 
temporal subformulae is postponed for as long as possible. This idea was proposed 
in [19J. 
Only the subset of CTL that was needed to verify the Gneiss kernel was actually im-
plemented. This subset will now be described precisely. Formulae of the general form 
AG(a) were used to describe invariant properties. The argument a of such formulae 
is required to be a state property. That means, it may not be anything else than an 
expression composed of the propositional operators 1\, V, -', and =*, with parenthesis 
used to arbitrary levels for grouping terms together, according to the syntactical defi-
nition of full CTL. Formulae of the general form AG(a => AF(3) were used to express 
response properties. The arguments a and f3 of such formulae are restricted as as 
above: they may not be anything else than state properties. 
Consider a CTL formula of the form AG(a =* AF(3). To determine the truth value of 
this formula in state s the verifier will explore all paths leading from s while checking 
that in each state along every path the argument to AG is true. Due to the implication, 
it is unnecessary to determine the truth value of the nested temporal formula (AFf3) 
in any state where a is false. If a is true however, the truth value of AFf3 is needed. 
Instead of computing this truth value immediately, the state s and the subformula are 
recorded as a subproblem to be analysed at a later stage. In the mean time, the nested 
subformula AF f3 is assumed to be true and the search continues. This approach has 
two advantages: (1) it reduces the memory requirements and (2) the model checking 
algorithm for the nested formulae that were needed is quite simple. 
When nested subformulae are evaluated immediately, the results must be stored in ran-
domly accessible memory so that the verifier can refer to these results. The efficiency 
of Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm is based on the availability of these intermediate 
results. By postponing evaluation, the implicit assumption is that all nested subfor-
mulae will eventually work out to be true. This makes it unnecessary to refer to any 
intermediate results. It is often necessary to evaluate the same nested subformula in 
many different states. A list of such states is stored and when it becomes too long, it 
can be written to disk. The technique of postponed evaluation has been implemented 
and used to check correctness claims for the Gneiss microkernel. 
Invariance properties, as expressed in the subset of CTL that was implemented, are 
simple to check. The entire reachable state space must be explored because of the AG 
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operator. The condition to be checked in each state is a state property and there-
fore simple to check. Consequently, the size of the state space determines the cost of 
checking invariance properties. 
The technique of postponing the evaluation of subformulae was only needed to check 
response properties. First, the entire state space is explored to discover a subset of 
states in which additional checking must be done. This is the set of states in which 
some triggering event occurs to which a response is needed. The subsequent checking 
ensures that each triggering event is always followed by the desired response. 
5.4 Strongly connected components and fairness 
As mentioned in [15], fairness can be implemented by computing the strongly connected 
components (SCCs) of the reachability graph. All SCCs of a graph can be computed 
in linear time3 by an algorithm due to Tarjan[l, Chapter 5]. The algorithm is shown in 
Figure 9. Each node or vertex represents' a state in a state graph. Nodes are numbered 
during a depth-first search to preserve the order in which they are visited. These 
numbers are used to detect the "root" node of each SCC~the node with the lowest 
search number that belongs to the SCC. Nodes that belong to a SCC are pushed onto 
a separate stack (the SCC stack). To find the root node of each SCC, each node has 
a field called lowlink. The lowlink field of each node is initially simply the depth-first 
search number of the node. This field must always contain the number of the node 
with the lowest search number that can reach the current node and the low link field 
of new nodes is updated to ensure this. If a node is reached which has a lower lowlink 
value than the current node, this lower value is used to replace the low link value of the 
current node. In [1, Chapter 5] it is proved that when the lowlink field of a node equals 
its search number, this node must be the root of the topmost SCC contained in the 
SQC stack. 
Intuitively, the version of fairness that was implemented requires that on a fair path a 
transition cannot be enabled infinitely often without eventually being executed. This 
version of fairness for CTL was formally defined by Tuominen in [69]. A path (an 
infinite sequence of successive states) is fair if for each suffix of the path the following 
holds: if some state Si appears infinitely often in the suffix and another state Sj is 
directly reachable from Si then S j appears at least once in the suffix. 
3Time O(Max(n, e)), where n = number of nodes, e = number of edges 
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PROCEDURE TarjanCv: Vertex); 
VAR w, x: Vertex; 
BEGIN 
INCCcount); C* count nodes as they are visited *) 
v.dfnr := count; 
v.lowlink := v.dfnr; 
v.marked := TRUE; 
push v on stack; 
FOR each descendant w of v DO 
IF NOT w.marked THEN 
TarjanCw); 
v.lowlink := MinCv.lowlink, w.lowlink) 
ELSIF Cw.dfnr < v.dfnr) & w is on the stack THEN 
v.lowlink := MinCv.lowlink, w.dfnr) 
END 
END; 
IF v.lowlink = v.dfnr THEN C* root found *) 
REPEAT pop x from stack UNTIL x = v 
END 
END Tarjan; 
54 
Figure 9: Tarjan's algorithm to compute the strongly connected components of a graph. 
Figure 10: Reachability graph with unfair paths through a strongly connected compo-
nent 
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Consider the reachability graph shown in Figure 10. The states 80,81,82,83 form an 
SCC rooted at So. The root of an SCC is the state that is encountered first during 
a depth-first search. More than one transition is enabled.in states 80 and 83. For 
example, in 83, one transition leads to state 81 and the other to 84. Along some path, 
state 83 may occur infinitely often since it is inside the SCC rooted at 80. Any path 
from 80 that continually ignores the transition leading to state 84 is unfair. 
To implement the version of fairness considered here, the path operators of the subset 
of CTL that was defined earlier must range over fair paths only. Unfair paths must be 
ignored subject to certain conditions to be discussed shortly. For the specified subset 
of CTL only the AF operator requires special treatment to implement fairness. The 
operator AG requires that all paths must be checked and needs no special treatment. 
For formulae that contain the AF operator special care is needed when some path leads 
to an SCC where the formula is false in all states and some state in the SCC has more 
than one transition enabled. 
As an example, consider the state graph shown in Figure 10 again. Suppose the truth 
value of AFa must be determined in state 80 and assume that a is false in all states 
except state 84. Therefore, for the formula to be true in 80, each path from state So 
must lead to a state in which a holds. If a path starting at 80 contains no state in which 
a is true, and leads back to So, it is necessary to check whether this path is fair or not. 
For this it is necessary to know whether some other transition from 80 leads to a state 
in which a is true. If this is not so, the formula is false in 80. On the other hand, if 
a state in which a holds can be reached from 80 the cycle may be ignored. Therefore, 
to decide whether AFa is true in 80, we must know whether a state in which a is true 
can be reached from So. As can be seen in Figure 10 such a path exists. However, 
depending on the order in which states are generated, this information may not be 
available when the first cycle (80, 81, 82, 80, ... ) is detected. Therefore, if a cycle leads 
back to state 80 for which a is false in all states, it cannot be assumed immediately 
that the formula AFa is false in 80. Instead, processing continues after setting a flag 
in state So to indicate that more information is needed: before backtracking from 80, 
some path from 80 must lead to a state where a is true. In Section 5.9 the details of 
implementing this version of fairness is discussed. 
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5.5 Structure of the verifier 
Two versions of the ESML verifier were implemented. The first version generated a 
Modula-2 program from each model [73]. This program was then compiled to pro-
duce an executable verifier for a specific model. State generation, state storage and 
state analysis were intertwined in this implementation, which made the system diffi-
cult to understand. Clearly, a verifier of this kind can be divided into four relatively 
independent components: 
• A compiler. This is a separate program that translates a model into a func-
tionally equivalent transition system. 
• The state generator. This module is responsible for executing a transition 
system to explore a model's state space. It also contains the mechanisms needed 
to support process scheduling and fairness. 
• A state storage module. This module is needed to detect revisited states 
by storing as many states as possible. One can experiment with different state 
storage techniques by replacing this module. 
• The analyser. The state generation process is controlled by this module. It calls 
upon the state generator to generate states as needed to verify a given formula. By 
replacing the analyser module, it should be possible to handle different temporal 
logics. 
A second version of the ESML verifier was developed to reflect this modular structure. 
The completed system is easier to understand and simpler to modify. One of the 
advantages of the design is that each module can be described and understood on its 
own. The ESML compiler is based on standard compilation techniques, the details of 
which are irrelevant here. For a given ESML model it generates functionally equivalent 
low level code that represents a transition system. The low level instructions were 
designed to simplify state generation. 
The verification system is divided into three components, each with a well-defined 
function. (1) Module State Generator is an interpreter for the abstract machine that 
handles state generation. It interprets the low level code generated by the compiler to 
explore the state space of the model. (2) Module Storage implements a cache to store as 
many states as possible to detect revisited states. It is used by module State Generator. 
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Figure 11: Structure of the verifier 
(3) The rest of the verifier consists of two modules: Logic and Analyser. Module Logi-c 
contains a procedure Check to verify subformulae that contain at most one temporal 
operator. Procedure Check relies on the state generator to generate new states when 
necessary. Module Analyser handles formulae that contain nested subformulae. It 
contains a procedure CheckFormula that calls procedure Check to determine the values 
of subformulae, one at a time. The interaction of the modules that make up the verifier 
is shown in Figure 11. State generation is completely separated from state analysis. 
The code generated by the compiler is read in by module State Generator. This code 
contains all information about a given model, including the CTL formula to be checked. 
Specific instructions are executed to check the propositions in the given CTL formula 
in every state generated. The values of these propositions are transmitted to module 
Logic on request. 
5.6 The state generator 
The state generator is a separate module. Its implementation contains much detail 
but it is based on standard techniques. It is basically an interpreter for a stack-
based abstract machine designed with state generation in mind. The instructions are 
classified as (1) typical instructions for stack-based evaluation of expressions such as 
PushVariable, PushValue, Add, Greater, and Equal, (2) instructions to handle flow 
of control: guards and jump, (3) instructions to manipulate operations on lists, for ex-
ample Head, and Length, (4) instructions for communication between processes: Hook, 
Bang, and Poll, and (5) instructions to create and terminate processes. The memory 
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Figure 12: Memory organisation of the abstract machine 
of the abstract machine is implemented as an array store ?f integers. It contains the 
abstract code to be interpreted, the variables of each process (the location pointer and 
data variables of each process are collectively known as a frame), and an expression 
stack which is used to evaluate expressions. The frame for each process is created by 
executing the Activate instruction. The memory organisation is shown in Figure 12. 
Module State Generator exports the following procedures: 
• Execute. This procedure executes a new transition if possible to generate a new 
state. The current state is stored within module State Generator. Terminal states 
indicate a deadlock. 
• Evaluate. This procedure is called to return the value of a given proposition in 
the current state. 
• Backtrack The state generator is instructed explicitly to fall back to the current 
state's immediate predecessor. 
• GetFormula. This procedure returns the operator (op) and operands (left, 
right) of the subformula (sf) that is being analysed. Procedure Getformula is 
called by module Logic. 
• Set Good Children. This procedure is needed to support fairness. It is a very 
simple procedure that sets a flag to indicate that a state is reachable from the 
current state where the argument of the current formula holds. This value is 
copied to the predecessor of the current state when the verifier falls back. 
• SetState. This pro-cedure is used to initialise the state generator. 
Procedure Execute (Figure 13) implements a depth-first search based on a cache with 
replacement of states. Each transition corresponds to executing some process, the 
procedure Reschedule selecting a new process when no transition is enabled in the 
current process. One or more transitions may be enabled in every state. The process 
number determines the order in which transitions are selected for execution. In every 
state generated, a transition is selected starting from process O. If no transition of 
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process 0 is enabled, a transition of the next process (process 1) is selected, and so on. 
lf multiple transitions are enabled in the same process (for example when more than 
one guard of an IF command is true) the first one will. be selected and later, when the 
verifier falls back to the state where the first transition was executed, the next one will 
be executed, and so on. This strategy ensures that a depth-first search is performed. 
All states encountered along the current execution path are stored in a stack. The 
process number is used to determine whether there are any enabled transitions left in 
the current state. lf no more transitions are enabled in the current state, the function 
Backtrack is called. Procedure Backtrack pops the topmost state from the stack and 
returns either Backtracked (thereby falling back to the current state's predecessor) or 
Complete (when the current state was the initial state). 
After a state has been generated, procedure Push is called, which tries to enter it in 
the stack. There are three possibilities: (1) if it is a new state, it is entered in the 
stack and the constant Inserted is returned, (2) if the state was already on the stack, 
the constant Loop is returned, and (3) if the state is neither new nor on the stack, it 
means that it was already encountered along some earlier path; the constant Revisited 
is returned to indicate this. A simple CASE command is used in procedure Execute to 
distinguish between the three possibilities. 
It is also possible that no state was generated. This can happen when an attempt 
to execute a communication command causes the current process to block. It is then 
necessary to select another process to execute. An error (such as division by 0) can 
also occur. 
Procedure Execute handles rescheduling of processes and calls procedure Step which 
attempts to execute a transition from the current process. Procedure Step is a typical 
interpreter for a stack-based computer. Its general structure is shown in Figure 14. 
Executing a transition may involve executing more than one instruction. Procedure 
Step sets the variable transi tion to TRUE as soon as a transition has been completed. 
The opcode of the current instruction (stored in the abstract machine's memory at 
position lac) is used to select the appropriate code to interpret each instruction. Some 
instructions have parameters which follow the opcode. The first of these is referenced 
as store [loc+l] , the second as store [loc+2], etc. During interpretation of each 
instruction the location pointer lac is updated to point to the next instruction. The 
code to interpret some instructions is straightforward. For example, the following code 
interprets the Add instruction: 
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PROCEDURE Execute*(): INTEGER; 
VAR loc, pos, base: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
LOOP 
Reschedule; 
IF AllProcessesTried THEN RETURN Backtrack() END; 
Step(loc, currentproc); 
IF result = Progress THEN (* successful execution *) 
CASE Stack.Push(s) OF 
Inserted: RETURN Forward 
I Revisited: RETURN Revisit 
I Loop: RETURN Cycle 
END 
ELSIF result = NoProgress THEN (* do nothing *) 
ELSIF result = Error THEN RETURN Error 
END 
. END 
END Execute; 
Figure 13: Procedure to execute a single transition 
PROCEDURE Step(VAR loc: INTEGER; process: INTEGER); 
(* declarations *) 
BEGIN 
transition := FALSE; 
REPEAT 
CASE store[loc] OF 
PushValue: (* code to interpret the PushValue instruction *) 
I Add: (* code to-interpret the Add instruction *) 
I ... 
END 
UNTIL transition (* a transition has been completed *) 
END Step; 
60 
Figure 14: General structure of the interpreter for low-level code. The location pointer 
loc points at the current instruction. The code is stored in an array store. 
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INC(sp); 
store [sp] := store[sp] + store[sp-l]; 
INC (loc) 
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Before executing an Add instruction, the values of its two operands must be pushed 
onto the stack by executing PushValue or PushVariable instructions. Executing the 
Add instruction will replace the topmost two values on the stack by their sum. Note 
that the stack is popped by incrementing the stack pointer. 
Instructions such as Add are used to evaluate expressions. The final result of an expres-
sion is stored by updating some data variable in the frame of the current process. This 
will change the global state of the model and variable transition is set to TRUE to 
indicate that a transition has been completed. Note that although the location counter 
is modified during execution of instructions such as Add, this is not reflected as a global 
state change until a data variable is updated. Each assignment therefore constitutes a 
single transition. 
The unconditional jump instruction has one parameter to specify the location to jump 
to. This is stored in the next memory location following the opcode. The code to 
interpret it is equally simple: 
loc := store[loc+l]; 
result := Progress; 
transition := TRUE 
Although the Jump instruction changes only the location pointer of the current process, 
it is seen as completing a transition. Therefore a global variable transition is set to 
TRUE. This variable is needed because some transitions may involve the execution of 
several instructions. The procedure Step does not return before transition is TRUE, 
as can be seen in Figure 14. The global variable result is used to indicate whether a 
completed transition made progress or not. 
Guarded commands are used as control structures in ESML. The instructions jump 
and guards are used to handle any number of guards. Each guard is represented by a 
pair of numbers (m, n), where m is the address of the code that evaluates the guard 
expression and n is the address of the next guard. A guarded command (IF or DO) is 
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IF x = 0 -> Y := 0 
[] x # 0 -> Y := 1 
END 
12 guards 32 
14 (47, 23) 
16 pushValue 2 
18 evaluate 44 
20 popVariable 
21 jump 33 
23 (54, 32) 
25 pushValue 2 
27 evaluate 61. 
29 popVariable 
30 jump 33 
32 trap 
33 
Figure 15: Translation of ESML guarded commands 
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translated into a guards instruction followed by any number of guards. The guards 
instruction has a single parameter which is the address of the instruction following the 
last guard. The guards are evaluated sequentially and the first true one is selected. 
The corresponding instruction sequence following the selected guard is then executed. 
The low-level code generated for an IF command is shown in Figure 15. At address 12 
is a guards instruction that controls the entire guarded command. Its parameter shows 
that the address of the instruction following the last guard is 32. At that address is 
a trap instruction, which will be executed to abort execution if all guards of the IF 
are false, as required by the ESML semantics. The first guard is at address 14. It 
indicates that the code to evaluate the guard expression is at address 47 and the next 
guard is at address 23. The code following each guard is executed if the guard is true. 
Otherwise the next guard is evaluated. The pushValue instruction pushes the offset 
of a variable onto the stack and the evaluate instruction executes code indicated by 
its parameter to leave a result on the stack. This result is assigned to the variable by 
the popVariable instruction. (The address of the variable is on the stack right below 
the result.) The DO command is handled in a similar way. The only difference is that 
it ends with a jump instruction to transfer control back to the beginning of the loop. 
The DO command terminates when all its guards are false. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. A VERIFIER FOR REACTIVE SYSTEMS 63 
To implement simple communication commands, two instructions hook (to receive mes-
sages) and bang (to send messages) are used. No attempt is made to find a communi-
cation partner when a hook instruction is executed; the process is simply blocked and 
another process is scheduled. When a process executes a bang instruction, the other 
processes are probed systematically to find one that is blocked at a hook instruction, 
willing to transmit an acceptable message. If such a communication partner is found, 
the message is transferred, otherwise the process that executed the bang instruction is 
blocked. It can be seen that the implementation of communication is asymmetric. In 
the SPIN verifier a simpler, more efficient strategy is used. When a process executes 
a send or receive operation in SPIN, this process is entered in a queue if no suitable 
communication partner is available yet. When another process later executes a match-
ing communication command, it is simple to test whether a message is waiting or not. 
However, the fact that two POLL commands in ESML must be able to synchronise 
required the more elaborate mechanism described above. In retrospect, it was perhaps 
a mistake to incorporate such an elaborate mechanism in ESML, since it is seldom 
used. This mechanism accounts for the extra states generated by the ESML verifier for 
communication commands when compared to SPIN, as described in Section 5.10.1. 
The hook instruction has parameters to indicate (1) the channel number, (2) which 
message is expected, (3) where the data must be stored, (4) the size of the data, and 
(5) a condition that must hold for the data to be acceptable. The last parameter is 
set to a predefined constant (MAX(INTEGER)) when no condition was specified. The 
bang instruction has similar parameters, but because data must be transmitted and 
not received, the third parameter indicates an expression to be evaluated to push the 
data onto the stack. 
The POLL command of ESML is translated into a poll instruction followed by a 
series of hook and/or bang instructions. ~he structure of the code generated for POLL 
commands is similar to that generated for IF commands. HoweveF, the poll instruction 
takes the place of the guards instruction and hook· and bang instructions take the place 
of guards. A simple example is shown in Figure 16. The poll instruction (line 7) has 
a single parameter to indicate the address of the first instruction following the entire 
POLL structure. The first guard (cl ?m) is translated into a hook instruction. Its 
first two parameters indicate that a message must be received from channel 0, and 
that message number 0 (m) is expected. The next parameter is 0 because no data is 
associated with the message. The next parameter (data size) is 0 because there are 
no associated data, and the number 32767 (MAX(INTEGER) indicates that there is 
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POLL c1?m -> SKIP 
[] c2!m -> SKIP 
END 
7 poll 27 
9 hook 0 0 0 0 32767 (19) 
16 skip 
17 jump 27 
19 bang 1 0 0 0 32767 (27) 
26 skip 
27 ... 
Figure 16: Instructions generated for a simple POLL command. 
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no associated Boolean expression either. The number (19) indicates where the next 
guard is located. For this guard a bang instruction was generated, which has similar 
parameters. 
An activate instruction is used to activate a new process. It has the following parame-
ters: (1) the identification number ofthe process, (2) the address of the first instruction 
of the process, (3) the number of variables declared for this process, (4) the number 
of parameters, and (5) the number of channels created by this process. Executing an 
acti vate instruction creates a frame, which reserves space for the local data of the 
process (including its instruction pointer). 
The state generator is initialised by transferring the contents of a specified file that 
contains compiled code to the lower part of store. Variable framesstart is initialised 
to point at a position directly after the code because this is where the first frame will be 
stored. At this stage variable framesend is set to the same position. The first process 
is then created. This involves executing the first activate instruction. 
5.7 State storage 
The cache is implemented as a separate module Storage. A state space caching scheme 
is used, with a suitable hash function to compute the position of each state in a large 
array. Closed hashing is used and if a hash collision occurs (a slot is occupied), rehashing 
with a second hash function is used to search for an open slot. The second hash function 
provides an "offset" which is added to the current position in the hash table and this 
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mechanism is used repeatedly, trying to find an open slot. If no open slot can be found 
during a predefined (small) number of probes, the state currently pointed at is replaced. 
To keep track of the current execution path, states are pushed onto a stack as they 
are generated. Fully analysed states are moved to the cache when they are known to 
satisfy the current subformula being checked. Instead of storing states that are on the 
current path (the stack) and states that are in the cache in separate data structures, a 
single large hash table is used to store all states, whether they are in the cache or on 
the stack. States that are on the stack are marked. When a state must be moved from 
the stack to the cache, it is only necessary to change its marking. The stack, which is a 
separate array, only contains pointers to the state values (as stored in the hash table). 
The advantage of this scheme is that the same hash computation can be used to look up 
a state whether it is in the cache or on the stack. A cache that is large enough to store 
at least 40% of a model's states was found to be needed for acceptable performance. 
A search path can be terminated when a state is reached that is in the cache. Such a 
mechanism is really essential to keep verification run times within acceptable limits. 
5.8 State analysis 
The module Logic (which is part of the analyser component) exports a procedure Check 
which is used to evaluate formulae. Formulae evaluated by Check may not contain more 
than one temporal operator. More complex formulae are handled by calling Check 
repeatedly. Here is the code for procedure Check: 
PROCEDURE Check*(sf: INTEGER; VAR result: BOOLEAN); 
VAR 
op, left, right, res: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
StateGenerator.GetFormula(sf, op, left, right); 
(* determine truth value in initial state *) 
value := TruthValueFormula(sf); 
IF value = U THEN (* result undetermined *) 
LOOP 
(* generate a new state *) 
res := StateGenerator.Execute(); 
(* now analyse the state *) 
CASE res OF 
Forward: 
value := TruthValueFormula(sf); 
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END 
END 
END; 
IF value = T THEN 
Trace.SetGoodChildren; 
res := StateGenerator.Backtrack(); AdaptValue(op) 
ELSIF value = F THEN EXIT 
END 
Complete: 
value := FinalValue(op); StateGenerator.BackTrack; EXIT 
AllChildrenExplored: 
value := FinalValue(op); StateGenerator.BackTrack; 
IF value = F THEN EXIT END 
Revisit: 
Path.SetGoodChildren; 
1\daptValue(op) 
IF value = T THEN result := TRUE 
ELSE result := FALSE 
END 
END Check; 
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The procedure Setstate, exported by the state generator module, is used to set up 
the state generator in the correct initial state before calling Check. The initial state 
is passed to SetState in packed (compacted) form. The subformula to be checked is 
indicated by parameter sf. The procedure Getformula returns the current operator 
since that is needed to determine whether to proceed or not. For example, when 
checking the formula AGa, the verifier can stop as soon as· a state is reached where a 
is false. On the other hand, when checking AFa, this is not so and execution should 
continue. Module Logic contains a procedure Truth ValueFormula which computes the 
truth value of subformula sf in the current state: The evaluation of propositions 
will be discussed first because that is quite simple. To determine the truth values 
of propositions, a procedure Evaluate, which is exported by the state generator, is 
called by Truth ValueFormula. The state generator has access to the current state and 
therefore the values· of all data variables. It is often impossible to determine the truth 
value of a subformula that contains a temporal operator by examining a single state. 
In such a case the value U (undetermined) is returned. Further states are generated 
until the value T (true) or F (false) is obtained. The code shown below illustrates how 
the subset of CTL that was used to verify the Gneiss kernel is handled: 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. A VERIFIER FOR REACTIVE SYSTEMS 
PROCEDURE TruthValueFormula(sf: INTEGER): TruthValue; 
VAR 
op, left,right: INTEGER; v: TruthValue; 
BEGIN 
StateGenerator.GetFormula(sf, op, left, right); 
CASE op OF 
(* Modal operators: *) 
AF: 
·.1 AG: 
v := TruthValueFormula(left); 
IF v = F THEN v := U 
ELSIF v = U THEN (* error: invalid formula *) 
END 
v := TruthValueFormula(left); 
IF v = T THEN v := U 
ELSIF v = U THEN (* error: invalid formula *) 
END 
(* Propositional operators: *) 
Imp: 
v := TruthValueFormula(left); 
IF v = F THEN v := T 
ELSIF v = T THEN 
v := TruthValueFormula(right); 
IF v = U THEN SubProblem(right); v := T END 
ELSIF v = U THEN (* error: invalid formula *) 
END 
(* other propositional operators, handled similarly *) 
ELSE (* Proposition *) 
v := StateGenerator.Evaluate(op) 
END; RETURN v 
END TruthValueFormula; 
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When procedure Execute (exported by the state generator) is called to generate a new 
state, the result will be one of the following: Forward (a new state was generated), Com-
plete (all states have been explored), AllChildrenExplored (all paths leading from the 
current state have been explored), or Revisit (a state was revisited). The appropriate 
action in each of these cases will be described separately . 
• New state generated. In this case (res Forward), Truth ValueFormula IS 
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called to assign the value of the subformula sf in this new state to value. Proce-
dure Truth ValueFormula only returns F if the correctness claim has been violated, 
meaning that the verification run can be stopped, because the correctness prop-
erty that is being checked has been violated. However, while the value is U (or T 
for some formulae), verification must proceed. As an example, consider checking 
the CTL formula AF a in a state s. A state may be found along the first execution 
path leading from s where a holds. However, this does not mean that a state 
where a is true is reachable along all paths that lead from s. As soon as a state 
is found in which a holds, exploration of that path is stopped and the verifier 
falls back to the state's predecessor. From this new state--the predecessor of the 
state in which a holds-there may exist another path to be explored. 
It is therefore necessary to adapt the truth value stored in value before verifi-
cation proceeds, depending on the specific temporal operator. The procedure 
Adapt Value is used to accomplish this. Its actions depend on the particular 
temporal operator. For the formulae considered here (AG and AF), procedure 
Adapt Value sets value to true. 
When all paths leading from the current state.have been explored, procedure 
FirwlValue is called. This will determine the value of the formula being checked 
in the current state before the verifier falls back. For AG FinalValue returns true, 
and for AF it returns true if GoodChildren is true, otherwise it returns false. If 
GoodChildren is true in the current state, it means that a state is reachable from 
it in which the operand of AF is true. This is similar to the idea of a goal state 
in Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm, as described in Chapter 4. 
• Complete. No further states need be explored. To determine the final value of 
the formula, the procedure FinalValue is called. 
• AllChildrenExplored .. There are no further paths to be explored from the 
current state. Procedure FinalValue is called to determine the value of the sub-
formula in the current state. If value is F, the verification run is terminated 
because the correctness claim has been violated. 
• Revisit. Because a state was revisited (it is in the cache), the subformula holds 
for the current path. This is so because the successor states of the state found in 
the cache have been explored already. For the subformula AFa this means that 
a is true somewhere on the current path (in some previously visited state) and 
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procedure SetGoodChildren is called to record this fact. (Procedure SetGoodChil-
dren is a very simple procedure that basically sets a flag in state records kept by 
the state generator.) This information is necessary to handle fairness and is used 
by procedure Final Value mentioned above. 
Procedures Check and Truth ValueFormula handle simple CTL formulae that contain at 
most one temporal operator (limited to the subset of CTL that was defined for verifying 
the Gneiss kernel). As explained in Section 5.3 more complex formulae are handled by 
postponing the evaluation of nested temporal operators. This technique may seem to 
be rather inefficient because many states may be explored more than once. Fortunately, 
the unnecessary work can be avoided. In Section 5.1 it was explained that a cache is 
used to avoid a substantial amount of unnecessary work by detecting revisited states. 
It turns out that the cache can also be used to avoid the unnecessary analysis of many 
subformulae. 
Recall that the algorithm of Vergauwen and Lewi described in Chapter 4 evaluates 
CTL formulae in a goal-directed fashion, using mutually recursive procedure calls to 
evaluate nested subformulae as necessary. The algorithm described here uses essentially 
the same idea, but postpones the evaluation of nested temporal subformulae instead of 
evaluating them immediately. A subformula and the state in which its value is needed 
is recorded as a subproblem to be evaluated at a later stage. To be able to proceed, the 
value of the subformula is assumed to be true. Many subproblems involve the same 
subformula, but different states. For each subformula, a list of states is built up in 
which the value of the subformula is needed. The formula is evaluated in each of these 
states during a subsequent exploration of the state space. 
Evaluating the same subformula in different start states may involve unnecessary work 
that should be avoided. To explain how this can be accomplished, recall that states are 
only entered in the cache when they are known to satisfy the formula being checked. 
This means that when a subformula f must be checked in a set of states S = So, S1, ... 
and any state Si E S is found in the cache, the subproblem can be skipped. The 
recursive definition of CTL formulae in terms of the next-state operator explains why 
this is so. For example, if the value of a formula AFa is needed in a state s, it can 
be computed by using the equivalent formula a V AX AFa. During evaluation of AFa 
only states that satisfy AFa are entered in the cache. If a state s' is found in the 
cache the search can be terminated because the formula is known to hold in the next 
state-state s'. The cache therefore helps to avoid unnecessary work. A verification 
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(* evaluate main formula *) 
Logic.Check(sf, satisfied); 
(* retrieve first subproblem, if any *) 
SubProblems.Get(sf, env, new, more); 
WHILE satisfied & more DO 
IF new THEN (* clear the cache *) Storage.Reset END; 
IF (* state not in cache *) THEN 
Logic.Check(sf, satisfied) 
END; 
(* select next subproblem; env = environment, sf = subformula *) 
StateGenerator.SetState(env, sf); 
SubProblems.Get(sf, env, new, more) 
END 
Figure 17: Code to handle nested temporal operators as subproblems. 
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run involves a number of sweeps of the state space, one for each temporal formula. 
Note, however, that the cache must be cleared before evaluating each new temporal 
su bformula. 
The code fragment shown in Figure 17 handles subproblems. Recall that the evaluation 
of nested subformulae is delayed as was explained in Section 5.3. Procedure Check is 
used repeatedly to check simple subformulae (containing a single temporal operator) 
as specified by the parameter sf. The result is returned in the parameter satisfied. 
Procedure Get in module SubProblems returns a new subproblem if possible. The 
argument sf indicates the subformula, env is the environment of the subproblem (used 
to set up the initial state of the state generator), new is used to indicate whether it 
is a new subformula (the cache must be cleared then), and more is a flag to indicate 
whether there are more subproblems to check. Module Storage implements the cache. 
The operation Storage. Reset is used to clear the cache for each new subformula that is 
checked to ensure that all states in the cache always satisfy the current subformula. A 
simple test then saves a substantial amount of unnecessary work: if a state is in the 
cache the subproblem can be skipped, as long as the same subformula is involved. 
In contrast to the strategy described above, Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm (described 
in Chapter 4) evaluates subformulae immediately. The advantages and disadvantages 
of these two strategies can now be discussed. If subformulae are evaluated immedi- . 
ately and intermediate results are stored, it is reasonably straightforward to check full 
CTL. Nested formulae are only evaluated when necessary, so no unnecessary work is 
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done. However, a substantial amount of memory is needed to record these interme-
diate results-the values of nested subformulae in all states visited. This amounts to 
lSI x length(f) x 2 bits of memory, where I SI is the size of the state space, and length(f) 
is the size of the formula. Two bits are required per formula, since its value can be 
true, false, or undetermined. The size of problems that can be evaluated is therefore 
limited by the amount of memory available. The structure of the algorithm further 
requires that the values of all subformulae be available all the time. Therefore, if the 
array holding these values fills up because the state space is too large, the verification 
run cannot proceed. 
By postponing the evaluation of nested subformulae it becomes unnecessary to store 
intermediate results, which reduces the memory requirements. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that a verification run is effectively divided into a number of smaller 
verification runs, one for each temporal formula. This means that the cache is used 
effectively, since it contains only states that are directly related to the temporal oper-
ator being evaluated. It would be possible to replace the large array in the algorithm 
described in Chapter 4 by a hash table. However, if nested subformulae are evaluated 
immediately (instead of postponing their evaluation), the cache will fill up faster be-
cause many states are visited to evaluate nested subformulae. When the cache fills 
up, states must be replaced, which means that work will have to be repeated. If the 
evaluation of nested temporal subformulae is postponed, the cache contains only states 
that are related to the (single) formula being evaluated. 
To measure the amount of memory saved by using the delayed evaluation technique 
would require implementing Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm on the same platform so 
that direct comparisons could be made. However, since the focus of this work was on 
verification of the Gneiss kernel, this was not attempted. 
5.9 Implementation of fairness 
Tarjan's algorithm [1, Chapter 5] was combined with the depth-first search algorithm 
to implement fairness. Instead of using a separate stack to store states that belong to a 
strongly connected component (SCC) as explained in Section 5.4, a single stack is used 
to store states belonging to the current path and SCC states. To identify states that 
are on the current path, they are linked together using a special field to indicate the 
predecessor of each state. Separate pointers indicate the top of the depth-first stack 
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and the top of the see-stack. States are always pushed onto the stack in the order 
they are encountered. Instead of storing depth-first numbers, the position of a state on 
the stack serves the same purpose. 
Fairness is implemented by two procedures Push (Figure 18) and Pop (Figure 19) that 
are exported by the module Stack. Procedure Push is called by the state generator 
for each state generated and Pop is called by procedure Backtrack to fall back to the 
current state's predecessor. 
For efficiency, the stack that stores states on the current path, the stack needed to 
store sec states (for Tarjan's algorithm) and the states in the cache are all contained 
in one large hash table. The global variable dftop indicates the top of the depth-first 
stack (the stack that contains states of the current path). Because all states are stored 
in a large hash table, it is necessary to first find the state by computing the hash 
function. If the state could not be found (on the stack or in the cache), it is new and 
. is pushed onto the stack. The top of the stack that stores the sec states is stored in 
top. A link is included with each stack entry (the link is called pre) to link each state 
to its predecessor. The global variable top is is incremented by Push. The field lowlink 
contains the lowest depth-first search number of the state that leads to the current 
state. 
Procedure Pop manipulates the same variables discussed for procedure Push and uses 
the low link field to detect the root state of an sec. When the root state is found, all 
states in the sec are inserted in the cache. 
5.10 Testing and evaluation of the ESML verifier 
Verifiers are programs that are complex enough to contain subtle errors. Since Promela 
and ESML are similar modeJling lang.!::!-ages, .systematic tests were conducted using SPIN 
for comparison purposes. Some tests are included here to show how the basic language 
constructs were tested4 . 
4The tests shown here were conducted by Jaco Geldenhuys. 
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PROCEDURE Push(s: State): INTEGER; 
VAR pos: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
pos := Find(s); (* find position of state in stack *) 
IF pos = -2 THEN (* not found, s is a new state *) 
stack [top] . state := s; 
stack [top] .lowlink := top; 
stack [top] .pre := dftop; 
dftop := top; 
INC(top); 
RETURN Inserted 
ELSIF pos = -1 THEN (* s found in cache *) 
RETURN Revisited 
ELSE (* s is on the stack *) 
stack[dftop].lowlink := Min(stack[dftop] .lowlink, pos); 
RETURN Loop 
END 
END Push; 
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Figure 18: Procedure Push that attempts to enter each generated state in the stack. It 
also implements fairness. 
PROCEDURE Pop(); 
VAR pre: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
pre := stack [dftop] .pre; 
stack [pre] .lowlink := 
Min(stack[pre] .lowlink, stack [dftop] .lowlink); 
IF stack [dftop] .lowlink = dftop THEN (* root of SCC found *) 
WHILE top > dftop DO 
DEC(top); 
Cache.Insert(stack[top] . state) 
END 
END; 
dftop := pre 
END Pop; 
Figure 19: Procedure Pop is called to fall back to the current state's predecessor. It 
also implements fairness. 
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MODEL Ctrli /* control structure */ 
PROCESS Pi proctype pO 
BEGIN { 
DO TRUE -) SKIP END do .. 1 -) /* skip */ od 
END p; } 
BEGIN init { 
p atomic {run pO } 
END Ctrli } 
# procs 1 2 3 4 # procs 1 2 3 4 
# states 1 1 1 1 - # states 2 2 2 2 
# trans 2 3 4 5 # trans 3 4 5 6 
Figure 20: Typical models used to test ESML control structures. The number of unique 
states generated and transitions executed are shown below each model for different 
nrtmbers of processes. 
5.10.1 Comparisons to SPIN 
To test the correctness of the basic control structures (guarded commands) several 
small models of the form shown in Figure 20 were written in ESML and Promela. 
Similar models were used to test the correctness of the IF command of ESML. Since 
the state spaces for such simple models are small, a comparison of the transitions 
executed and the unique states generated was feasible and could be checked to be the 
same. Actually, SPIN always generates one state more than the ESML verifier, but 
this can be explained easily. The ESML verifier views the initial state as the state 
generated after executing the code for the main process. In SPIN's case, the initial 
state is the state before the code of the main process has been executed. To test the 
scheduling of several processes, the same models were executed with several instances 
of the same process running concurrently. The number of unique- states generated and 
the number of transitions executed are shown below the models. (Promela also has a 
skip statement, but when it was used, the number of states and transitions executed 
escalated. ) 
The models shown in Figure 21 were used to test a loop with mUltiple guards. This 
test was also repeated with several instances of the same process to test the actions of 
the scheduler. 
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PROCESS p; proctype pO 
BEGIN { 
'DO TRUE 
-> SKIP do .. 1 -> 1* skip *1 
[] TRUE -> SKIP 1 -> 1* skip *1 
[J TRUE -> SKIP .. 1 -> 1* skip *1 
END od 
END p; } 
# procs 1 2 3 4 # procs 1 2 3 4 
# states 1 1 1 1 # states 2 2 2 2 
# trans 4 7 10 13 # trans 5 8 11 14 
Figure 21: Models used to test an ESML loop with more than one simple guard. 
The number of unique states generated and transitions executed are shown below each 
model for different numbers of processes. 
PROCESS p; proctype pO 
TYPE int = O .. 2; { 
VAR x: inti int x = 0; 
BEGIN 
DO x = 0 -> x := 1 do (x -- 0) -> x = 1 
[J x 1 -> x := 2 (x -- i) -> x = 2 
[J x = 2 -> x := 0 (x -- 2) -> x = 0 
END od 
END p; } 
# procs 1 2 3 4 # procs 1 2 3 4 
# states 6 36 216 1296 # states 7 37 217 1297 
# trans 9 97 865 6913 # trans 8 74 650 5186 
Figure 22: Models used to test an ESML loop with more than one simple guard. 
The number of unique states generated and transitions executed are shown below each 
model for different numbers of processes. 
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To test more complex guards the models shown in Figure 22 were used. For more 
than one process the number of states and transitions executed were too numerous to 
be checked manually. While the number of unique states generated corresponded, the 
number of transitions executed did not. 
Communication commands in ESML and Promela differ enough to make comparison 
difficult. For example, the POLL command in ESML allows optional Boolean expres-
sions in the guards, a feature that proved useful in some of the kernel models described 
in the next chapter. However, the same testing technique was used to compare simple 
models that include communication commands. 
A simple one-way channel was tested using the models shown in Figure 23. Several 
instances of processes p and q were tested. By studying the output of small models, it 
was possible to trace the internal operation of the verifiers and explain the differences. 
In this way it was possible to gain some confidence in the correctness of the ESML 
verifier. The number of states generated and transitions executed are shown to indicate 
that communication in ESML is less efficient than in Promela. This is caused by the 
more elaborate implementation strategy required to support synchronisation between 
different ESML POLL commands. 
Progressively more complex models were used to test communication commands as far 
as differences between the two modelling languages allowed. Some models are easily 
translated from ESML to Promela, as shown in Figure 24. Other models, especially 
models that make use of the optional Boolean expression in the guards of POLL com-
mands, need some rewriting. For example, a Promela version of one of the models 
developed to verify the Gneiss microkernel is shown in Appendix A 5 . The ESML and 
Promela versions are quite similar. Macro definitions were used to implement the queue 
operations of ESML and different channels were used to model selective reception of 
messages in a POLL command. 
5.10.2 Modelling style and the number of states generated 
The main limitation of model checking is the state explosion problem. It therefore 
helps to be aware of the influence of different modelling styles on the number of states 
generated. In particular, it is necessary to know what to avoid. The simple experiments 
described in this section illustrate the effect of different ESML constructs on the number 
5The Promela version of the original ESML model was written by Willem Visser. 
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MODEL Comm; /* communication */ 
TYPE ch = {a}; mtype = {a} 
VAR C: chj 
PROCESS q(IN i: ch); proctype q(chan in) 
BEGIN { 
DO TRUE -> i?a END do 1 -> in?a od 
END q; } 
PROCESS p(IN 0: ch); proctype p(chan out) 
BEGIN { 
DO TRUE -> o!a END do :: 1 -> out!a od 
END p; } 
BEGIN init { 
q(C); p(C) chan C [0] of {mtype}; 
atomic { run q(C)j run p(C} } 
END Comm; } 
q q 
P 1 2 3 P 1 2 3 
1 6 18 54 1 5 9 17 
9 40 163 7 18 46 
2 12 36 108 2 9 17 33 
25 109 433 18 50 130 
3 24 72 216 3 17 33 65 
65 277 1081 46 130 338 
-_. 
Figure 23: Models used to test simple communication commands. The upper numbers 
in each row represent states and the lower numbers transitions for different combina-
tions of processes p and q. Note that the ESML verifier generates more states. This is 
due to a more complex implementation needed to synchronise communication partners. 
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MODEL PC; 
CONST Max· = 2; 
TYPE Int = O .. Max; Ch = msg(Int); 
Buf = ARRAY[Max] OF Int; 
VAR A, B: Ch; 
PROCESS Consumer(IN i: Ch); 
VAR x: Int; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> i?msg(x) END 
END Consumer; 
PROCESS Producer(OUT 0; Ch); 
VAR x; Int; 
BEGIN x := 0; 
DO TRUE -> 
IF x 0 
[] x = 1 
[] x = 2 
[] x = 2 
-> x 
-> x 
-> x 
-> x 
END; o!msg(x) 
END 
END Producer; 
:= 1 
:= 2 
:= 1 
:= 0 
PROCESS Buffer(IN i: Ch; OUT 0: Ch); 
VAR buf: Buf; len: int; 
BEGIN 
DO len > 0 -> 
len := len - 1; o!msg(buf[len]) 
[] len < Max -> 
i?msg(buf[len]); len := len + 1 
END 
END Buffer; 
BEGIN 
Producer(A); 
Buffer(A, B); 
Consumer(B) 
END PC; 
1* producer-consumer *1 
#define MAX 2 
proctype consumer(chan i) 
{ 
byte x; 
do :: 1 -> i?x od 
} 
proctype producer(chan 0) 
{ 
byte x = 0; 
do .. 1 -> 
if (x 0) -> x = 
(x 
--
1) 
-> x = 2 
.. (x == 2) -> x = 1 
.. (x == 2) -> x = 0 
fi; i!x 
od 
} 
1 
proctype buffer(chan i; chan 0) 
{ 
·byte buf[MAX]; byte leng= 0; 
do :: leng > 0 -> 
leng = leng - 1; o!buf[leng] 
:: leng < MAX -> 
i?buf[leng]; leng = leng + 1 
od 
} ._--_.- . 
init { 
chan a 
chan b 
[0] of {byte}; 
= [0] of {byte}; 
} 
atomic { 
run producer(a); 
run buffer(a, b); 
run consumer(b) } 
Figure 24: A model of a producer-consumer system in ESML and Promela. 
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PROCESS Pj 
VAR x: BOOLEANj 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> x := TRUE END 
END Pj 
BEGIN 
Pj Pj P (* for 3 instances of process P *) 
END 
# procs # states 
1 4 
2 16 
3 64 
4 256 
Figure 25: Effect of increasing the number of processes 
of states generated. 
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Perhaps the most important consideration is to keep the number of concurrent processes 
to an absolute minimum. The effect of increasing the number of concurrent processes 
is shown in Figure 25. 
As can be seen, the number of states generated increases dramatically as more processes 
are added. This is so because the processes are independent and therefore every state 
that is reachable for a given process must be matched up with every state that is 
reachable for all other processes. Partial order techniques are particularly effective to 
reduce the number of interleavings to be analysed in such situations. 
In ESML, communication commands make processes dependent. Dependence among 
processes has an inhibiting effect on the size of the state space. The models of the 
Gneiss microkernel described in Chapter 2 show that rather complex models need not 
generate unmanageable state spaces. This is due in part to the mutual dependence 
among processes. 
A pipeline of processes illustrate the effect of dependence on the, number of states 
generated. Figure 26 shows the effect of adding more instances of process P2 to lengthen 
the pipeline. By comparing Figure 25 to Figure 26 it can be seen that dependencies 
among processes reduce the state explosion. The number of states generated does not 
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PROCESS P1(OUT out: Msg)j 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> out!signal END 
END P1 j 
PROCESS P2(IN in: Msgj OUT out: Msg)j 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> in?signalj out!signal END 
END P2j 
PROCESS P3(IN in: Msg)j 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> in?signal END 
END P3j 
# procs # states 
1 18 
2 54 
3 162 
4 486 
Figure 26: Effect of dependence among processes 
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increase as rapidly as when the processes are independent. This is so because processes 
must wait on one another and therefore many potential state configurations simply 
cannot occur. 
Concurrency has such a marked influence on the size of the state space because several 
transitions are enabled simultaneously. Another way to have more than one transition 
enabled at the same time is the use of nondeterministic choice. This is expressible 
in ESML as guarded commands where more than one guard expression can be true 
simultaneously. As can be expected, the size of the state space increases as the number 
of guarded commands is increased. However, the state explosion is less drastic in this 
case, "as can be seen in Figure 27. 
In Figure 27 it can be seen how the size of the state space increases when the number 
of guarded commands in a control structure is increased. Nondeterministic choice is 
useful to model decision structures where the exact decision mechanism is irrelevant. 
For example, this technique is useful to model. the environment of a control system. 
Such environments often generate different signals or events to which control logic must 
repond. It would be possible to model the environment of a control system as a set 
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DO TRUE -> DO TRUE -> 
IF TRUE -> x := 1 DO TRUE -> x := 1 
[] TRUE -> x := 2 [] TRUE -> x := 2 
[] TRUE -> x := 3 [] TRUE -> x := 3 
END END 
END END 
# guards # states 
1 6 
2 12 
3 20 
4 30 
5 42 
6 56 
Figure 27: Effect of increasing the number of guards 
of concurrent processes,but a nondeterministic control structure is more efficient. In 
fact, nondeterministic choice should be used instead of concurrency whenever possible. 
Another example is a model of a lossy channel. The channel can be modelled as 
a process that selectively discards some messages. On the other hand, it is better 
to avoid modelling the channel explicitly as a process. A guarded control structure 
can be used to select events nondeterministically. Even if only one process can be 
eliminated by using nondeterminism (or any other technique) it can sometimes reduce 
the size of the state space significantly. Several examples of the use of concurrency and 
nondeterministic choice will be described in the next chapter. 
5.11 Performance of the verifier 
The latest version of the verifier (that was used to check the models presented in the 
-- ._ .. - --.- ---_.- ---_ ... 
next chapter) was studied and optimised by Jaco Geldenhuys. All important mecha-
nisms that can influence the performance of the verifier were measured carefully. Most 
results confirm what has been reported in the literature but some results are perhaps 
surprising and will be mentioned here. The interested reader is referred to [33] for 
details. 
ESML models are translated into abstract code that is interpreted. This decision sim-
plified the verifier substantially, but it is difficult to measure the effect of interpretation 
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directly. Using a profiler, it was found that for the models measured between 49% 
and 64% of the time was spent in the interpreter. The rest of the time was spent on 
analysing the states generated. By studying the essential actions and how these could 
be performed if interpretation was abandoned, it was found· that little, if anything, 
could be gained. 
Strong fairness has been implemented by constructing strongly connected components 
SCCs). The effect on run time was found to be negligible. Building SCCs was found to 
have a real impact on memory requirements. For many models the effect is negligible, 
but for others the memory requirements are doubled. 
Thecompaction technique de_scribed in Section 5.2 reduces the state size and memory 
requirements roughly 5 times, and decreases the run time by a factor of between 0.54 
and 0.8 for the models measured. 
5.12 Summary 
A verification system'that is powerful enough to verify a typical microkernel was de-
scribed in this chapter. A subset of CTL was adopted to express correctness claims 
and ESML, an experimental modelling language, was developed to express behaviour. 
A recursive strategy is used in Vergauwen and Lewi's algorithm to handle nested tem-
poral subformulae, as explained in the previous chapter. A different technique was used 
here, the basic idea being to postpone the evaluation of nested subformulae. Although 
only a subset of CTL can be checked in this way, it makes it possible to avoid storing 
intermediate results, which reduces memory requirements. The technique is compati-
ble with (and depends on) the use of a cache which allows replacement of states. This 
makes it possible to analyse state spaces that are somewhat too large to fit into memory. 
A state compression technique was also developed that improves the effectiveness of 
the cache significantly with the surprising result of simultaneously reducing verification 
run times. 
When the verifier detects an error in a model an error trail (the current execution path 
that leads to the error) is dumped to a file. The error trail can then be inspected 
interactively by stepping through the model to determine what is wrong. Each process 
is displayed in a separate window and the currently active command is marked using 
colour. A similar facility is available in the SPIN verifier. 
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To gain some confidence in the correctness of the ESML verifier, it was tested sys-
tematically by translating ESML models to Promela and using SPIN as a basis for 
comparison. In addition, the effects of different ESML constructs on the number of 
states generated were studied. Based on these results, a number of guidelines will be 
formulated in the next chapter for reducing the impact of the state explosion problem. 
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Verifying a microkernel 
Current operating systems are not designed to be verified. However, verification seems 
essential to meet the most stringent requirements. For example, the success of open 
systems based on widely accepted communication protocol standards created a security 
problem with regard to stored and transmitted data. Standards for secure distributed 
systems are emerging. An example is the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Cri-
teria published by the American Department of Defense that can be used to classify 
systems according to different levels of security. The highest (Al) level requires for-
mal verification. For this, the development of verified designs seems like a necessary 
first step. This chapter presents a verified design for a microkernel-a fundamental 
component of many current operating systems. 
As described in Chapter 2, a microkernel is a typical reactive program that interacts 
with its environment via kernel calls and a mechanism to field interrupts. Verified mod-
els of various components of a microkernel were constructed: a scheduler, interprocess 
communication, kernel call and interrupt mechanisms, and device drivers. 
The microkernel presented here as a case study is a practical program that is used in 
industry. I was fortunate to be in charge of its development and verification was kept 
firmly in mind during the design phase. The project was only possible with the help of 
a number of other people and since the outcome of a software project depends on its 
history, some background is provided here. 
Werner Fouche and I designed the microkernel and Werner implemented the first ver-
sion in Modula-2 [30, 29]. Harry Lewis extended this program by writing additional 
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device drivers. Meanwhile, I designed and implemented the first version of the verifi-
cation tool described in Chapter 5 [18]. Willem Visser and I designed the modelling 
language ESML [21] and Willem wrote the first ESML compiler [73] to produce a 
useful verification system. Hans Loedolff, Jaco Geldenhuys and I rewrote the entire 
verifier to improve its performance and internal structure. Pieter Muller rewrote the 
microkernel in Oberon, improving some mechanisms where necessary. For example, the 
object-oriented facilities of the Oberon language made it possible to develop a hierar-
chy of extensible device drivers [56]. While this improved version of the kernel (called 
"Gneiss") was implemented, I developed and verified models of various mechanisms. 
These models are presented here. 
6.1 Modelling basic mechanisms . 
The verified models of the micro kernel consist of a number of mechanisms that seem 
to form part of most reactive systems. The identification of components· that are 
fundamental in some sense, combined with a theory of concurrency, may lead to a 
practical methodology for the design of concurrent reactive systems. 
Various theories of concurrency have been developed of which the process algebraic 
approach, and specifically CSP, is most relevant here. CSP provides a theoretical 
framework to describe concurrent mechanisms· [41]. The notation is useful to define 
various components of reactive systems such as pipes, buffers and protocols. However, 
to model practical reactive systems, a strongly typed modelling language is more suit-
able. The modelling language ESML-which is based on CSP-is used here to present 
a number of useful mechanisms. 
Pipes, buffers, filters and protocols. A pipe is a process with one input channel 
and one output channel. Two pipes may be chained together by connecting the output 
channel of one process to the input channel of another to form a more complex pipe. 
There is one additional constraint: the two processes must be compatible regarding 
the messages transmitted between them. In ESML that means that the two channels 
connected together must have the same type. 
A buffer is a pipe that transmits on its output channel all messages received on its input 
channel without reordering them. Two or more buffers can be combined to produce 
a chain of buffers. Buffers introduce extra overhead, but are useful to store messages 
when they cannot be accepted immediately. Here is an example of a buffer that handles 
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a stream of numbers ranging from 0 to 10: 
TYPE INT = 0 .. 10; Stream = {int(INT)}; 
PROCESS Buffer(IN in.: Stream; OUT out: Stream); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> in?int(m); out!int(m) END 
END Buffer 
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A filter is a pipe that modifies its input in some way. Bit stuffing, for example, can 
be modelled as a filter. Bits received on the input channel appear unchanged on the 
output channel, except that after a given number of consecutive I-bits an extra 0 is 
inserted. In ESML thfs filter can be modelled as follows: 
TYPE Binary = {Bool(BOOLEAN)}; 
PROCESS Filterl(IN in: Binary; OUT out: Binary); 
VAR bit: BOOLEAN; count: INT; 
BEGIN count := 0; 
DO TRUE -> in?Bool(bit); 
IF bit = 0 -> count := 0 
[] (bit = 1) & (count < 6) -> count := count +1 
[] (bit = 1) & (count = 6) -> out!Bool(O) 
END; 
out!Bool(bit) 
END 
END Filter1 
On the receiver side, the extra 0 bits can be removed by the following filter: 
TYPE Binary = {Bool(BOOLEAN)}; 
PROCESS Filter2(IN in: Binary; OUT out: Binary); 
VAR bit: BOOLEAN; count: INT; 
BEGIN count := 0; 
DO TRUE -> in?Bool(bit); 
IF bit = 0 -> count := 0 
[] (bit = 1) & (count < 6) -> count := count +1 
[] (bit = 1) & (count = 6) -> in?Bool(bit) 
END; 
out!Bool(bit) 
END 
END Filter2 
Filters behave like total functions, and consequently, the effect of a filter can be undone 
by composing it with its inverse. This explains why a filter composed with its inverse 
behaves like a buffer. Note that the two filters shown above are not inverses of each 
other. 
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A Protocol is another fundamental component of reactive systems. Many protocols 
can be modelled as a number of layers and behave like buffers, since their purpose 
is to transmit data faithfully without modification. Filters and their inverses play an 
important role in protocols. For example, when data must be transmitted in encrypted 
form, encryption and decryption can be modelled as two filters that are inverses of each 
other. This means that data transmitted over the physical communication medium 
will be encrypted, while the protocol as a whole behaves like a buffer-messages are 
transmitted without modification. Apart from correctness, the main advantage of 
specifying each component of a complex protocol by means of a verified model is that 
different implementations of the same component are interchangable. 
A number of basic mechanisms that are particularly relevant to microkernels will now 
be described. An introduction to many other mechanisms found in concurrent programs 
can be found in Andrews [2]. 
Clients and servers. A microkernel is a resource manager that offers a service· to 
client processes. It is natural to use client-server terminology when modelling a micro-
kernel. The simplest kind of server-a synchronous server-forces clients to wait for 
each operation to be completed. A server is always willing to engage in one of a number 
of operations; which one, is determined by its clients. Some synchronous servers only 
manage data and a simple input-output style of interaction is adequate. For example, 
a synchronous server is useful to model a circular buffer: 
PROCESS Buffer(IN in: Stream; our out: Stream); 
CaNST number = 5; max = number-l; 
TYPE Items = ARRAY number OF INT; 
VAR first, last, count: INT; buf: Items 
BEGIN 
first := 0; last := 0; count := 0; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?int(buf[last]) & count < number -> 
last := (last + 1) MOD max; 
count := count + 1 
[] out!int(buf[first]) & count> 0 -> 
first := (first + 1) MOD max; 
count := count + 1 
END 
END 
END Buffer 
The buffer only accepts new input if there is some space left and it is always ready to 
output an item if it is not empty. When the buffer is neither full nor empty, it may 
choose nondeterministically between an input operation or an output operation. 
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A more complex pattern of interaction between clients and a synchronous server is 
sometimes necessary. A client may supply data and wait for a response from the 
server. The general outline of a such a synchronous server is given below. 
PROCESS SyncServer(IN in: Request; OUT out: Response); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?requestA -> out!responseA 
[] in? requestB -> out!responseB 
[] ... 
END 
END 
END SyncServer 
It is quite acceptable to block a client process while a short operation is completed. 
Unfortunately, some operations, like the typical. operations executed by peripheral de-
vices, are inherently slow. A slightly more complex kind of server-an asynchronous 
server-is needed to handle such operations. The simplest kind of asynchronous server 
accepts a request for service and allows its clients to proceed without waiting. However, 
only one operation can be accepted at a time; all further requests for service are ignored 
UIitil an external signal arrives to indicate that the operation has been completed. This 
design can be modelled as follows: 
PROCESS AsyncS-erver (IN in: Request; OUT out: Response); 
VAR currentOperation: INT; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?requestO -> currentOperation := 0 
[] in?requestl -> currentOperation := 1 
[] ... 
END; 
(* wait for completion signal *) 
in?completionSignal; 
IF currentOperation 0 -> out!responseO 
[] currentOperation 1 -> out!responsel 
[] ... 
END 
END 
END AsyncServer 
An asynchronous server can be made to accept more than one request at a time by 
adding a buffer. This can improve throughput substantially if the overhead of buffering 
is low compared to the average time needed for operations to complete. Many peripheral 
device drivers can be modelled by such an asynchronous server that maintains a list of 
pending requests. 
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PROCESS AsyncServer(IN in: Request; OUT out: Response); 
TYPE RequestList = LIST[max] OF Request; 
VAR currentClient: INT; pending: RequestList; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?request(id) & -busy -> 
currentClient := id; 
busy := TRUE; 
(* start operation *) 
[] in?request(id) & busy -> pending := pending::<id> 
[] in?completionSignal -> 
END 
END 
(* activate current client *) 
IF LEN (pending) = 0 -> busy := FALSE 
[] LEN (pending) > 0 -> 
END 
currentClient := HEAD(pending); REMOVE(pending); 
(* start operation *) 
END AsyncServer 
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Because of their simplicity, synchronous servers are preferable in all situations where 
operations require little time to complete. An asynchronous server should be used only 
when operations are inherently slow. 
Schedulers. Most reactive systems need some way of allocating shared resources 
among waiting users. This is known as the scheduling problem. A monitor is a well-
known example of a scheduler that enables a number of processes to share a resource. 
Hoare's classical paper [40] introduced the concept and the first implementation is due 
to Brinch Hansen [6]. Monitors provide mutual exclusion and condition synchronization 
in a structured way. Wherever data must be protected against concurrent access in a 
kernel, a monitor should be considered instead of unstructured low-level mechanisms 
like semaphores, as suggested by Andrews for example [2]. 
Scheduling is often associated with processor management. Nonetheless, all schedulers 
are similar, no matter what the nature of the shared resource may be. Basically, 
a suitable data structure is needed to keep track of waiting clients and a selection 
policy to choose the next candidate to serve. For reasons of efficiency, many different 
scheduling algorithms have been devised to address different situations. The following· 
is an example of a scheduler modelled as a synchronous server. It allocates a resource 
to the longest waiting client. 
CONST max = 2; 
TYPE Client = O .. max; 
Clients = {new(Client) , old(Client)}; 
PROCESS Scheduler(IN in: Clients; OUT out: Clients); 
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TYPE Waiting = LIST max OF Client; 
VAR q: Waiting; client: Client; 
BEGIN q := <>; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL out!new(HEAD(q)) & LEN(q) > 0 -> REMOVE(q) 
[] in?old(client) -> q := q::<client> 
END 
END 
END Scheduler 
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A queue of clients wait to gain access to a shared resource. Clients are numbered from 
o to 2. When requested, the scheduler selects a new client· (the first one in the queue) 
to be served. Clients that release the resource are entered at the back of the waiting 
list. 
An important requirement for schedulers is fairness. Roughly, this means that all 
requests must be completed eventually. Some scheduling policies are efficient, but 
unfair and designers should be aware of this. For example, using the shortest seek time 
as a basis for disk head scheduling is efficient, but unfair. A fair disk head scheduling 
policy is the elevator policy that is designed to keep disk heads moving in the same 
direction as long as possible. The direction of movement is only reversed when all 
requests in the current direction of movement (inwards or outwards) have been serviced. 
Unfortunately, requests that arrive when the read/write heads have just passed a certain 
cylinder take longer to complete. For processor allocation similar scheduling policies 
exist. A simple and fair policy is round-robin scheduling. Various more sophisticated 
- policies, such as priority scheduling, are aimed at providing improved response to short 
important requests. Ensuring fairness usually involves some overhead and the kind of 
fairness determines how much. Good descriptions of classical scheduling policies may 
be found in standard textbooks on operating systems, such as [65]. 
6.2 General guidelines for modelling and design 
It is easier to understand a non-trivial program when it is structured in such a way that 
its different components can be described and studied separately. The main advantage 
of abstraction is that the details pf the components can be ignored when studying their 
interaction. Good designs are easy to describe and understand, but should also allow 
an efficient implementation. Many books have been written about software design. 
Broadly speaking, there are currently two approaches: functional design and object-
oriented design. In functional design, the focus is on algorithms, while in object-oriented 
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design the data structures manipulated by a program are placed in the foreground. Both 
techniques are useful, but the resulting programs may be structured quite differently. 
Functional design leads to well-structured, efficient programs. On the down side, such 
programs are somewhat resistant to change because algorithms and data are closely 
integrated. Functional design thus works best for programs of small to medium size 
that must be efficient and will need little after-the-fact modification. 
In object-oriented design, reusable abstractions (data and closely associated algorithms) 
are grouped together and decoupled from other components relying on them. Object-
oriented programming languages provide mechanisms to extend basic reusable mech-
anisms. This allows extra flexibility, but unfortunately the unavoidable extra levels 
of indirection introduce some inefficiency. Nevertheless, object-oriented techniques are 
useful where adaptability is mandatory. While some overly enthusiastic supporters of 
object-oriented design may think otherwise, it should be kept in mind that the tech-
nique can only be applied sensibly where complex data structures are present. In [53] 
M6ssenb6ck presents a balanced introduction to object-oriented design, pointing out 
the advantages and disadvantages of the technique. Roughly, the choice is between 
flexibility and efficiency. 
Designing and modelling requires creativity. Sometimes a formal specification can 
suggest a possible design, but it is difficult to derive a good design from a specification 
in a mechanical way. Although general guidelines can help, design and modelling 
skills are mostly acquired through experience. No set of rules can be devised that 
will immediately turn an inexperienced person into an expert. Nonetheless, since it is 
important to know what to avoid and what to aim for, a number of common mistakes 
and general guidelines will be pointed out. 
Our goal is to develop a verified design of a microkernel. For this, we need to combine 
functional and object-oriented design techniques with formal modelling and verification. 
In [44, Chapter 2] Holzmann gives general rules for designing protocols that are equally 
applicable to the design of operating systems. These rules reflect a considerable amount 
of experience and are therefore adopted here, with minor changes to make them less 
protocol-specific: 
1. Make sure that the problem is well-defined. All design criteria, requirements and 
constraints, should be enumerated before a design is started. 
2. Define the service to be perfo.rmed at every level of abstraction before deciding 
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which structures should be used to realise these services (what comes before how.) 
3. Design external functionality before internal functionality. First consider the 
solution as a black-box and decide how it should interact with its environment. 
Then decide how the black-box can be organised internally. Likely it consists of 
smaller black-boxes that can be defined in a similar fashion. 
4. Keep it simple. Fancy designs are buggier than simple ones; they are harder 
to implement, harder to verify, and often less efficient. Problems that appear 
complex are often just simple problems huddled together. Our job as designers is 
to identify the simpler problems, separate them, and then solve them individually. 
5. Do not connect what is independent. Separate orthogonal concerns. 
6. Do not introduce what is immaterial. Do not restrict what is irrelevant. A good 
design is "open-ended," i.e., easily extensible. A good design solves a class of 
problems rather than a single instance. 
7. Before implementing a design, build a high-level prototype-a model-and verify 
that the design criteria are met. 
The first rule stipulates that constraints should be known up front. These are often 
determined by the implementation environment. It is good practice to select a system 
model to match the architectural constraints of the implementation environment. Most 
systems can be structured and modelled in radically different ways. For example, it 
is important to decide at an early stage whether the design will be centralised or 
distributed. The choice is usually determined by the hardware architecture at hand. 
Most reactive systems are made up of several concurrent processes and the popular 
client-server model is often appropriate, although other models may sometimes be 
preferable. The advantage of selecting a well-known system model is that properties 
such as efficiency, reliability and adaptability will be known in advance. Fortunately, it 
is seldom necessary to start from scratch because tried and tested designs for concurrent 
systems can be found in standard textbooks such as [2]. An experienced designer knows 
many different models to choose from. 
The warning contained in rules 2 and 3 is to focu~ on correctness and leave efficiency is-
sues until later . Elegant designs that can be modelled and verified are often discovered 
by ignoring irrelevant detail. The main goal should be to develop a clean abstract rep-
resentation that will simplify reasoning about the system. Once this has been achieved, 
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refinement of a model and its implementation should proceed hand in hand, using one 
as a check against the other. Design is an iterative process. As problems are uncovered 
and new insight gained, it may be necessary to rework some ideas until an acceptable 
structure emerges. 
It often helps to model several aspects of a system before attempting a final design. 
Designing a system is a process of selecting the most suitable from a number of al-
ternative solution strategies. The system specification defines the goal and reasoning 
leads the way. As design decisions are taken, a final verified design will gradually crys-
tallise out of initial vague ideas. Whether to work in a top-down fashion or bottom-up, 
is not always clear. A top-down strategy may lead to the discovery that some lower 
level mechanism cannot be implemented efficiently. On the other hand, working one's 
way upwards from a set of efficient low level mechanisms can produce awkward de-
signs unless a global picture is kept in mind. The conventional design process is rather 
error-prone because ideas can only be tried out by implementing them.· Prototype im-
plementations help, but errors can still go undetected until everything has been cast in 
concrete. Modelling and verification offers a better alternative: new ideas are modelled 
and verified as they occur during the design process, modelling being a more reliable 
check on correctness than prototyping. 
A good strategy is to gain insight by studying simple models. This normally leads 
to the discovery of subsystems and gradually a series of verified models of increasing 
sophistication will be produced. Some will be discarded, but what remains will be the 
"prototype" mentioned in Holzmann's rule number 7. 
While developing a model, it is crucial to avoid constructs that are known to cause 
a state explosion during verification. Various ESML constructs affect the number of 
states generated, as was discussed in Chapter 5. This suggests a number of additional 
rules, the rules of modelling: 
1. Include only data structures that can influence the future responses of every com-
ponent of a model-actions visible across interfaces. 
The general idea is to analyse intricate concurrent mechanisms-these often con-
tain the most subtle logical design errors. Therefore, we should focus on modelling 
control flow and try to represent data as abstractly as possible. For each compo-
nent of a model, we are only interested in data that can influence its externally 
observable actions. Other data should be excluded or represented in simplified 
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form. For example, when modelling interprocess communication, the contents of 
the messages can be ignored. 
2. Restrict the number of concurrent processes to the absolute minimum. 
As was shown in Chapter 5, the number of concurrent processes has a marked 
effect on the number of states generated. If events are mostly independent, partial 
order techniques can reduce the state explosion due to different interleavings of 
events, but in general it is sensible to restrict concurrency as much as possible. 
When there is more than one instance of the same process, it is often unnecessary 
to model them all. For example, it may be enough to show that the interaction 
between a server and one or two client processes is correct. Modelling many 
client processes may contribute nothing to the analysis and will only increase the 
number of states generated. 
3. If possible, eliminate buffers by using direct synchronous message passing between 
processes or restrict the size of buffers to the minimum size that allows correct 
operation. 
Buffers are typically used to improve throughput (at the cost of increased re-
sponse time) by decoupling concurrent processes from each other. However, the 
number of states generated will also be increased. When large buffers are used in 
combination with several concurrent processes, the effect is a severe state explo-
sion. Whenever feasible, synchronous, unbuffered communication is preferable to 
asynchronous communication. This limits concurrency and therefore the number 
of states generated. Such systems are also simpler to implement. 
4. Beware of seemingly simple processes that generate huge state spaces through 
manipulation of data variables. 
Some processes may not interact visibly with other processes, but can generate 
huge state spaces because each different data value represents a different state. 
In particular, clocks and counters should be avoided. The following is an extreme 
example: 
value := 0; 
DO counter < max -> counter := counter + 1 
[] counter = max -> counter := 0 
END 
5. Use nondeterminism to model a decision structure when the alternative actions 
are important, but the decision mechanism is irrelevant. 
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An IF construct with more than one TRUE guard can be used to capture al-
ternative actions when the choice is arbitrary. For example, a server that can 
display different visible actions, depending on some irrelevant internal mecha-
nism (such as whether a buffer is full or not), can be modelled by the following 
ESML fragment: 
IF TRUE -> appropriate action when buffer is full 
[] TRUE -> appropriate action when buffer is not full 
END 
It is thus unnecessary to represent the data that drive the decision mechanism 
explicitly. This technique can lead to a significant state space reduction. The 
number of states generated increase with the number of guards, but the blow-up 
is manageable as was shown in Chapter 5. However, it should be kept in mind 
that nondeterminism is resolved according to the fairness policy supported by the 
verifier. Special care is needed to ensure correctness in a final implementation. 
Consider, for example, a model of access control mechanisms to a critical section. 
Depending on the level of detail in the model, a verifier that implements strong 
fairness may not show up potential starvation of processes. This is so because 
selection of any process immediately disables the others. Some transitions are 
therefore enabled infinitely often, and strong fairness guarantees that they will 
eventually be selected for execution. If no mechanism is modelled explicitly to 
prevent starvation, a verifier that implements strong fairness will not find this 
potential problem. 
6. Divide complex designs into clearly defined subsystems that can be verified sepa-
rately. 
A complete design is usually too complex to verify because there are too many 
patterns of interaction. It helps to find a structure that can be decomposed into a 
.number of subsystems. Depending on the structure of the overall system model, it 
may be possible to "zoom in" on one subsystem at a time by replacing irrelevant 
I 
parts of a model by simplified equivalents. This can reduce the number of states 
generated significantly. 
7. Reuse verified designs that solve important general problems. 
Reactive systems are expensive to develop, one reason being that new systems 
are usually designed from scratch. Such expensive ad hoc development techniques 
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may be avoided by adapting successful designs to suit slightly different (but sim-
ilar) situations. Unfortunately the source code of a non-trivial reactive system is 
usually too detailed to be reused effectively. Moreover, most reactive systems are 
not documented well enough to allow effective reuse of successful designs. How-
ever, there is a viable alternative: successful mechanisms can be distilled from 
existing systems and presented as verified models. Such verified models would 
represent an invaluable "tool kit" of reusable designs for the development of new 
systems. 
6.3 The architecture of a microkernel 
Cat tel describes a first attempt at verifying a real-time kernel [10]. The verification 
system SPIN was used and a subtle error was discovered. However, the paper does not 
describe how the models were developed. What is needed is a design discipline that 
can be followed to produce provably correct designs. Holzmann wrote the first book on 
the design and verification of protocols [44]. A tutorial on the use of the verification 
tool SPIN and the modelling language PROMELA can be found in [32]. It is argued 
that any good engineering discipline should use prototypes to verify decisions and to 
predict essential characteristics of products before they are implemented. 
The verification of the microkernel presented here should be seen as a first step to 
develop a similar discipline for designing operating systems. Since the verification of 
an entire operating system is a formidable task, it seems necessary to concentrate on 
the verification of single important components first. An overview of the proposed 
method is presented in [20]. 
The Gneiss microkernel described here was designed as a set of interacting servers. 
Without such a formal structuring mechanism, the complexity of the task would be 
beyond the capabilities of currently available verification techniques. It is significant, 
however, that the design could still be implemented efficiently without deviating from 
the verified design. Microkernels present the additional problem that their actions 
depend on rather complex internal data structures. ESML-the modelling language 
used to verify the Gneiss microkernel-was designed to address this problem, as was 
explained in Chapter 5. 
The experiment described here had a well-defined goal: to determine to what extent 
the mechanisms found in a typical microkernel can be verified and described as reusable 
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designs. Answers were sought to the following questions: 
• Can reusable verified designs be developed for mechanisms found in microkernels? 
• Can current verification techniques cope with the state explosion encountered 
when verifying typical microkernel mechanisms? 
• Which constructs are needed in a modelling language for this kind of system? 
• Is it possible to find a design for a microkernel that can be verified but which will 
also allow an efficient implementation? 
• Is it possible to develop a design discipline that will also work for other operating 
system components? 
It seemed natural to model a microkernel as a collection of interacting servers. The 
Gneiss microkernel consists of four subsystems: a memory manager, processor manager, 
interprocess communication subsystem and drivers for peripheral devices. The memory 
manager is a synchronous server that allocates and deallocates physical memory. The 
processor manager is modelled as two interacting servers. One controls the currently-
active process by responding to kernel calls and interrupts. It interacts with another 
server-the scheduler-to select the next process to activate. Interprocess communica-
tion is a simple client-server protocol and device drivers are modelled as asynchronous 
servers. The various models and the major design decisions are described in the fol-
lowing sections. 
A firm decision was taken about the relative importance of some conflicting software 
properties: simplicity was placed first because complex code is usually unreliable and 
simple systems are easier to verify. Efficiency was placed second because nobody would 
like to use an inefficient microkernel. In addition, it would balance the quest for sim~ 
plicity by ruling out a trivial design. Adaptability was considered least important since 
it is often in conflict with efficiency. Fortunately, apart from adding new device drivers, 
microkernels are seldom modified. 
Basic memory management, process management and interprocess communication 
must be as efficient as possible. Functional design was therefore selected as the appro-
priate method. However, object-oriented techniques were used to design device drivers 
to simplify the process of adding new drivers to the kernel. Since peripheral devices are 
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slow compared to processor speeds, the extra overhead imposed by an object-oriented 
design is negligible in the case of most device drivers [56]. 
An important decision was the kind of message passing to use. Asynchronous message 
passing allows a process to proceed directly after sending a message to maximise concur-
rency. However, the unavoidable added complexity of message buffering would violate 
our most important requirement-simplicity. Synchronous message passing is simpler 
to implement and requires no buffering of messages because the sender of a message is 
blocked until the message has been received. Also, unbuffered synchronous communi-
cation reduces the state explosion problem and would thus simplify verification of the 
kernel. 
Designing is a process of reasoning and discovery: reasoning begins with a set of require-
ments in mind and gradually the required functionality is discovered. The development 
process, rather than the complete design, is described here. The final verified models 
are shown in Appendix A. 
The first task was to develop a high-level model of the kernel to define a workable 
structure. The kernel is seen by user processes as a synchronous server that provides 
a transaction service. The design process started from that perspective. Transactions 
are supported by kernel calls. A server called Running manages the currently active 
user process .. At first it was ignored that the currently active process is associated with 
some VM. The following model captures the basic kernel call mechanism between a 
user process and the kernel: 
PROCESS User(OUT running: Trap); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> running!kcall END 
END User; 
PROCESS Running(IN request: Trap); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> request?kcall END 
END Running 
The OUT port of process User is coupled to the IN port of Running by a channel 
variable (not shown) and the message transmitted over this channel represents a kernel 
call. Process Running continually accepts requests (kernel calls) ,from User. Actually 
the kernel offers three different kernel calls. A request for service is issued by executing 
the kernel call Transaction. The kernel call ReceiveRequest enables a server to accept 
a request and it responds by executing the SendReply kernel call. When modelling the 
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kernel mechanisms, such detail are not relevant. 
A typical kernel request starts an input or output operation on a peripheral device. 
The model was extended to include a device driver-another server used by Running. 
A request doio is issued by Running to start an input or output operation on behalf 
of the waiting user process: 
PROCESS Running(IN request: Trap; OUT devicedriver: IOcommand); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> request?kcall; devicedriver!doio END 
END Running; 
PROCESS Devicedriver(IN .request: IOcommand); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> request?doio END 
END Devicedriver 
There are two channels: one between User and Running and another between Running 
and Devicedriver. A set of legal messages (the channel alphabet) is defined for each 
channel. The definition of suitable channel alphabets was found to be important. Many 
design errors involve sending the wrong kind of message or specifying the wrong port, 
Alphabet definitions enable the verification system to detect such errors. 
This simple model was easily verified for absence of deadlock, but it was still too 
unrealistic to be of much value: there was only one user process waiting for Running to 
accept a kernel call request, with Running waiting in turn on Devicedriver to accept 
a doio operation. 
Because device operations are slow, an asynchronous server was needed. Other user 
processes could therefore be served while some slow operation on a peripheral device is 
in progress. To do this, it was necessary to modify Running to respond to kernel calls 
as well as interrupts. 
PROCESS Running (IN in: ,Request; OUT tcidevicedri ver: iocommand); 
VAR curproc: procid; , 
BEGIN 
in?new(curproc); 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?kcall(curproc) -> todevicedriver!doio(curproc) 
[] in?int -> todevicedriver!iocomplete 
END; 
in?new(curproc) 
END 
END Running; 
It was also necessary to add another server called Ready-the first beginnings of a 
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scheduler-to select a new process when the current process requested an 10 operation. 
For simplicity, it was first assumed that a new process to be activated would always be 
available. This meant that no scheduler queue was required; it could be added later. 
PROCESS Ready(IN in: ProcID; OUT out: ProcID); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -) 
POLL out!new(Proc) -) SKIP 
[] in?old(Proc) -) SKIP 
END 
END 
END Ready; 
The model was refined to capture the activation of one user process at a time. User 
processes (different instantiations of the same process in ESML) were modified to wait 
for a resume signal after every kernel call. Resume signals are sent by Running to 
indicate which process to activate. The creation of user processes was not modelled 
explicitly though. 
PROCESS User(id: procid; IN in: Resume; OUT out: KernelCall); 
BEGIN 
(* process registers itself *) 
out!old(id); 
DO TRUE -) 
out!kcall(id); 
POLL in?resume(p) & p = id -) SKIP END 
END 
END User; 
A device driver was modelled as an asynchronous server that accepts requests for 10 
issued by the currently active user process. Such requests are handled by Running. 
Since Running responds to all external events, including interrupts, it reactivates the 
device driver when the 10-completion interrupt arrives. The variable device idle is 
used to ensure that only one 10 request at a time can be pending. The appropriate 
user process is resumed by returning its process record to the scheduler. 
PROCESS DeviceDriver(OUT toready: readyrequest; 
IN request: iocommand; OUT todevice: devicecommand; 
OUT touser: continue); 
CONST qmax = 2; 
VAR curproc, id: procid; deviceidle: BOOLEAN; 
BEGIN 
deviceidle := TRUE; 
DO TRUE -) 
POLL request?doio(id) & device idle -) 
curproc := id; 
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todevice!startio; 
deviceidle := FALSE 
[] request?iocomplete -> 
touser!resume(curproc); 
toready!enterproc; 
deviceidle := TRUE 
END 
END 
END DeviceDriver; 
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The device controller hardware is modelled as a simple synchronous server that accepts 
IO commands from the device driver. It generates an interrupt for every request: 
PROCESS Device(OUT torunning: runningrequest; 
IN request: devicecommand); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
request?startio; 
torunning!int 
END 
END Device; 
Some peripheral devices work more efficiently when a queue ·of waiting requests is 
maintained. To exploit this idea, a request queue was added to the device driver. 
When the device is idle, an IO operation can be started immediately, but if the device 
is busy, a request for IO must be entered in a queue. This means that, on arrival of 
the IO completion interrupt, the next IO operation can be started immediately. The 
following model shows how the list construct of ESML was used to model a request 
queue: 
PROCESS DeviceDriver(OUT toready: readyrequest; 
IN request: iocommand; 
OUT todevice: devicecommand; 
OUT touser: continue); 
CONST qmax = 2; 
TYPE requestqueue = LIST[qmax] OF procid; 
VAR curproc, id: procid; rq: requestqueue; deviceidle: BOOLEA~;_ 
BEGIN 
EMPTY(rq); deviceidle:= TRUE; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL request?doio(id) & deviceidle -> 
curproc := id; 
todevice!startio; 
deviceidle := FALSE 
[] request?doio(id) & -deviceidle -> 
APPEND (rq, id) 
[] request?iocomplete -> 
touser!resume(curproc); 
toready!enterproc; 
IF LEN(rq) o -> device idle := TRUE 
[] LEN (rq) > 0 -> 
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END 
END 
END 
curproc := HEAD(rq)j 
REMOVE (rq) j 
todevice!startio 
END DeviceDriverj 
102 
These refinements led to the model of global kernel interaction shown in Appendix A. 
To make further verification possible and to simplify implementation, the design was 
divided into subsystems, each consisting of a number of functionally related compo-
nents. The first of these-the kernel proper-is centered around the currently active 
process. The key components have already been encountered. These are Running, 
that manages the immediate environment of the currently running process, and the 
scheduler Ready that selects a new process when necessary. The Gneiss scheduler was 
developed by a process of exhaustive case analysis. The requirements were analysed in 
a systematic way, the final ESML model corresponding closely to the implementation 
code. This is described in Section 6.6. Although the memory manager could be mod-
elled as a synchronous server, this was not considered worthwhile because it is rather 
simple. The memory manager maintains a list of blocks of available memory and this 
list is searched on request, using a first fit algorithm. More interesting is the subsystem 
that supports communication between clients and server processes. It manages com-
munication ports and each port may have an associated queue of requests waiting to be 
processed. Device drivers form a third subsystem. Each device driver is designed as a 
kernel-resident server that responds to requests from the kernel proper. The refinement 
of these subsystems will be described next. 
6.4 Interprocess communication 
The communication subsystem supports message passing and manages ports-a flex-
ible naming scheme for services. Ports provide an extra level of indirection to avoid 
direct naming of user processes that are communication partners. Inter-process com-
munication is based on transactions, each representing a request directed at a specified 
server. Each server is known through a unique port identifier. 
The communication mechanism used in the Gneiss kernel was modelled based on a 
single port, routing of messages via multiple ports being a straightforward extension. 
A port has an associated queue of processes waiting for messages to be transferred. 
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Because messages are transferred immediately when a communication partner is avail-
able, a single queue per port is sufficient. It will contain either client processes or server 
processes, but not both at the same time. 
The port queue was modelled as a list of process identifiers. The communication 
subsystem is a server that accepts the three kernel calls Transaction, Recei veRequest 
and SendReply as requests. The control flow mainly involves managing the port queue. 
There was no point in modelling the copying of messages explicitly. The identifier of the 
user process that executed a kernel call is passed on to the communication subsystem. 
A POLL command forms the backbone of the model, its three guards handling the 
three kernel calls: 
POLL 
in?Transaction(cp) -> ... 
[] out!ReceiveRequest(sp) -> 
[] in?SendReply(sp) -> ... 
END 
A user process that executes a Transaction primitive is suspended until another user 
process-its communication partner-executes a matching SendReply primitive. The 
process identifier of the client process (the process that executed the Transaction 
primitive) is entered in the port queue. If a server process is already waiting on the 
specified port, the message associated with a transaction is transferred immediately 
from client to server. The server will later need to identify the client that issued the 
request and therefore a temporary binding between communication partners is set up 
by means of an array Partner. The command toReady ! enterProc (s) is used to enter 
the server process in the scheduler queue. 
IF clients OR LEN(pq) = 0 -> (* no server is ready *) 
APPEND (pq, cp); clients := TRUE 
[] -clients & LEN(pq) > 0 -> (* a server is ready *) 
sp := HEAD(pq); REMOVE(pq); 
Partner [sp] := cp; 
toReady!enterProc(sp) 
END 
A server process executes a ReceiveRequest primitive to accept a request from a 
specified port. If there is a pending transaction, and thus a waiting client process in 
the port queue, the message is transferred immediately to the server. Otherwise, the 
server process is suspended and entered in the port queue. 
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IF clients & LEN(pq) > 0 -> (* a client is ready *) 
Partner [sp] := HEAD(pq); REMOVE(pq); 
toReady!enterProc(sp) 
[] -clients OR LEN(pq) = 0 -> (* no client is ready *) 
APPEND (pq. sp); clients := FALSE 
END 
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A SendReply primitive is executed by a server process to complete a transaction. The 
server process and its communication partner are both activated. The status code 
that is returned to the client to reflect the outcome of the operation requested is not 
modelled explicitly. 
toReady!enterProc(Partner[spJ); 
Partner [sp] := nullproc; 
toReady!enterProc(sp) 
\ 
In some cases it is possible to generate implementations directly from validated models. 
However, this is difficult in the case of low-level code that must be efficient. A good 
programmer can write more efficient code than can be produced by a general purpose 
code generator. It is proposed that models should be used as guidelines for coding to 
make errors unlikely. Although this approach is not defensible from a purely logical 
perspective, it is currently the only reasonable approach where efficiency is important. 
To illustrate this technique, part of the model that handles the Transaction primitive 
is shown in Figure 28. The corresponding implementation for this part of the model 
is shown in Figure 29. The code has been simplified somewhat to make it easier 
to understand, basically by eliminating error handling code. Structurally, however, 
nothing has been changed. 
The detail of handling different ports could be ignored in the model, but not in the 
implementation. Queues of processes and other objects are manipulated by module 
GObjects. If the specified queue is non-empty, procedure GetP returns TRUE and 
removes the first object from the queue, assigning it to a specified variable of type 
GObjects.Object. If the queue is empty, GetP returns FALSE. Procedure Put enters an 
object in a specified queue. The correspondence between the model and implementation 
should be obvious. For example, lines 16-19 in Figure 29 implement lines 10-11 of the 
model shown in Figure 28. 
The code illustrates that the kind of detail needed for an efficient implementation can 
seldom be afforded in a model. For example, copying of data is ignored in the model. 
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1 PROCESS Comms(IN in: AO; OUT toReady: A2); 
2 CONST NIL = 0; 
3 TYPE Map = ARRAY[maxProc+1] OF ProcID; 
4 VAR cp, sp: ProcID; pq: ProcQ; clients: BOOLEAN; Partner: Map; 
5 BEGIN 
6 clients:= FALSE; 
7 DO TRUE -> 
8 POLL 
9 in?Trans(cp)-> (* Transaction primitive *) 
10 IF clients OR LEN(pq) = 0-> (* no server is ready *) 
11 APPEND (pq, cp); clients := TRUE 
12 [] -clients & LEN(pq) > 0 -> (* a server is ready *) 
13 sp :=, HEAD(pq); REMOVE(pq); 
14 Partner [cp] := sp; 
15 Partner [sp] := cp; 
16 toReady!enterProc(sp) 
17 END 
18 [] in?RecReq(sp) -> 
19 
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Figure 28: Part of the model for inter-process communication showing the Transaction 
primitive 
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1 PROCEDURE LocaITransaction(pid: GPorts.PortID; 
2 req, rep: Message; timeout: LONGINT): LONGINT; 
3 VAR 
4 cp, sp: GProcs.Process; (* client, server processes *) 
5 ob: GObjects.Object; (* used to ,store a process record *) 
6 res: LONGINT; (* result of transaction *) 
7 p: GPorts.Port; 
8 cbs, sbs: BS; (* client, server blocked state record *) 
9 BEGIN 
10 (* Phase 1: code deleted to allocate cbs and look up the port 
11 and assign it to p *) 
12 
13 (* Phase 2: Communication *) 
14 cp:= GRunning.proc; (* client process *) 
15 sp:= NIL; (* server process *) 
16 IF p.clients OR -GObjects.GetP(p.queue, ob) THEN 
17 cbs.req := req~; cbs.mptr:= rep; cbs.rep:= rep~; 
18 GObjects.Put(p.queue, cp); p.clients:= TRUE; 
19 res := 0 (* successful, so far *) 
20 ELSE (* a server is available *) 
21 cbs.req := nullmsg; cbs.mptr:= rep; cbs.rep:= rep~; 
22 sp := ob(GProcs.Process); (* get the server process *) 
23 sbs := sp.bs(BS); (* get message descriptor *) 
24 (* copy request msg to server *) 
25 res := GVMs.CopyMessage(req, sbs.req); 
26 IF res = 0 THEN (* all seems ok *) 
27 sp.state.EAX := 0; 
28 cp.server := sp; sp.client := cp; (* link client, server *) 
29 sbs.req.len := req.len; (* number of bytes copied *) 
30 GReady.EnterProcess(sp); sp:= NIL (* unblock server *) 
31 END; 
32 
33 (* Phase 3: Finalisation *) 
34 IF res # 0 THEN (* error occurred in phase 2, undo *) 
35 ELSE (* everything ok, block the client process *) 
36 cp := GRunning.PreemptProcess(ContTransaction); 
37 cp.bs := cbs; 
38 END 
39 END; RETURN res 
40 END LocalTransaction; 
Figure 29: Oberon code to show how the Transact ion primitive was implemented. 
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In/the implementation a data'structure cbs ("client blocked state") is used to store 
pointers to the data to be copied. Manipulation of cbs is shown in lines 17, 21 and 36. 
The complete model of the communication subsystem is shown in Appendix A. 
6.5 Device drivers 
To add a new device driver to a typical operating system, a programmer must fully 
understand (1) the device controller hardware and (2) the mechanisms through which 
device drivers interact with the rest of the system. The former kind of knowledge 
is needed for every new device. However, the interface that defines the interaction 
between device drivers and the rest of the system should be designed to hide irrelevant 
detail. This idea was exploited to develop families of similar device drivers for the 
Gneiss microkernel [56]. All device drivers have a similar structure. The most intricate 
mechanisms common to a family of similar devices have been combined and hidden 
inside low-level modules that are reusable without recompilation. 
As an example, a disk driver is presented here. The main ideas behind the driver 
and the implementation will be discussed before showing how it was modelled. The 
complete model for the disk driver is shown in Appendix A. 
The driver consists of two components: a generic module and a device specific module. 
The reusable generic component was modelled and verified. The control flow of the 
device specific component is trivial. It contains device specific procedures that are 
called by the generic module. True to the spirit of object oriented design, the device 
specific module extends the generic module by adding detail that differs from one disk 
controller to the next. The family of disk drivers share common mechanisms that reside 
in the generic module. Request messages are accepted from clients and handled one at 
a time. A queue of requests is maintained to improve performance. When the interrupt 
arrives that signals completion of a peripheral operation, the waiting client process is 
reactivated and the next peripheral operation (if any) is started. A status code reflects 
the outcome of each operation. 
The generic module Disk contains two handler procedures TransactionHandler and 
InterruptHandler that are called by mechanisms in the rest of the kernel at the 
appropriate times. Each time an 10 request arrives, procedure TransactionHandler 
in Disk is activated. Similarly, an interrupt from the disk controller activates procedure 
InterruptHandler in Disk. Interrupts are associated with hardware interrupt numbers 
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(managed by the kernel component Running) and transactions are associated with port 
numbers (managed by module Comms). Modules Running and Comms each provide a 
procedure InstallHandler. These procedures are called during initialisation to bind 
the procedure InterruptHandler of each device driver to a specific interrupt number 
and procedure TransactionHandler to a specific port number. Further details of 
interrupt handling and transaction handling are irrelevant here. The binding of specific 
handlers to specific interrupt numbers and ports was not modelled explicitly, but the 
rest of the control flow is reflected in the model. 
To illustrate the correspondence between the model and implementation of the disk 
driver, various implementation code fragments (written in Oberon [50]) are included. 
Here is the (simplified) code of TransactionHandler showing two operations: Read 
and Write: 
PROCEDURE TransactionHandler(d: Running. Object; 
req: Comms.Message): LONGINT; 
VAR result, time: LONGINT;- currentproc: Procs.Process; params: Params; 
BEGIN 
WITH d: Controller DO 
CASE Operation(req) OF 
Read, Write: 
currentproc := Running.PreemptProcess(NIL); 
params := Parameters(req); currentproc.bs := params; 
IF d.activeproc = NIL THEN (* idle, start operation *) 
d.activeproc := currentproc; 
result := d.start(d, params, time); 
IF result = ok THEN 
TObjects.SetTimeout(d.activeproc, time, TimeoutHandler) 
ELSE Wakeup(d, result) 
END 
ELSE (* busy, queue request *) 
TObjects.Put(d.waiting, currentproc) 
END 
ELSE result := error 
END 
END 
END TransactionHandler; 
The procedure Transactionhandler operates on an object called d that is imported 
from module Running. The current process (that requested the 10 operation), is pre-
empted, which includes saving its state. If the request queue is empty (d. acti veproc 
= NIL) the 10 operation is started immediately, but otherwise the request is queued. 
If the operation has been started successfully, a timeout is set on the process as a 
guard against lost interrupts due to device malfunction. Otherwise, procedure Wakeup 
is called to enter a status code in the state record of the client process and reactivate 
it. The duration of the timeout depends on the controller and is therefore supplied by 
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the device specific module. Process state records are "transient objects" managed by 
module TObjects. The two handler procedures of the disk driver are modelled as a 
POLL with two guards. Here is a model of the transaction handler: 
POLL in?IOrequest(currentProc) -> 
IF activeproc = NIL -> (* idle, start operation *) 
activeproc := NIL; toST506!Start 
[] activeproc # NIL -> (* busy, queue request *) 
APPEND (requestQ, currentproc) 
END 
[] (* Interrupt *) 
END 
When an 10-completion interrupt arrives, procedure InterruptHandler is activated. 
The process waiting for 10 to complete will be activated by calling procedure Wakeup 
as shown below: 
PROCEDURE InterruptHandler(d: Running.Object); 
VAR more: BOOLEAN; result: LONGINT; 
BEGIN 
WITH d: Controller DO 
IF d.activeproc # NIL THEN (* a request is active *) 
result := d.transfer(d, d.activeprocs.bs(Params), more); 
IF (result # ok) OR -more THEN 
TObjects.CancelTimeout(d.activeproc); 
Wakeup(d, result) 
END 
END 
END 
END InterruptHandler 
Procedure Wakeup enters the process (and the status code) in the scheduler queue. If 
the device driver's request queue contains other requests, the next one will be started. 
PROCEDURE Wakeup(d: Controller; result: LONGINT); 
BEGIN 
SetStatusCode(d.activeproc, result); 
Ready.EnterProcess(d.activeproc); d.activeproc := NIL; 
IF -TObjects.Empty(d.waiting) THEN (* start next request *) 
... (* similar code in TransactionHandler *) 
END Wakeup 
The time server in Gneiss maintains a queue of future times at which a given activity 
must be activated. Although timeouts can be modelled in ESML by using nondeter-
minism, the time server is so simple that it was not modelled explicitly here. In Gneiss, 
timeouts are only used to prevent device drivers from waiting for ever for an expected 
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interrupt because of a hardware error. The functions of procedures InterruptHandler 
and Wakeup could be combined in the following ESML fragment: 
POLL (* 10 request *) 
[] in?Interrupt -> 
END 
toST506!Transier; 
toClient!EnterProc(activeproc); 
IF LEN(rq) # 0 -> (* handle next request *) 
activeproc ;= HEAD(rq); REMOVE(rq); 
toST506!Start 
[] LEN(rq) = 0 -> (* no more requests queued *) 
activeproc ;= NIL 
END 
The disk driver is modelled by the two processes Disk and ST506. The former represents 
the generic component, and the latter the device specific component. The complete 
model of the disk driver is shown in Appendix A. 
6.6 Refining the scheduler specification 
In the models described so far, VMs played no role. A VM in the Gneiss microkernel has 
a protected address space that may be shared by a number of (light-weight) processes. 
This was described in Chapter 2. Processes and VMs are scheduled by the kernel; VMs 
are time-sliced, while processes are scheduled non-preemptively. In this section the 
technique used to develop the Gneiss scheduler is explained. The major data structure 
used by the scheduler is shown in Figure 30. 
The scheduler is a state machine whose actions are determined by its current state 
(such as queues of VMs and processes that are ready to run) and external events (kernel 
calls and interrupts). A specification was developed by first deciding on a number of 
scheduling conditions, each a function of the scheduler's state: 
• Must the current VM continue to run? This is indicated by the VM's state, 
which can be "stop" or "proceed". The state of a VM may be modified by events 
external to the scheduler, like a timer interrupt . 
• Is the process queue of the current VM empty? If not, the next process in the 
queue is selected (unless the state of the current VM is "stop"), but if the process 
queue is empty, another VM must be selected. 
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VM process records 
VM process records 
Figure 30: The scheduler queue 
• What is the state of the current process? If the current process is not the null 
process, its state must be saved in such a way that it can be reactivated at a later 
stage. Different actions are required for interrupts and kernel calls. After a kernel 
call, the process record is entered at the back of the current VM's process queue. 
However, when an interrupt occurs, the state of the interrupted process must be 
saved in such a way that it (and no other process) will be reactivated when the 
VM is restarted later. This scheduling principle eliminates the need for explicit 
synchronisation primitives between processes that share the same address space. 
The process record is thus entered at the front of the current VM's process queue. 
If the current process is the null process, there is no state to save; a new process 
is simply selected if possible. 
The first scheduling condition depends on the state of the current VM. This is stored in 
( 
stateCurrentVM which can take on the values stop or proceed. The second condition 
depends on whether the process queue of the current VM is emptyor ngt. This involves 
testing the length of a list: LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) = o. The third condition can take 
on three values: nullProc if the current process is the null process, kcall if the kernel 
is currently responding to a kernel call or int if the kernel is servicing an interrupt. 
The scheduler was designed by exhaustive case analysis. This technique can be used 
to design any decision mechanism that is based on a finite number of variables that 
can each take on a finite number of values. The following abbreviations are used in the 
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presentation: 
STOP 
PROCEED 
PQE 
KCALL 
[NT _ 
NULL 
stateCurrentVM = stop 
stateCurrentVM = proceed 
LEN( currentVM.Procq) = 0 
stateCurrentProc = kcall 
stateCurrentProc = int 
currentProc = nullProc 
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A combination of two 2-valued<;onditions and one 3-valued condition leads to 12 cases. 
Each case is considered separately to specify an appropriate action according to the 
requirements of scheduling. This technique of exhaustive case analysis guarantees com-
pleteness of the specification with respect to the given set of conditions. 
1. STOP APQE 1\ KCALL -+ Action 0 
A new VM must be selected. The current process is at a descheduling point (it 
is waiting for a kernel call). It is inserted in the (currently empty) process queue 
of the current VM. The current VM is then inserted at the end of the VM queue. 
A new VM is selected and the first process in its process queue is selected to be 
activated. 
(a) Insert current process at back of current VM's process queue 
(b) Insert current VM at back of VM queue 
( c) Select first VM in VM queue; assign to current VM 
(d) Select first process in currentVM's process queue 
2. STOP 1\ PQE 1\ INT -+ Action 1 
A new VM must be selected. When a process is interrupted, it is inserted at 
the front of the current VM's process queue to ensure that it will be resumed 
immediately when the VM is activated again. (Because the process queue is 
empty it makes no difference whether the process is inserted at the back or at 
the front of the queue.) The current VM can now be inserted at the end of the 
VM queue. A new VM is then selected and the first process in its process queue 
is selected to be activated. 
(a) Insert current process at front of current VM's process queue 
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(b) Insert current VM at back of VM queue 
(c) Select first VM in VM queue; assign to current VM 
(d) Select first process in currentVM's process queue 
3. STOP 1\ PQE 1\ NULL -t Action 2 
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The process queue is empty and there is no current process. The VM is not 
inserted in the VM queue, since it cannot be activated before at least one process 
joins its process queue again. A new VM and process are selected. 
(a) Select first VM in VM queue; assign to currimtVM 
(b) Select first process in ~ current VM's process queue 
4. STOP 1\ -,PQE 1\ KCALL -t Action 0 
The only difference between this case and case 1 is that the process queue is not 
empty. This is irrelevant and the current process (which is at a descheduling 
point, waiting for a kernel call) is simply inserted at the back of the current VM's 
process queue. The current VM is inserted at the back of the VM queue and a 
new VM and new process is selected. The action is the same as in case 1. 
5. STOP 1\ -,PQE 1\ INT -t Action 1 
Another VM must be selected. The current process is inserted at the front of the 
process queue of the current VM. The action is the same as in case 2. The fact 
that the process queue is not empty, is irrelevant. 
6. STOP 1\ -,PQE 1\ NULL -t Action 3 
A new VM must be selected, but since there is no current process, it is only 
necessary to return the current VM to the VM queue. A new VM is then selected 
and the first process in its process queue is selected. 
(a) Insert current VM at back of VM queue 
(b) Select first VM in VM queue; assign to current VM 
(c) Select first process in currentVM's process queue 
7. PROCEED 1\ PQE 1\ KCALL -t Action 4 
The same VM must stay active. There is no other yrocess (the process queue is 
empty) and the current process (which is waiting for a kernel call) is allowed 
to proceed, although it will actually just wait until the kernel call has been 
completed. The scheduler state remains unchanged. 
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8. PROCEED 1\ PQE 1\ INT -+ Action 4 
Action 4 is indicated. A change of VM is not required and the process queue is 
empty. The current process was interrupted and must proceed. The scheduler 
state remains unchanged. 
9. PROCEED 1\ PQE 1\ NULL -+ Action 2 
It is not required that a new VM be selected. However, the current VM's process 
queue is empty. The current VM is thus entered in the VM queue and another 
VM selected. This is the same as Action 2. 
10. PROCEED 1\ -,PQE 1\ KCALL -+ Action 5 
This indicates a descheduling point. The current VM must proceed. Its process 
queue is not empty and a new process is selected after inserting the current 
process at the end of the process queue. 
(a) Insert current process at back of current VM's process queue 
(b) Select first process in currentVM's process queue 
11. PROCEED 1\ -,PQE 1\ INT -+ Action 4 
The current process was interrupted. A new process may not be selected and 
since a change of VM is not called for, the current process is allowed to proceed. 
This is the same as Action 4. The scheduler state remains unchanged. 
12. PROCEED 1\ -,PQE 1\ NULL -+ Action 6 
The current VM may stay active. However, there is no current process. Since 
the current VM's process queue is not empty, the first process is selected to run. 
(a) Select first process in currentVM's process queue 
Note that the same action is so~etimes speci_fiedunder differe:gtj:;ir_cumstances. For 
example, action 0 is specified regardless of whether the process queue is empty or 
not. Simplification is possible by combining such conditions that lead to the same 
action. The first and fourth cases can be combined by forming their disjunction, since 
the same action (action 0) is indicated. The disjunction of the two conditions in this 
case is (STOP 1\ PQE 1\ KCALL) V (STOP 1\ -,PQE 1\ KCALL) which simplifies 
to STOP 1\ KCALL. Similar simplifications can be made for action 1, action 2 and 
action 4. After some manipulation, seven guarded actions remain as represented by 
the following IF-structure: 
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IF stateCurrentVM = stop & stateCurrentProc = kcall -> ActionO 
[] stateCurrentVM = stop & stateCurrentProc = int -> Action1 
[] LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) = 0 & currentProc = nullProc -> Action2 
[] stateCurrentVM = stop & LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) > 0 & 
currentProc = nullProc -> Action3 
[] (currentProc # nullProc & stateCurrentProc = kcall & 
LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) = 0 & stateCurrentVM = continue) 
OR 
(currentProc # nullProc & stateCurrentProc = int & 
stateCurrentVM = continue) -> Action4 
[] stateCurrentVM = continue & LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) > 0 & 
stateCurrentProc = kcall -> Action5 
[] stateCurrentVM = continue & LEN(currentVM.ProcQ) > 0 & 
currentProc = nullProc -> Action6 
END 
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The scheduler modifies its state by executing a number of basic queue operations. VMs 
are inserted at the back of the VM queue by the operation Insert VM. The first VM in 
the VM queue is selected by executing Select VM. Similarly, processes can be selected 
by SelectProc. Processes are inserted at either the back or front of the current VM's 
process queue by InsertProcB and InsertProcF respectively. The basic operations to 
manipulate these queues are shown below: 
InsertVM APPEND(VMq, currentVM) 
SelectVM currentVM := HEAD(VMq); REMOVE(VMq) 
SelectProc currentProc := HEAD(currentVM.ProcQ); 
REMOVE( current VM.ProcQ) 
InsertProcB APPEND( current VM.ProcQ, currentProc) 
InsertProcF PREP END (current VM.ProcQ, currentProc) 
The scheduler model contains seven unique guarded actions. The informal description 
of these actions that was given earlier can now be formalised as a sequence of basic 
operations on queues. 
ActionO InsertProcB; Insert VM; Select VM; SelectProc 
Action! InsertProcF; Insert VM; Select VM; SelectProc 
Action2 Select VM; SelectProc 
Action3 Insert VM; Select VMj SelectProc 
Action4 SKIP 
Action5 InsertProcB; SelectProc 
Action6 SelectProc 
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The list structure of ESML was inspired by the scheduler model. Although queues can 
be modelled as arrays, this is less clear and requires detail (index manipulation and 
modulo arithmetic) that obscures the design. The complete model of the scheduler is 
shown in Appendix A. The implementation code for the scheduler was derived directly 
from this model. 
6.7 Correctness requirements 
The first correctness property to check is freedom from deadlock. This will eliminate 
most interaction problems between processes. However, this is not enough. Even 
when it is known that deadlock is impossible, other more subtle errors may remain. 
Suitable temporal logic formulae must be used to express these more specific correctness 
claims. As suggested by Manna and Pnueli, most correctness claims that are important 
in practice can be expressed as either invariants, response properties, or precedence 
properties [51J. Unfortunately, this gives no indication of how to derive meaningful 
correctness claims. A systematic methodology is needed to increase confidence that a 
given design has been verified properly. In a way, the derivation of correctness claims 
for designs is similar to the derivation of test· cases for implementations. A similar 
strategy, based on these techniques, is proposed here to derive correctness claims for 
reactive systems. 
One of the standard references on testing methodology is the excellent book by My-
ers [57J. A more recent presentation, that specifically covers testing of reactive systems, 
can be found in [48J. These books provide detailed descriptions of various techniques 
that were found to yield best results in practice. There are basically two complementary 
approaches to test implementations. These are known as functional testing (black box 
testing) and structural testing (white box testing). During functional testing, the source 
code is ignored and test cases are derived from the specification. V~rious techniques 
known as equivalence partitioning, boundary-value analysis and cause-effect analysis 
have been shown to yield good test cases in practice. The disadvantage of functional 
testing is that errors caused by a specific implementation technique may be missed. 
For example, specific inputs may cause an error because some table is too small. It is 
hard to know this without considering the source code, which is the goal of structural 
testing. The basic idea is to examine the logic of a program and to derive test cases 
by considering the conditions in alternative commands and loops. These techniques 
should not be applied without keeping the specification in mind, because incomplete 
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implementations may then be missed. 
Boundary value analysis is a technique that yields good correctness claims to check. 
The basic idea is to concentrate on extreme values of variables because experience 
shows that errors are more likely to occur near these boundary conditions. The basic 
assuption is that the value of only one variable is modified for each different correctness 
claim. It is useful to let each variable assume the minimum and maximum value of its 
range. In some cases, correctness claims can be derived by considering other interesting 
values, but this requires special knowledge about the design that is analysed. 
ESML, the modelling language used here, simplifies boundary condition analysis be-
cause ranges of variables are checked automatically. Thinking about boundary con-
ditions also helps to identify correctness claims that relate to startup conditions. It 
can be surprisingly difficult to get the initialisation of a model right. Thinking about 
boundary conditions helps to identify suitable correctness claims· to be checked to verify 
startup conditions. The guiding principle for boundary condition analysis is to think 
of all variables as independent entities. Each variable has a specified range and the 
minimum and maximum values usually provide hints to formulate correctness claims. 
To keep the strategy simple, the interaction between variables is ignored. Boundary 
condition analysis is a source of simple invariance claims such as "the number of entries 
in the buffer will always be smaller than max". This can be expressed by a CTL formula 
of the form AG(LEN(buJ) < max) 
It is often unnecessary to consider the full range of values of a variable. A considerable 
amount of work can be saved by a technique known as equivalence class analysis. The 
ranges of variables are divided into a small number of disjoint subranges according 
to some criterion. The different values in each subrange are similar in some sense 
and are represented by a single abstract value. This strategy makes it possible to 
formulate more specific correctness claims because fewer different values are involved. 
As an example, consider a system that monitors the temperature of a liquid. When 
the temperature is between a given low and high mark, nothing happens. However, 
when the temperature rises above the high mark, a cooler must be activated and when 
the temperature drops below the low mark, a heater must be switched on. Instead of 
representing the temperature of the liquid by a variable that can take on values between 
o and 100 (say), it is much better to use only three values: low, medium and high. All 
values below the low mark form one equivalence class. Similarly, all values equal to 
or higher than the low mark and less than or equal to the high mark form a second 
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equivalence class, and the values higher than the high mark form a third equivalence 
class. Because there are seldom more than a few equivalence classes for each variable, it 
is feasible to formulate correctness claims to check all possible combinations of values. 
First it should be checked that each possible value can occur. This is often stated 
negatively as a simple CTL formula of the form AG(t # low), where t represents the 
temperature in the example given above. When this claim is violated a designer can 
be certain that the model can reach a state where the temperature is low. Whether 
the right action occurs at each temperature can then be checked by verifying a claim 
expressed as AG((t = low) => AF(lowact)), where lowact is the appropriate action for 
a low temperature. Some errors occur because more than one variable take on extreme 
values simultaneously. A strategy to study this kind of behaviour is called worst case 
analysis, and is useful to study extreme conditions. 
Another successful technique, known as cause-effect analysis, involves the interaction 
between events. The guiding principle is to identify all events relevant to a given 
design. These events are then classified as. "causes" and "effects" and paired off to 
consider every possible combination. Decision tables may be used to specify these 
pairs of events. Conditions should be thought of as "inputs" and effects as "outputs" 
and these input-output pairs then form the basis of a valuable class of correctness 
claims. Sometimes more than one condition must be met to cause a certain effect. A 
systematic approach will ensure that important event sequences are not missed. 
Just like structural testing can yield test cases to check specific mechanisms, the logic 
of a model can be analysed to obtain valuable correctness claims. It should be checked 
that each alternative of every IF command can be executed. Similarly, each guard in 
every loop (DO or POLL) should be checked to be satisfiable. The simplest of CTL 
formulae are needed to check for unreachable fragments in a model, but subtle errors 
can sometimes be pinned down in this way. If tables are used, check that each entry 
is used at least once. Also check that every kind of message is actually used and that 
every message sent is received. Auxiliary variables are sometimes needed to capture 
the fact that some condition holds or that some event has occurred. Finally, express 
invariants to be checked for every loop, every process, and the system as a whole. 
The following strategy is proposed for designing correctness claims for the verification 
of reactive systems. 
1. Since designs for reactive systems concentrate on flow of control, it makes sense 
to start by identifying causes and effects. Identify all events that are considered 
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either a cause or an effect and consider all possible combinations and write tem-
poral logic formulae that can be used to check these claims. Consider both valid 
and invalid cases. This step should result in a list of response properties to be 
checked. Look for events in processes that are triggered from other processes. 
This ensures that process scheduling is involved. 
2. Use boundary-value analysis to derive additional correctness claims to check prop-
erties not already covered. Specifically check what happens when buffers are 
empty or full. Also, use equivalence class techniques to limit the values that 
control variables can take on. Equivalence class techniques make it possible to 
restrict the number of values that variables can take on. This often makes it 
feasible to write correctness claims that will explore all possible combinations of 
these values. 
3. Examine the logic of each process and derive claims to check every condition 
in alternative commands and the terminating conditions of every loop. Include 
claims to check all possible messages in every channel alphabet. Write formulae 
to check every entry in every table. 
4. Derive meaningful invariants for every loop and process. Invariants can also be 
defined for some data structures. For example, it may be required that the entries 
in a queue be ordered. This is expensive to check, but may be feasible in some 
cases. 
5. Study the interaction of different processes and define system invariants that 
should be maintained. 
Of course the proposed strategy does not guarantee that a set of correctness claims will 
be derived that is complete in any formal sense. However, such a systematic approach 
must be more reliable than ad hoc techniques. In particular, formal verification offers 
the following advantages when compared to traditional testing: 
• Testing is carried out by using the implementation. A model (prototype) is used 
for formal verification. Errors are therefore discovered at an earlier stage. 
• Coverage is incomplete for testing because it is impractical to check all execution 
sequences. For the same reason traditional debuggers are also rather limited as a 
means of finding errors. In formal verification the complete relevant state space 
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is checked for every correctness claim. A test case shows that an implementation 
is correct for a single specific execution sequence. A correctnes~ claim shows that 
a design is correct for all possible execution seq"!lences. 
• It can be checked that invariants are maintained. Without formal verification the 
best that can be done is to include certain checks in the code to check invariants at 
run time. This is a source of inefficiency that can only be afforded for the simplest 
of cases such as checking array indices. Formal verification can sometimes be used 
to check for and eliminate errors such as buffer overflow. In some situations it 
then becomes unnecessary to use run-time checks in implementations. 
Despite the advantages of formal verification the list of correctness claims may still be 
incomplete and therefore a design can only be claimed to be correct with respect to a 
given set of correctness claims. 
Validated models are developed interactively. Temporal logic is used as a kind of "query 
language" to increase a designer's confidence in the correctness of a model. In this way, 
correctness claims are formulated, verified and discarded all the time. The final list of 
verified correctness claims therefore represent only a small subset of all the temporal 
logic formulae that were used to gradually convince a designer that a given model is 
correct. 
To illustrate this development technique, a number of correctness claims that were 
used to verify the Gneiss kernel models will be described here. The correctness claims 
verified for the global kernel model (shown in Appendix A) will be discussed first. 
After checking for deadlock to eliminate general interaction problems, every process was 
studied on its own. For example, process user contains two interesting events: when a 
resume signal is received, a kernel call is executed in response. By studying each process 
on its own and following the control logic of a model, interesting execution sequences 
can be identified and checked by a verification system. A systematic approach will 
ensure that all interesting cause-effect sequences are identified. To increase the chances 
of showing up errors, it helps to study execution paths of reasonable length to include 
as many intermediate actions as possible. This shows a fundamental difference between 
testing and formal verification. Modules are tested one at a time during structural and 
functional testing to keep execution sequences short. That is the only way to force 
execution of specific paths. However, with formal verification it is unnecessary to force 
the execution of specific paths. All paths relevant to a given correctness claim are 
executed automatically. If an error can occur, it will be detected. 
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The reception of a resume signal by process user should be seen as an "effect" that is 
"caused" by some event in the rest of the model. Process running sends the resume 
signal after requesting a new process from the scheduler. A cause-effect relationship 
therefore exists between the processes user and running. As another example, consider 
the event ! kcall (id) in process user. By following the logic it can be seen that this 
event should cause the event ! doio in running. In turn, this should eventually cause 
the device to start an io operation, as indicated by setting the flag deviceidle to false. 
This sequence of events can be checked by the CTL formula AG(Blocked(pi) => 
AF.(Idle(device)). Predicates like Blocked depend on the values of variables in a 
model. Sometimes auxiliary variables must be used because the information needed 
is not recorded explicitly by the model. For example, a variable blocked was added 
to record whether process user is blocked or not. Auxiliary variables may be added 
provided that they do not influence the control logic of a model in any way. 
Other cause-effect sequences could be identified by analysing the other processes in the 
model one by one. The following formulae capture interesting correctness claims for 
the global kernel model: 
• AG(Entered(Pi) => AF(Selected(pi)), which means that if process Pi is entered 
in the scheduler queue, process Pi will eventually be selected and activated again. 
• AG(Waiting(pi) & Signal => AF(Entered(pi)), which means that if process Pi 
is waiting for 10 and an 10 completion signal arrives, process Pi will eventually 
be entered in the scheduler queue. 
The only two interesting data structures in the model are the scheduler queue in process 
ready and the request queue in devicedriver. Boundary value techniques suggest 
that empty queues should be investigated. The following correctness claims could be 
verified: 
• AG(Idle(device) => Empty(rq)), which means that when the peripheral device 
is idle the request queue in devicedriver must be empty. 
• AG(Empty(q) => EF(.Idle(device) , which means that the peripheral device 
can be busy processing an 10 request while the scheduler queue is empty. This 
is possible when there is only one user process in the system. 
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The model GComms represents interprocess communication in more detail. Because the 
three different kernel calls supported by the Gneiss kernel were modelled explicitly, it 
was possible to distinguish between client and server processes. The processes Client, 
Server, Ready,and Running are simple. Similar processes have been encountered in the 
global kernel model. The process Comms is the interesting one to concentrate on in this 
model. A POLL command is used to select any one of the three kernel calls. If process 
Pi executes a transaction and process Pj responds to it by executing a Recei veRequest 
operation, the kernel must keep track of this. An array Partner [] is used to keep track 
of communication partners. When a server process executes a SendReply operation, 
this array is used to determine which processes to activate. 
The proposed technique of cause-effect analysis was used to derive the following cor-
rectness claims: 
• Client and server processes can be paired off as communication partners. How-· 
ever, clients cannot communicate with clients and servers cannot communicate 
with servers. Several CTL formulae of the fbrm AG(Comms.Partner[m] # n) 
were used to check this. 
• When several client processes are sending requests to a server by executing 
Transaction operations, it should be possible to have more than one process 
waiting in the request queue. A server process and three clients were used to 
check this. The formula AG(LEN(Comms.pq < 2)) is violated when a second 
process is entered in the request queue. 
• AG(Trans => AF(RecReq)) When a client process executes a Transaction 
kernel call the server will eventually execute a Recei veRequest kernel call. A 
single client and server were used to check this. 
The ESML model of the Gneiss scheduler contains more detail than any of the other 
kernel models. However, the structure of the model is simple. It consists mainly of 
a rather complex IF command, each alternative guarding execution of a single action. 
The actions manipulate the scheduler queue by removing and entering processes or 
VMs. As was explained in Section 6.6, the conditions were derived in a systematic way 
by using exhaustive case analysis and the model was therefore expected to be correct. 
The structure of the model suggested cause-effect analysis, which was extremely simple 
in this case. Each condition in the IF command represented a different cause, the 
corresponding effect being the action taken. A set of simple CTL formulae of the form 
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AG(Ready.action # n) quickly established that all actions could be executed, except 
action number five. The error was tracked down to an incorrectly coded condition in 
the controlling IF structure. Formal analysis of a scheduler is particularly important 
because errors sometimes do not cause the system to stop, but may lead to inefficiency. 
Many of the correctness claims described above were violated at first. This will not 
be surprising to anyone who has used formal verification in practice. Deadlock is 
often encountered during the initial stages of developing a model. In fact, considerable 
patience is usually required to make the initial deadlocks disappear. Of course, a 
deadlock free model does not mean that everything is fine. Surprisingly subtle errors 
can sometimes be found by checking invariants that should hold or by checking specific 
patterns of interaction. Experience shows that the most valuable properties to check are 
simple. This is good news, because complex properties are also the most expensive ones 
to check. For example, formulae that contain nested temporal operators require much 
more time than simple assertions and invariant formulae. These simpler properties 
should therefore be checked first because when an error is detected the model must be 
modified and all previous verification runs must be repeated. 
6.8 Summary 
The verification of an entire operating system is a formidable task. A reasonable first 
step involves the verification of a single interesting component. This was shown to 
be possible. A detailed formal verification study of a microkernel as described in this 
chapter has not been published before. Holzmann has published similar studies for 
protocols [44, 32]' but operating systems present a different challenge. The approach 
taken was to divide the design into components that could be verified independently. 
This was done by structuring the kernel as a set of interacting servers. Some mecha-
nisms such as buffers and schedulers are fundamental building _blo<:k~. It was shown 
how such components could be modelled in ESML, the modelling language described 
in Chapter 4. Such verified designs may be reusable in different application areas. 
Experience has shown that certain constructs in a modelling language can simplify 
models significantly. For example, the list construct of ESML was particularly useful 
to model queues. Without it the rather complex scheduler model would contain even 
more distracting detail. Other language constructs such as dynamic process creation 
and buffered communication channels, were not needed at all. This indicates that 
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different kinds of modelling languages may be required for different application areas. 
It was shown how the implementation of the Gneiss kernel corresponds to the verified 
design. The microkernel is efficient, despite being structured as a set of interacting 
servers. It is significant that this was not merely an academic project. In fact, the 
Gneiss kernel is used to support a commercial digital signal processing system. 
Whether the same verification techniques will also work for other operating system 
components remains to be seen. However, it seems likely that most servers that in-
corporate concurrent algorithms will benefit from the verification techniques described 
here. 
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Evaluation and Conclusions 
Probably the most significant contribution of this work is its demonstration that auto-
mated verification techniques can be applied to the development of operating system 
software. The project showed that: 
• Validated designs can be developed for typical mechanisms that are used in mi-
crokernels. The design of the Gneiss microkernel was verified against various 
correctness criteria. The level of detail captured by the various models differ, but 
in two cases-the scheduler and interprocess communication-the models and 
implementations correspond closely. In such cases, it should be possible to gen-
erate the implementation code automatically from the verified design, although 
this was not attempted. The Gneiss microkernel is a useful tool. It is used in 
two commercial applications: a distributed control system for assembly lines in 
factories and a dedicated digital signal processing system. Although Gneiss is a 
relatively small microkernel, it contains many mechanisms found in well-known 
microkernels such as Amoeba, Mach and V. Whether some of these verified de-
signs are fundamental in some sense remains to -be seen. 
• An efficient microkernel can be designed as a collection of interacting servers, 
each simple enough to be verified in considerable detail. Suitable structuring 
principles are essential, however: Servers must conform to definite rules to allow 
them to be verified separately and combined into a correctly functioning kernel. 
Without this structuring technique it would probably be difficult to verify a 
microkernel in sufficient detail. A top-down approach was used. A high-level 
model was first designed to study the interaction between the major components 
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of the kernel. More detailed models were then constructed of the scheduler, 
interprocess communication and device drivers. The Gneiss device drivers all 
share the same object-oriented design: a more complex, but reusable part that 
interacts with the rest of the kernel, and a simpler device-specific part [56]. The 
model of a disk driver described in Chapter 6 reflects this structure. The remote 
communication mechanism used in Gneiss is a standard protocol that was verified 
using a similar approach [63]. 
• A modelling language with special features is needed to verify a microkernel. The 
list construct of ESML was especially useful when modelling the. scheduler and 
device drivers. However, complex structured data lead to larger states and an 
effective state compression technique was developed to cope with this problem. 
The experimental verifier described in Chapter 5 was used to verify the kernel models. 
This verifier is based on standard on-the-fly verification techniques. However, a new 
technique was developed to handle nested subformulae. This technique, which involves 
delayed evaluation of subformulae was preferred, although there are different on-the-fly 
algorithms that can handle full CTL [72, 4]. The reason is that these general algorithms 
require too much memory in practice. 
The verifier was divided into three components, each with a well defined function. 
These are the state generator, state storage and the evaluator. This modular structure 
makes it easier to experiment by replacing some components with alternative ones. 
Despite this modular structure, the resulting verifier was still quite efficient. States are 
analysed at roughly the same rate as SPIN [44], which is widely regarded as an efficient 
verification system. It should be kept in mind, however, that a detailed comparison 
with SPIN was not attempted because there are too many differences to make this 
meaningful. Efficient compaction techniques were found to be essential. Even though 
some processor time is spent on compacting states before they are stored in the cache, 
this is amply repaid because the hash functions used to access the cache are simpler to 
compute when states are smaller. 
The most serious limitation of state based verification techniques is the huge number 
of states generated. Much progress has been made and current verifiers can cope with 
models that generate millions of states. Guidelines are crucial to avoid a state explosion. 
The guidelines given in Chapter 6 are intended to simplify the development of verified 
models of operating system software. By following these guidelines, the number of 
states generated were found to be reduced significantly. 
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Although models of the most important mechanisms in the Gneiss microkernel were 
developed and verified, some problems remain. Currently only relatively simple cor-
rectness properties of finite state models can be verified efficiently. Although more 
expressive logics exist that can capture more advanced correctness properties, efficient 
verification algorithms are known only for simple logics like CTL and LTL. To ver-
ify more elaborate correctness claims, a combination of model checking and theorem 
proving may be useful. 
A problem with the approach taken in verifying the Gneiss microkernel is that there is 
no rigorous connection between models and implementations. Since models are abstract 
programs, it seems feasible to generate efficient implementations automatically from 
verified models. This has been done for protocols. For microkernels, some mechanisms 
are too low level and machine dependent and require careful coding for acceptable 
performance. At best, the verified models can serve as guidelines for coding. A strategy 
that worked well, was to include various correctness checks in the implementation code 
to detect errors at run-time. Validated models can often suggest such run-time checks. 
The strict adherence to CSP as a design framework worked out well. For example, 
global variables shared among processes were never missed. However, .although ESML 
served its purpose well, some concepts should be reconsidered. Among these are the 
use of a single construct-a process-for expressing both concurrency and encapsula-
tion, which are two different concepts. Two different constructs such as a module for 
encapsulation and a process for concurrency would probably be better. Also, a complex 
model that contains a large number of channels is difficult to understand. Bidirectional 
channels may be used to reduce the number of channels. In addition, the POLL con-
struct should be simplified to allow a more efficient implementation like the strategy 
used in SPIN. 
A fundamental problem is that a verifier, like any complex program, may contain subtle 
errors. When a model is rejected erroneously, an "error trail" will be produced that 
should be enough to detect the problem. On the other hand, a model that contains an 
error may be accepted. This is more serious because such errors may go undetected. 
Fortunately, verification systems are based on sound theory. Formal logic and automata 
theory present two such theoretical frameworks that can guide the design of verifica-
tion systems. However, just how to translate sound theoretical ideas into functional 
I 
verification systems that use computing resources effectively, is quite another matter. 
The design of the verifier described in Chapter 5 is meant to improve reliability by 
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dividing a complex program into simpler interacting modules. The verifier has three 
components: a state generator, a separate component to evaluate logical formulae, and 
a compiler for the modelling language. Each component has a well-defined interface 
and as long as this is preserved, internal mechanisms can be modified without affect-
ing other components. This design and the choice of a safe implementation language 
(Oberon) should improve reliability. 
7.1 Summary of what was learnt from the project 
The experience gained during this project is summarised here because it may be useful 
to others. 
7.1.1 Verifiers 
• LTL seems preferable to CTL for expressing correctness claims in practice al-
though this is a controversial issue[49, 59, 25, 27]. Although CTL can be checked 
in linear time and the time complexity of checking LTL is exponential, it should 
be remembered that the exponential blow-up for LTL is caused by the number 
of operators in the formula, which is usually small in practice. More important 
is that large data structures are needed to store intermediate results in a CTL 
model checker. The CTL model checking algorithm of Vergauwen and Lewi needs 
a large array for storing the values of every subformula in every state [72]. The 
algorithm by Bhat, Cleaveland and Grumberg for CTL* (which includes CTL) 
has similar space requirements [4]. Two large data structures are needed to store 
all assertions that have been encountered and a set of assertions that have been 
found to be false. In the verifier described in this dissertation (Chapter 5), the 
memory requirements could be reduced by handling only a subset of CTL. In 
addition, it is hard tb-find-ii, really usefulformula that can be expressed in CTL, 
but not in LTL. However, there are useful properties that can be expressed in 
LTL, but not in CTL. For example, it is possible to express strong fairness in 
LTL, but not in CTL. A classification of useful LTL properties to be checked for 
concurrent systems is described in [52]. 
• A model checker should be designed to check directly for the simplest properties. 
For example, to check for deadlock freedom only requires a single full search of 
the reachable state space. This can be done more efficiently if no temporal logic 
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formula is specified. It is simply necessary to check for invalid end states. This 
approach is also used in the SPIN verifier [44]. Such simple correctness properties 
seem to be the most useful to check in practice and should therefore be handled 
as efficiently as possible. 
• Within reason, model checking algorithms should be optimised for space, not 
time. Reachable states must be stored in main memory, since secondary storage 
is too slow to be practical. One way to fit more states into main memory is to 
use compaction techniques. While the simple compaction technique described in 
Section 5.2 can actually speed up state comparison operations, the amount of 
compaction obtained in this way is limited (about 40%). More effective com-
paction techniques seem to slow down the model checker as was shown in [45]. 
However, since processor speeds are increasing all the time, more sophisticated 
state compaction techniques may be feasible in the near future. 
• Computing strongly connected components is probably not a good idea for imple-
menting fairness. It was found to double the memory requirements in some cases, 
although the effect on run time is negligible. The effect of computing strongly 
connected components in the ESML model checker is reported in [34]. 
• A model checker can be structured as two components: a state generator and a 
state analyser. The ESML model checker is structured in this way as described 
in Section 5.5. The state analyser requires only the values of propositions in the 
current state. The details of how states are represented are hidden inside the 
state generator. This approach makes the model checker easier to understand. 
• Using interpretation to generate states simplifies the model checker. This was 
found to have little measurable effect on the execution speed as reported in [34]. 
The reason is that the overhead of interpretation is small compared to the other 
tasks to be performed by a model checker. 
7.1.2 Verification of operating systems 
• The most important contribution of this project is perhaps the illustration that 
parts of an operating system can be verified. In Chapter 6 three different models 
of parts of a microkernel are discussed: a model of a scheduler, disk driver, 
and inter-process communication. A more abstract model is also presented to 
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study the main flow of control through the system as it interacts with user-
level processes. Two different approaches are recommended: (1) Use modelling 
as a design technique while developing intricate mechanisms. The completed 
verified model can then be'used as a guideline for developing an implementation. 
(2) Derive models from existing implementation code. This is only feasible for 
well-structured code. If an error is detected in a model, it should be possible 
to determine whether a similar error could occur in the implementation. This 
is a valuable check on the correctness of intricate mechanisms, especially when 
concurrency is involved. 
• Do not try to model the complete system because the state space may be too 
large to include enough detail to find subtle errors. As described in Chapter 6 
the Gneiss kernel was modelled as interacting client and server processes. In this 
way it is possible to replace a model of a server (for example, the scheduler) by 
an abstract version when its internal details are irrelevant. This technique is 
illustrated by the "global interaction model" shown in the appendix (A.1). 
• It helps to focus on the most intricate mechanisms where concurrency is involved. 
For example, the model of a disk driver described in Chapter 6 was designed to 
study the asynchronous nature of code that drives peripheral devices. The disk 
driver can receive requests from user processes even when the disk controller is 
busy. For this a queue of requests is maintained and interrupts signal the end of 
each 10 operation. Even rather abstract models of such mechanisms are useful. 
Logical errors are difficult to find during testing and these are exactly the kind 
of errors that can be found through verification. 
• For operating systems it is probably not feasible to generate implementation code 
from verified models. A good programmer can certainly produce more efficient 
code than can be generated automatically. At best, it may be possible to translate 
certain verified mechanis~s l!ke a scheduler into efficient code. Although this 
. was not attempted, the process of translating the scheduler model described in 
Section 6.6 into implementation code was rather mechanical. 
• A serious attempt to find suitable abstractions for low-level operations that can 
be represented as atomic transitions in a model can improve the implementation 
significantly. 
• When the implementation is modified as the system evolves, always remember 
to modify the models too and repeat the verification runs. It is all too easy to 
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introduce subtle bugs by seemingly trivial modifications to the implementation 
code. 
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The Gneiss kernel models 
A.1 Global interaction model 
MODEL Kernel; 
CONST 
nullproc = 0; qmax 2; 
TYPE 
procid = O .. 2; 
readyrequest = {selectproc(procid), enterproc(procid)}; 
runningrequest = {newproc(procid), kcall(procid), int, tick}; 
iocommand = {doio(procid), iocomplete}; 
devicecommand = {startio}; 
continue = {resume(procid)}; 
procqueue = LIST[qmax] OF procid; 
VAR chO: readyrequest; 
ch1: runningrequest; 
ch2: continue; 
ch3: iocommand; 
ch4: devicecommand; 
PROCESS user(id: procid; OUT torunning: runningrequest; 
132 
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OUT toready: readyrequest; 
IN request: continue); 
133 
(* use value parameter to identify different processes (procid) *) 
VAR p: procid; 
BEGIN 
(* proc registers itself *) 
toready ! enterproc(id); 
DO TRUE -> 
(* wait for the right resume message (procid 0 or 1) *) 
POLL request?resume(p) & p = id -> SKIP END; 
torunning!kcall(id) 
END 
END user; 
PROCESS ready(IN request: readyrequest; 
OUT response: runningrequest); 
VAR p: procid; q: procqueue; 
BEGIN 
request?enterproc(p); APPEND(q, p); (* initialize ready queue *) 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL 
request? selectproc(p) -> 
IF LEN(q) > 0 -> 
P := HEAD(q); REMOVE(q); response!newproc(p) 
[] LEN(q) = 0 -> 
response!newproc(nullproc) 
END 
[] request?enterproc(p)-> 
END 
END 
IF -p #nullproc -->- APPEND(q, p) 
[] p = nullproc -> SKIP 
END 
END ready; 
PROCESS running(OUT toready: readyrequest; 
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IN request: runningrequest; 
OUT todevicedriver: iocommand; OUT touser: continue); 
VAR curproc: procid; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL toreadylselectproc(curproc) -> 
request?newproc(curproc); 
IF curproc # nullproc -> touser 
[] curproc = nullproc -> SKIP 
END 
resume (curproc) 
[] request?kcall(curproc) -> todevicedriverldoio(curproc) 
[] request?int -> 
todevicedriverliocomplete 
END 
END 
END running; 
PROCESS devicedriver(OUT toready: readyrequest; 
IN request: iocommand; OUT todevice: devicecommand); 
VAR curproc, id: procid; rq: procqueue; deviceidle: BOOLEAN; 
BEGIN 
EMPTY(rq); deviceidle:= TRUE; 
DO TRUE-> 
POLL request ? doio(id) & deviceidle -> 
curproc := id; 
todevicelstartio; 
deviceidle := FALSE 
[] request?doio(id) & -deviceidle -> 
APPEND (rq, id) 
[] request?iocomplete -> 
toreadylenterproc(curproc); '" 
IF LEN(rq) = 0 -> deviceidle := TRUE 
[] LEN(rq) > 0 -> 
curproc := HEAD(rq); 
REMOVE(rq); 
todevicelstartio 
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END 
END 
END 
END devicedriver; 
PROCESS device(OUT torunning: runningrequest; 
IN request: devicecommand); 
VAR idle: BOOLEAN; 
BEGIN 
idle := TRUE; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL request?startio & idle -> 
idle := FALSE 
END; 
idle := TRUE; 
torunning!int 
END 
END device; 
BEGIN 
ready (chO, chi); running (chO, chi, ch3, ch2); 
devicedriver(chO, ch3, ch4); device (chi , ch4); 
user(i, chi, chO, ch2); user(2, chi, chO, ch2) 
END Kernel; 
A.2 Interprocess Communication 
MODEL GComms; 
(* Gneiss microkernel: interprocess communication *) 
CONST nullproc = 0; 
maxProc = 2; 
TYPE ProcID = 0 .. maxProc; 
ProcQ = LIST[maxProc] OF ProcID; 
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AO {Trans (ProcID), RecReq(ProcID), SendRep(ProcID), 
newProc(ProcID)}; 
A1 {trans, recReq, sendRep, newProc(ProcID)}; 
A2 = {enterProc(ProcID), selectProc(ProcID)}; 
A3 {resume(ProcID)}; 
VAR chO: AO; ch1: Ai; ch2: A2; ch3: A3; 
PROCESS Client (id: ProcID; IN in: A3; OUT toRunning: Ai); 
VAR p: ProcID; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?resume(p) & p = id -> SKIP END; . 
toRunning!trans 
END 
END Client; 
PROCESS Server(id: ProcID; IN in: A3; OUT toRunning: Ai); 
VAR p: ProcID; 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL in?resume(p) & p id -> SKIP END; 
tORunning!recReq; 
POLL in?resume(p) & p = id -> SKIP END; 
toRunning!sendRep 
END 
END Server; 
PROCESS Ready(IN in: A2; OUT toRunning: Ai); 
VAR p: ProcID; q: ProcQ; 
BEGIN 
EMPTY(q); APPEND(q,i); APPEND(q, 2); 
p := nullproc; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL 
in!selectProc(HEAD(q)) & LEN(q) > 0 -> REMOVE(q) 
[] in!selectProc(nullproc) & LEN(q) = 0 -> SKIP 
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[] in?enterProc(p) -> 
IF P # nullproc -> APPEND(q, p) 
[] p = nullproc -> SKIP 
END 
END 
END 
END Ready; 
PROCESS Running(IN in: Ai; OUT toReady: A2j OUT toUser: A3; 
OUT toComms: AO); 
VAR cp: ProcID; (* current proCess *) 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
toReady?selectProc(cp)j 
IF cp # nullproc -> toUser!resume(cp)j 
POLL 
in?trans -> toComms!Trans(cp) 
[] in?recReq -> toComms !RecReq(cp) 
[] in?sendRep -> toComms!SendRep(cp) 
END 
[] cp = nullproc -> SKIP 
END 
END 
END Running; 
PROCESS Comms(IN in: AOj OUT toReady: A2); 
CONST NIL = 0; 
TYPE Map = ARRAY[maxProc+i] OF ProcID; 
VAR cp, sp: ProcID; pq: ProcQ; clients: BOOLEAN; Partner: Map; 
BEGIN 
clients := FALSEj 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL 
in?Trans(cp)-> 
IF clients OR LEN(pq) = 0-> (* no server is ready *) 
APPEND (pq, cp); clients := TRUE 
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[] -clients & LEN(pq) > 0 -> (* a server is ready *) 
sp := HEAD(pq); REMOVE(pq); 
Partner [cp] := sp; 
Partner [sp] := cp; 
toReady!enterProc(sp) 
END 
[] in?RecReq(sp) -> 
IF clients & LEN(pq) > 0 -> (* a client is ready *) 
cp := HEAD(pq); REMOVE(pq); 
Partner [cp] := sp; 
Partner [sp] := cp; 
toReady! enterProc (sp) 
[] -clients OR (LEN(pq) = 0) -> (* no client is ready *) 
APPEND (pq, sp); clients := FALSE 
END 
[] in?SendRep(sp) -> 
END 
END 
cp := Partner[sp]; Partner[sp] := NIL; Partner[cp] := NIL; 
toReady!enterProc(cp); toReady!enterProc(sp) 
END Comms; 
BEGIN 
Client(i, ch3, chi); 
Server(2, ch3, chi); 
Ready (ch2, chi); 
Running (chi , ch2, ch3, chO); 
Comms(chO, ch2) 
END GComms; 
A.3 Device drivers 
MODEL GDisk; 
CONST 
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nullproc = 0; qmax 2· ,
TYPE 
FrocID = o .. 2; 
ProcQueue = LIST[qmax] OF ProcID; 
ContrReq = {IO}; 
DiskReq = {IOReq(ProcID), Interrupt}; 
ClientReq = {EnterProc(ProcID)}; 
ST506Req = {Start, Transfer}; 
VAR chO: DiskReq; 
ch1: ST506Req; 
ch2: ContrReq; 
ch3: DiskReq; 
ch4: ClientReq; 
PROCESS Client(IN req: ClientReq; OUT toDisk: DiskReq); 
VAR rq: ProcQueue; id: ProcID; next: ProcID; 
BEGIN 
EMPTY(rq); APPEND (rq, 1); APPEND (rq, 2); 
next := HEAD(rq); REMOVE(rq); 
DO TRUE -> 
(* 
POLL 
toDisk!IOReq(HEAD(rq)) & (LEN(rq) > 0) -> REMOVE(rq) 
[] req?EnterProc(id) -> APPEND (rq, id) 
END; 
next := HEAD(rq); REMOVE(rq); 
toDisk!IOReq(next); 
req?EnterProc(id); 
APPEND (rq, id); 
*) 
toDisk!IOReq(1); 
req?EnterProc(id) 
END 
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END Client; 
PROCESS Disk(IN req: DiskReq; OUT toST506:ST506Req; 
OUT toClient: ClientReq); 
VAR activeproc, currentproc: ProcID; 
rq: ProcQueue; (* queue of requests *) 
BEGIN 
EMPTY(rq); activeproc:= nullproc; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL req?IOReq(currentproc) -> 
IF activeproc = Iiullproc -> (* idle, start operation *) 
activeproc := currentproc; 
toST506 ! Start 
[] activeproc # nullproc -> (* busy, queue operation *) 
APPEND (rq, currentproc) 
END 
[] req ? Interrupt -> 
toST506!Transfer; 
(*Wakeup: *) 
toClient!EnterProc(activeproc); 
IF LEN(rq) # 0 -> (* handle next request *) 
activeproc := HEAD(rq); REMOVE(rq); 
toST506 ! Start 
[] LEN(rq) = 0 -> (* no more requests queued *) 
activeproc := nullproc 
END 
END 
END 
ENO Disk; 
PROCESS ST506(IN req: ST506Req; OUT toContr: ContrReq); 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL req ? Start -> toContr 10 
[] req?Transfer -> SKIP 
END 
140 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX A. THE GNEISS KERNEL MODELS 
END 
END ST506j 
PROCESS Contr(IN req: ContrReqj OUT toDisk: DiskReq)j 
BEGIN 
DO TRUE -> 
req?IOj 
toDisk!Interrupt 
END 
END Contrj 
BEGIN 
Client(ch4,chO)j 
Disk(chO,chi,ch4)j ST506(chi,ch2)j Contr(ch2,chO) 
END GDiskj 
A.4 Scheduler 
MODEL GSchedulerj 
CONST 
NrVMs = 2j NrProcs = 3j NIL NrProcsj (* NIL is highest proc nr *) 
TYPE 
INT = O .. NrProcsj 
ProcState = active, int, kcallj 
ProcInfo = (id: INTj state: ProcState)j 
AO = {selectproc(ProcInfo), enterproc(INT)}j 
Ai {newproc(INT)}j 
A2 {doio(INT)}j 
VAR chO: AOj chi: Aij ch2 A2j 
PROCESS Ready(IN in : AOj OUT response Ai)j 
TYPE 
VMQ LIST [NrVMs] OF INTj 
ProcQ = LIST[NrProcs] OF INTj 
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ProcQarray = ARRAY[NrVMs] OF ProcQ; (* proc queues *) 
ProcToVM = ARRAY[NrProcs] OF INT; (*maps procs to vms *) 
Action = O .. 6; 
VAR cp: ProcInfo; p: INT; cvm: INT; action: Action; 
stop: BOOLEAN; q: ProcQarray; vmq: VMQ; vm: ProcToVM; 
BEGIN (* initialise *) 
EMPTY(q[O]); APPEND(q[O], 0); 
EMPTY(q[1]); APPEND(q[1], 1); APPEND(q[1], 2); 
vm[O] := 0; (* proc 0 belongs to vm 0 *) 
vm[1] := 1· , (* proc 1 belongs to vm 1 *) 
vm[2] := 1· , (* proc 2 belongs to v1ri 1 *) .. 
EMPTY(vmq); APPEND (vmq, 1); 
cvm := 0; 
DO TRUE -> 
POLL 
in?selectproc(cp) -> 
(* choose whether vm will stop or not *) 
IF TRUE -> stop := TRUE [] TRUE -> stop :~ FALSE END; 
(* now select a new process *) 
IF stop & cp.id # NIL & cp.state = kcall -> 
(* action 0: *) action := 0; 
APPEND(q[cvm], cp.id); APPEND (vmq, cvm); 
cvm := HEAD(vmq); REMOVE(vmq); 
p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
[] stop & cp.id # NIL & cp.state = int -> 
(* action 1: *) action := 1; 
PREPEND(q[cvm], cp.id); APPEND (vmq, cvm); 
cvm := HEAD(vmq); REMOVE(vmq); 
p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
[] (cvm = NIL OR LEN(q[cvm]) = 0) & cp.id = NIL -> 
(* action 2: *) action := 2; 
cvm := HEAD(vmq); REMOVE(vmq); 
p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
[] stop & cvm # NIL & LEN(q[cvm]) > 0 & cp.id = NIL -> 
(* action 3: *) action := 3; 
APPEND (vmq, cvm); cvm := HEAD(vmq); REMOVE(vmq); 
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p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
[] (cvm # NIL & LEN(q[cvm]) = 0 & 
cp.id # NIL & cp.state = kcall) OR 
(cp.id # NIL & cp.state = int & -stop) -> 
(* action 4: *) action := 4; p := cp.id 
[] -stop & cvm # NIL & LEN(q[cvm]) > 0 & cp.id # NIL & 
cp.state = kcall -> 
(* action 5: *) action := 5; 
APPEND (q[cvm], cp.id); 
p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
[J--stop & cvm # NIL & LEN(qrcvm]) > 0 & cp. id = NIL -> 
(* action 6: *) action := 6; 
p := HEAD(q[cvm]); REMOVE(q[cvm]) 
END; response!newproc(p) 
[] in?enterproc(p) -> APPEND(q[vm[p]], p) 
END 
END 
END Ready; 
PROCESS Running(OUT toReady: AO; IN in: Al; 
OUT toDeviceDriver: A2); 
VAR p: INT; cp: ProcInfo; 
BEGIN cp.id := NIL; 
DO TRUE -> 
toReady!selectproc(cp); in?newproc(p); 
cp.id := p; 
IF TRUE -> cp.state := kcall; 
toDeviceDriver!doio(cp.id); cp.id := NIL 
[] TRUE -> cp.state := kcall (* non-io kcall *) 
[] TRUE -> cp. state := int (* process was interrupted 
END 
END 
END Running; 
PROCESS DeviceDriver(IN in: A2; OUT toReady: AO); 
*) 
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VAR p: INT; 
BEGIN 
P := NIL; 
DO TRUE -> in?doio(p); toReady!enterproc(p) END 
END DeviceDriver; 
BEGIN 
Ready(chO, ch1); Running(chO, ch1, ch2); 
DeviceDriver(ch2, chO) 
END GScheduler; 
A.5 The global interaction model in Promela 
#define nullproc 0 
#define qmax 3 
#define FALSE 0 
#define TRUE 1 
#define Append(q,qlength,p) \ 
d_step { q[qlength] = p; qlength = qlength+1; } 
#define HEAD(q) q[O] 
#define REMOVE(q,qlength) \ 
d_step { \ 
} 
i = 0; \ 
do \ 
.. i <= qlength-1 -> \ 
q[i] = q[i+1]; \ 
i++ \ 
i > qlength-1 -> break \ 
od;\ 
qlength = qlength-1 \ 
#define LENGTH(qlength) qlength 
mtype = {createproc, selectproc, enterproc, newproc, kcall, inter, 
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tick, startio, resume, iocomplete, doio} 
chan readyrequest = [0] 
chan runningrequest = [0] 
chan continue_chan = [0] 
chan iocommand = [0] 
chan runningtodevicedriver[2] 
chan device_iocommand 
hidden byte dummy; 
#define p1 (the_proc==1) 
#define q1 (the_proc==2) 
= [0] 
of {byte,byte} 
of {byte, byte} 
of {byte,byte} 
of {byte, byte}; 
= [0] of {byte,byte}; 
of {byte, byte}; 
proctype ready(chan request, response) 
{ 
byte p,i; 
byte q[qmax]; 
byte qlength=O; 
do :: TRUE -> 
if 
od 
.. request?selectproc(p) -> 
if 
fi 
.. qlength> 0 -> P = HEAD(q); REMOVE(q,qlength); 
response!newproc(p); 
:: qlength == 0 -> response!newproc(nullproc) 
fi 
. re'quest?ent"erprodp) .:> 
if 
.. P != nullproc -> Append(q,qlength,p); 
assert(qlength < qmax); 
p == nullproc -> skip 
fi 
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} 
proctype running(chan toready, request, tOdevicedriver, touser) 
{ 
} 
byte curprocj 
do :: TRUE -> 
if 
fi 
od 
toready!selectproc(curproc) -> 
request?newproc(curproc)j 
if 
.. curproc != nullproc -> touser!resume(curproc)j 
.. curproc -- nullproc -> /* skip */ 
fij 
request?kcall(curproc) -> 
runningtodevicedriver[O] !doio(curproc) 
request?inter(dummy) -> 
todevicedriver!iocomplete(dummy) 
proctype devicedriver(chan toready, request, todevice) 
{ 
byte curproc,id,i; 
byte rq[qmax]; 
byte rq_length=O; 
bool device_idle=TRUE; 
do .. TRUE -> 
if 
runningtodevicedriver[1-device_idle]?doio(id) -> 
curproc = id; 
todevice!startio(dummy); 
device_idle = FALSE 
runningtodevicedriver[device_idle]?doio(id) -> 
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od 
} 
if' 
Append(rq,rq_length,id) 
request?iocomplete(dummy) -> 
toready!enterproc(curproc) 
.. rq_length == 0 -> device_idle = TRUE 
rq_length> 0 -> curproc = HEAD(rq); 
REMOVE(rq,rq_length); 
todevice!startio(dummy) 
fi 
fi 
proctype device(chan torunning, 
request) 
{ 
} 
do :: TRUE -> 
request?startio(dummy); 
torunning!inter(dummy) 
od 
proctype user(byte id; chan torunning, toready, request) 
{ 
} 
toready!enterproc(id); 
do :: TRUE -> 
if : : (id 1) -> request?resume,l 
: : (id 
--
2) -> request?resume,2 
::(id 3) -> request?resume,3 
fi; 
torunning!kcall(id) 
od 
init { 
atomic { 
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} 
run ready(readyrequest,runningrequest); 
run running(readyrequest,runningrequest,iocommand,continue_chan); 
run devicedriver(readyrequest,iocommand,device_iocommand); 
run device(runningrequest,device_iocommand); 
run user(l,runningrequest,readyrequest,continue_chan); 
run user(2,runningrequest,readyrequest,continue_chan) 
} 
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